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While all houses of Australian parliaments using proportional representation 
use the Single Transferable Vote arrangement, district magnitudes (the 
numbers of members elected per division) and requirements for casting a 
formal vote vary considerably. Early chapters of this thesis analyse election 
results in search for distinct patterns of proportionality, the numbers of 
effective parties and partisan advantage under different conditions. This thesis 
argues that while district magnitude remains the decisive factor in determining 
proportionality (the higher the magnitude, the more proportional the system), 
ballot paper numbering requirements play a more important role in 
determining the number of (especially) parliamentary parties. The general 
pattern is that, somewhat paradoxically, the more freedom voters have to 
choose their own preference allocations, or lack of them, the smaller the 
number of parliamentary parties. 
 
Even numbered magnitudes in general, and six member divisions in 
particular, provide some advantage to the Liberal and National Parties, while 
the Greens are disadvantaged in five member divisions as compared to six or 
seven member divisions. The latter number appears to be the lowest at which 
no major party group has a particular advantage over the others. 
 
Later chapters of the thesis examine rates of independent and female 
representation in PR-elected houses in comparison to the corresponding 
house in the same jurisdiction elected via a majoritarian system. It is argued 
that, contrary to the arguments of some observers; independent candidates 
have a better success record in single-member houses. Women tend to 
succeed more in PR-elected houses, (as feminist writers in particular have 
argued was likely to occur) but in some cases the differences become 
miniscule once the ability of PR systems to facilitate the election of minor 
parties (such as the Greens) that are more likely to select women is factored 
out of the equation. 
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At the time of the official campaign for the 2019 federal election, this thesis 
was in the final editing stage. At the end of that process, results are still not 
final for either the House of Representatives or (especially) the Senate. 
Consequently the thesis contains no analysis of the (likely) results. However it 
was considered appropriate that some comments about the 2019 election 
should be made on this page. 
 
The author was as surprised as any seasoned observer by the result in the 
House of Representatives, which saw the Morrison Government returned to 
office with a slim majority, in defiance of all major opinion polls. However this 
result had little impact on the findings of this thesis, beyond noting that the 
continued success of independents backs up some of the findings made in 
chapter seven. 
 
The Senate is at a much earlier stage of counting; with preference counts still 
the best part of a month away at time of submission. However the indicated 
likely results appear to be bearing out some of the claims made in this thesis. 
The suggestion that the new voting system is clearly having a reductive 
impact on the number of parliamentary parties, as this thesis had argued it 
would. The likely failure of Senator Derryn Hinch to hold his seat points to the 
difficulty independents have in winning seats under STV systems with above 





Introduction: The Scope and Analysis of Proportional 
Representation 
 
The thesis will be the first exhaustive examination of Australian election 
results that have taken place under Single Transferable Vote (STV) systems 
of proportional representation. It aims to explain what general patterns, if any, 
exist under different types of STV systems used in Australia. Proportional 
Representation was first used in Tasmania in the early part of the twentieth 
century and has been used in many Australian elections over the past 
century. The analysis examines such factors as the degree of proportionality 
or lack of it, the number of effective parties existing within jurisdictions both 
before and after the introduction of proportional representation (PR), and the 
impact on levels of minor party, independent and female representation. 
 
The thesis also offers an analysis of the distribution of preferences under the 
Single Transferrable Vote (STV) systems used in Australia (both with and 
without a ticket voting option). It is argued that ticket voting, or more 
specifically, the onerous task of casting a non-ticket vote in most systems with 
ticket voting (most notably the Australian Senate between 1984 and 2014), 
weakened democratic accountability by making it easier for political parties 
and groups to manipulate the system (a practice that has become known as 
preference whispering) for their own advantage. 
 
The thesis makes an extensive study of the levels of disproportionality, and 
the number of electoral and parliamentary parties, produced by the different 
nuances of the STV system, in which the Gallagher Least Squares Index and 
the extension of the Herfimdahl-Hirschman Concentration Index1 are used as 
the measuring instruments. Later chapters referring to partisan advantage use 
the simpler comparisons of the differences in vote and seat percentages 
received by the various political parties, while chapters relating to minor party, 
 
1 For an explanation of the above index and the measurement of the number of effective 
parties that flow from it, see Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Seats and Votes: 
The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems  (New York: Yale University Press, 1989). 
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independent and female representation take a comparative statistical 
approach, and analyse success rates in a range of proportional and non- 
proportional systems. The non-proportional system used almost exclusively in 
Australia for other elections, namely preferential voting in single-member 
districts, is an excellent instrument for comparison because it is essentially a 
single transferable vote system with a district magnitude of one. 
 
Although seven of Australia’s nine parliamentary jurisdictions use the STV 
system of PR to elect members to one of their houses (Queensland and the 
Northern Territory are the two exceptions), there is a considerable level of 
variation between those systems in aspects of district magnitudes (the 
number of members elected per district, ranging from two in the Australian 
Capital Territory and Northern Territory elections to the federal Senate, to 21 
in New South Wales Legislative Council elections held since 1995). There is 
also variation on the requirements placed on voters in order to cast a valid 
vote (which have ranged from the ability to cast a single vote for one’s 
preferred party/group to a requirement to number every candidate on the 
ballot paper, and quite frequently a choice of the two alternatives mentioned 
above). 
 
While most analyses of federal elections have devoted some space to Senate 
elections (and the 2013 election was notable in in this respect),2 there is 
comparatively little research that provides an overall summary of the workings 
of the system under the different magnitude and voting method configurations 
and the effect it has on proportionality and partisan advantage. This thesis fills 
that gap and, in the case of the mainland states and the Australian Capital 
Territory, analyses important aspects of two jurisdictions that have received 
 
 
2 The most detailed analysis of the 2013 Senate election was provided by Antony Green, 
"Explaining the Results," in Abbott's Gambit: the 2013 Australian Federal Election, ed. Carol 
Johnson and John Wanna (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2015), 393-410. 
Another analysis with more historical context was provided by Malcolm Mackerras, "In 
Defence of the Present Australian Senate Electoral System," (Canberra: Australian Catholic 
University Public Policy Institute, 2013). 
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little attention. These include the level of proportionality generated, the 
number of parliamentary parties that emerge, and the democratic legitimacy of 
the outcomes produced. The thesis draws links between the above factors 
and the variations in the rules applying to the duties placed on voters to cast a 
formal vote and the options available to them for allocating their preferences. 
 
Until the 2013 Senate election, the impact of preference distributions had 
received little public attention, (although Colin Hughes and Malcolm 
Mackerras have provided analysis of preferences in individual Senate 
contests 3), but some results from 2013 brought these issues into sharp focus 
for commentators, politicians and the general public alike. Concerns among 
politicians about the rules then applying were to manifest themselves in 
changes to the voting system via the Commonwealth Electoral Amendment 
Act 2016. Following the changes introduced by this Act, the 2016 Senate 
election was conducted under new rules, and is analysed closely in Chapter 3. 
 
The thesis has, however, a much wider focus than the Senate, because all the 
states and territories using STV have their own individual quirks with different 
outcomes within them. The Victorian Legislative Council election of 2014, for 
example, replicated the pattern of the 2013 Senate election in enabling the 
election of a number of micro-parties, but elections for the upper houses in 
Western Australia (2013) and New South Wales (2015) did not. This is despite 
the WA system more closely resembling the pre-2016 Senate system than 
that of system used in Victoria since 2006. Victoria is one of the jurisdictions 
whose PR-elected house has received little analysis, and the same applies to 




3 The best examples of in-depth analysis of Senate preference counts is by the said author, 
see Colin A. Hughes, "A Close-Run Thing," in Australia at the Polls: The national elections of 
1980 and 1983, ed. Howard Penniman (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 216-47. Also 
see his contribution on the 1983 election in the same volume, titled ‘An election about 
perceptions’, 281-318. For an example of Mackerras’s analysis of a Senate election, see 
Malcolm Mackerras, The Mackerras 1993 Federal Election Guide (Canberra: Australian 
Govt. Pub. Service, 1993). 
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since the publication of Terry Newman’s wide-ranging, though not 
comprehensive, 1992 book.4 This thesis looks in more detail at the Tasmanian 
lower house and the upper house elections for other states and fills some of 
the gaps. 
 
The salience of this study is demonstrated by the fact that Australia is one of 
the few countries to use the single transferable vote system to elect either a 
national or provincial parliament. Only Ireland and Malta use the STV system 
for national elections, and Northern Ireland uses STV to elect its local 
Assembly. Two Canadian provinces (Alberta and Manitoba) used a 
combination of STV and single-member preferential voting for provincial 
elections during the middle of the twentieth century. 
 
The rarity of STV use was noted by Arend Lijphart in 1987 as an ethnic/lingual 
distinction: 
we still have a perfect social science law without any major exceptions 
– very rare in the social sciences – linking political culture with forms of 
PR. When Anglo-American countries use PR, they always choose STV; 
in other countries, the choice is list PR.5 
But soon after, in 1996, New Zealand became an exception to the rule when it 
adopted a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system (which has a list 
component). Soon afterwards, Australian commentator Malcolm Mackerras 
argued that such a system should be abandoned because it was counter to 
the political culture of New Zealand. He failed to mention Guyana as another 
exception to the first part of ‘Lijphart’s Law’, but he does mention Estonia as a 
(temporary) exception to the second part.6 Estonia used STV for its first free 
and fair election in 1990, but switched to a list system for its 1992 election, 
 
4 Terry Newman, Hare-Clark in Tasmania: Representation of All Opinions (Hobart: Joint 
Library Committee of the Parliament of Tasmania, 1992). 
5 Arend Lijphart, "The Demise of the Last Westminster System? Comments on the Report of 
New Zealand's Royal Commission on the Electoral System," Electoral Studies 6, no. 2 (1987), 
97-103. 
6 Malcolm Mackerras, "Prospects for Electoral Reform in New Zealand," in Proceedings of the 
Australasian Political Studies Association Annual Conference (University of Canterbury, 
Christchurch, 1998), 5. 
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and is thus the only case of a country making such a switch. Little information 
exists on either of these two elections, though the information that is available 
confirms the arguments made in this thesis about the types of electoral 
arrangements that assist independent candidates.7 
 
As a general rule, the countries using list systems do not allow for any 
expression of preferences beyond a voter’s first choice and, consequently, 
provide no basis for comparison with the Australian experience in this respect. 
However, the general patterns of proportionality and the numbers of parties 
produced in list systems can be compared with those of STV. Accordingly, 
New Zealand, as a near neighbour and a country sharing similarities with 
aspects of Australian political culture, is used as a direct comparison when 
analysing success rates of independent and female candidates. Ireland and 
the Canadian provinces that use or used STV also provide comparison points 
on these subjects. The fact that two distinct types of proportional 
representation system exist in the world invites the asking of an important 
question. 
 
What is Proportional Representation? 
The question, what is proportional representation, once posed as the title of a 
book by Vernon Bogdanor,8 should be considered carefully in the context of 
this thesis. This is because some clarification of what constitutes a 
proportional representation system is necessary, as both academic observers 
and politicians have differing views on the definition. Once the clarification is 
made, it is possible to make more coherent arguments about its effects. 
 
Douglas Rae gives as good a description as any of the principle behind a 
proportional representation system, namely: that the share of seats won by a 
 
 
7 Vello Pettai, Elections in Estonia 1990-1992: Transitional and Founding (Berlin: edition 
sigma, 2012). 
8 Vernon Bogdanor, What is Proportional Representation?: A Guide to the Issues (Oxford: 
Martin Robertson, 1984). 
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political party should be equal to the vote share received by that party.9 
However, as Rae himself admits, this kind of perfect proportionality is never 
achieved in practice, for a number of reasons.10 One, which Taagepera and 
Shugart have mentioned, is that while vote shares come in fractions and 
decimals, seats are allocated in whole numbers only.11 Taagepera and 
Shugart give a less strict definition: they make a specific reference to list PR 
as a system using some mathematical formula for the allocation of seats to 
parties in approximation to vote shares.12 This has tended to be the accepted 
definition of proportional representation among political scientists. It is also an 
accurate description of the Mixed Member Proportional system used in New 
Zealand and Germany and similar to the PR system used in the Netherlands 
(which provides an even purer form of PR). 
 
The single transferable vote, which is currently the only form of proportional 
representation used in Australia (though much less common worldwide) is a 
more candidate based system, although the availability of a ticket voting 
option (the ability to cast a single vote to endorse all candidates of a party in 
the order determined by the party) in many jurisdictions means these systems 
have a list component.13 By implication of placement, Taagepera and Shugart 
regard such a system as being proportional.14 Rae, in writing about the 
substantially similar Irish system, claims that STV, like any other system of 
proportional representation, “operates quite proportionally.”15 However 





9 Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1967), 28. 
10 Ibid., 29. 
11 Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, 19. 
12 Ibid., 22-23. 
13 Only the Tasmanian House of Assembly and the Australian Capital Territory do not allow 
voters the option of voting for a party ticket. The Senate and the four mainland state upper 
houses using STV allow voters to vote either for a party ticket above the line or for individual 
candidates below the line. 
14 Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, 26-27. 
15 Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 111. 
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semi-proportional system,16 and other writers have also suggested that STV 
systems using low district magnitudes should be regarded as semi- 
proportional.17 As will be seen, there are formulas available to determine how 
much any given electoral system deviates from proportionality.18 
 
Only Lijphart has specified when a system ceases to be a proportional system 
and becomes a semi-proportional one, or ceases to be a semi-proportional 
system and becomes a non-proportional one. Mackerras has adopted this 
method via use of the Gallagher Least Squares Index.19 In later chapters this 
Index will be used to measure the proportionality of electoral systems being 
examined. 
 
This thesis accepts, based on the above measure, that some systems loosely 
defined as proportional representation will often produce a semi-proportional 
result, and will on rare occasions produce a non-proportional result. Indeed, a 
central argument of this thesis is that because of the use of preferential voting 
in the STV systems, the results achieved will contain an element of both 
proportional and preferential characteristics. This thesis explores how the 
interaction of the two components of the system influence levels of 
proportionality and the number of effective parties. 
 
At the same time, attention will also be paid to the differences that can occur 
when, on the one hand, PR is used for an upper house election held in 
conjunction with a lower house election under a single member system (such 
as a standard Australian federal election), and, on the other, a PR election 
 
16 Malcolm Mackerras, “Howard's Strategy for Senate Control,” Paper prepared for 
conference ‘John Howard’s Decade’, Australian National University, Canberra, 3-4 March 
2006, 8. 
17 For example, see Rob Salmond, "Proportional Representation and Female 
Parliamentarians," Legislative Studies Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2006), 175-204. 
18 The methods used to measure levels of proportionality and disproportionality have been 
analysed by Michael Gallagher, "Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems," 
Electoral Studies 10, no. 1 (1991), 35-51. The author accepts the rationale that Gallagher’s 
own Least Squares Index is the best such measure for the reasons argued by Gallagher. 
19 Mackerras, "Howard's Plan for Senate Control". 
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held alone for a house of government, such as Tasmania (where upper house 
elections are always held separately). 
 
Tasmania and the ACT, the only jurisdictions to use STV for a lower house, 
are also the only PR elected houses not to allow the option of voting for a 
party ticket (the 1949-1983 Senate system was also of this nature but, unlike 
the former two, required voters to give a preference to every candidate in 
order to cast a valid vote). The Senate and those mainland states with an 
upper house using a form of PR gave voters a choice of voting for a party box 
above the line, or individual candidates below the line. It is argued in this 
thesis that these two distinct models produce quite different patterns of results 
in terms of levels of minor party, female and (especially) independent 
representation. At various times, Tasmania provides evidence to suggest that 
proportional representation does not always assist minor parties, 
independents or women to be elected in larger numbers. It also provides clues 
as to why certain single transferable vote systems defy the conventional 
wisdom(s). It should be noted that the Tasmanian Legislative Council, which is 
elected by preferential voting in single-member districts, has seen higher rates 
of election for Independents and (except for the 1982-92 period) women.20 
Research Questions 
PR. Proportionality and the number of parties. 
In the 1950s French political scientist Maurice Duverger formulated the ‘law’ 
that single-member plurality systems (commonly known as first past the post) 
tended to lead to a two-party system, and the ‘hypothesis’ that proportional 






20 Most of the data in relation to these two points has been collected from Terry Newman, 
Representation of the Tasmanian People: Expanded Edition, 1803-1994, Expanded [i.e. 2nd] 
ed. ([Hobart]: Tasmanian Parliamentary Library, 1994). 
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system.21 While the hypothesis was challenged at various stages over the 
following years, many analysts found a strong link between proportional 
systems and multi-party politics. Duverger, however, paid little attention to the 
importance of district magnitude or the number of parties (beyond two) that 
were likely to be elected under certain magnitudes. 
 
A little over a decade later, Douglas Rae also found a strong link between 
proportional representation and multi-party politics and advanced a 
proposition that both proportionality and the number of parliamentary parties 
tend to increase with increasing magnitude. Taagepera and Shugart argued 
the same two principal features,22 although Josep Colomer has argued more 
recently that political parties have more influence on the electoral system than 
the other way round. He also measures the number of effective parties 
produced by different electoral systems in a range of countries.23 
The argument made in this thesis is that while the link between higher 
magnitudes and larger numbers of parties might be true in an overall sense, 
the methods used for allocating preferences can be just as important, if not 
more so, than district magnitude in determining the number of parties elected 
to parliament. 
 
Much of the motivation for the writing of this thesis came about from a desire 
to explain the reasons why results sometimes produced by the STV systems 
in particular do not conform to the hypothetical model expected of them. 
Tasmania is a notable case. For nearly all of the first seventy years of its use 
in Tasmania, the Hare-Clark STV system did not result in the election of a 




21 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State 
(London: Methuen, 1964). 
22 Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes. Rae makes this claim on p.112, although the 
table on p.113 for the presented voting data tends to back up the argument being made in this 
thesis. 
23 Josep M. Colomer, "It's Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or Duverger's Laws Upside 
Down)," Political Studies 53, no. 1 (2005), 1-21. 
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national lower house elections, has also conformed to this apparent aberrant 
pattern since World War II. Results obtained in Tasmania and the Australian 
Capital Territory provide a better explanation of why Malta has remained a 
two-party system that is more sophisticated than that put forward by an 
observer of Maltese politics, namely, that voters simply prefer it that way.24 In 
particular, this thesis demonstrates that where voters have the ability (or are 
compelled) to vote for individual candidates rather than a party ticket, or can 
allow their preferences to exhaust, the number of parliamentary parties 
elected is reduced. 
 
District Magnitude, Ballot Paper Rules and Partisan Advantage 
While research by international observers such as Pippa Norris,25 Rae, and 
Taagepera and Shugart provide substantial analysis on the number of 
effective parties produced by different levels of district magnitude (DM), little 
attention is paid to the idea that different levels of district magnitude might 
favour one major party over another. Michael Gallagher, who has analysed 
the occurrence of such a phenomenon in Ireland, is a rare exception to this 
pattern.26 The first attempt to construct a general pattern in Australia was 
made by Malcolm Mackerras, who in his 1993 election guide predicted that in 
most circumstances, a normal half-Senate election electing six members per 
state, the likely distribution of seats will be a 3-3 split between parties of the 
left and parties of the right. 
 
This prediction was made on the basis of one election, but it proved to be 
accurate: in the next four elections, only one contest (New South Wales in 
1998) provided a deviating case. However, in his most valuable scholarly 
 
 
24 Wolfgang Hirczy and John C. Lane, "Malta: STV in a Two-Party System," in Elections in 
Australia, Ireland and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote; Reflections on an Embedded 
Institution 
ed. Shaun Bowler and Bernard Grofman (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 197. 
25 Pippa Norris, "Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems," 
International Political Science Review 8, no. 3 (1997), 297-312. 
26 Michael Gallagher, "Disproportionality in a Proportional Representation System: The Irish 
Experience," Political Studies 23, no. 4 (1975), 501-13. 
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contribution to knowledge of the specific issue, a paper presented at a 
conference commemorating John Howard’s tenth year as Prime Minister, 
Mackerras’s argument on the nature of the system had changed. He argued 
that Senate elections (which had developed into a pattern of six senators per 
state and two senators per territory) were in fact more likely to favour the 
coalition of Liberal and National Parties.27 
 
Research conducted for this thesis points to a strong link between six-member 
districts and Liberal-National success, with the Western Australian Legislative 
Council’s experience between 2008 and 2017 showing the strongest 
advantage. Of the previous research conducted on this jurisdiction, only Harry 
Phillips addresses the question of partisan advantage, and that only to a 
minor extent.28 
 
In more recent years the level of Liberal-National advantage in Senate 
elections has progressively dropped over time. This has been due to a 
combination of changing voter behaviour (an increasing tendency of voters to 
vote for minor and micro parties) and the recognition of the ability of such 
parties to manipulate the (pre-2016) system to their advantage via preference 
harvesting.29 In considering the 2016 Senate election, Nick Economou has 
emphasised the importance of ballot paper numbering requirements, but has 
paid little attention to district magnitude.30 
 
The difference in partisan patterns between five-member and six-member 
districts is cited as a deviation from the general rule that overall proportionality 
 
27 Mackerras, "Howard's Plan for Senate Control." 
28 Harry Phillips, Proportional Representation in Western Australia: Its Principles, History, 
Outcomes and Education (Perth: Western Australian Electoral Commission, 2012). 
29 Preference Harvesting (sometimes called “preference whispering” is the practice of using 
group voting tickets to enable (mostly small) parties to exchange preferences with each other 
in an attempt to secure election for one or more minor parties before transfer votes move to 
major parties 
30 Nick Economou, "An Instance of Cartel Behaviour: The Politics of Senate Electoral Reform 
2016," (Melbourne: Electoral Regulation Research Network/Democratic Audit of Australia, 
2016). 
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increases as district magnitude increases. However, this thesis argues that 
when district magnitude reaches seven, only at this point does the system 
become one that does not significantly favour any of the three largest parties 
over any of the others, although it might well still give them an advantage over 
the smaller parties. There appeared to be some advantage for Liberal- 
National in ten- and twelve-member districts in the Senate prior to 1990, but 
this was not the case in 2016. The eleven-member districts used for the South 
Australian Legislative Council do not appear to provide any particular 
advantage for either of the major parties. If anything, Labor has been slightly 
more over-represented than has the Liberal Party. 
 
The fact that the Australian Senate, the Tasmanian House of Assembly, the 
Western Australian Legislative Council and the ACT Legislative Assembly 
have undergone changes to the number of members elected in their districts 
at various stages means there is now a large body of evidence to assess the 
changing nature of partisan advantage over a series of elections. This 
enables an assessment of how factors other than district magnitude have 
affected results over time. This is examined in detail in Chapters two, three, 
four and five. 
 
The 2010 Victorian election threw up a deviating case: with a vote well short 
of 50%, the Liberal and National Parties won an overall majority of two in the 
Legislative Council, which uses five-member regions. This thesis explores 
whether there is any consistent pattern in the links, or whether the 
peculiarities of political geography of different jurisdictions help to explain the 
differences in patterns. 
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PR, Minor Parties and Independents 
A commonly made claim articulated, for example, by Campbell Sharman,31 
and, by implication at least, Rae,32 is that proportional representation favours 
smaller parties (and, in the case of the STV system, Independent candidates) 
at the expense of larger parties. This is, of course, partly true: it is clear, for 
example, that in recent years the Australian Greens have made gains under 
proportional representation systems that would not have been possible under 
a single-member system. However, it is important to note that once some 
success in PR-elected houses was achieved, success in the corresponding 
single-member house often followed several elections later. If Sharman’s 
general point is applied to state politics, however, the picture is more complex 
than he suggests. Some counter examples do exist, either in the case of 
parties not doing as well as might be expected under PR systems (such as 
the Democratic Labor Party), or failing to achieve the success under a PR 
system that had been achieved under a single-member system (such as 
Katter’s Australian Party). 
 
In relation to independents, it is argued here that Sharman’s claim is wrong. 
The evidence from Australia suggests that independent candidates are just as 
likely, if not more likely, to win seats in a single-member preferential system 
as in a proportional system. It is not claimed, however, that certain aspects of 
some proportional systems do not sometimes assist independents. Newman 
devoted almost half a chapter of his 1992 book to the success of 
independents under Hare-Clark in Tasmania, although the question mark 




31 Campbell Sharman, "The Representation of Small Parties and Independents," in 
Representation and Institutional Change: 50 Years of Proportional Representation in the 
Senate, ed. Marian Sawer and Sarah Miskin (Canberra: Department of the Senate, 1999), 
149-158. 
. See also Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. 
32 Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 180. Differential Proposition Five 
claims that ‘Plurality and majoritarian formulae tend to eliminate a larger number of small 
parties than proportional representation formulae. 
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system assisted independents.33 Later research by Costar and Curtin 
(Australia-wide), and Dawn Brancati (worldwide) attempted to construct 
general theories on what constitutes independent-friendly conditions,34 with 
Brancati’s claim that candidate-centred electoral systems favour independents 
the most compelling so far.35 This thesis aims to refine the above argument to 
Australian conditions, taking account of major and minor differences in 
electoral rules applying in various Australian jurisdictions. 
 
PR and Female Representation 
Proportional representation has also been seen by its supporters as a way of 
getting more women elected.36 This position has received some support in 
academic literature both in Australia and overseas, and has also received 
some criticism from, for example, former UK MP and current member of the 
House of Lords, Peter Hain, has suggested that cultural factors (most notably 
the strength of feminist movements and the influence of religions with male 
chauvinist traditions) are more important.37 
 
It is argued in this thesis that while the Australian experience suggests women 
do somewhat better in proportional systems than single-member preferential 
ones, the perceived importance of a particular house, the propensity of certain 
minor parties to select women in winnable seats, and the Labor Party’s 
adoption of affirmative action policies have also had a significant impact on 






33 Newman, Hare-Clark in Tasmania, 229-50. 
34 Brian J. Costar and Jennifer Curtin, Rebels with a Cause: Independents in Australian 
Politics, (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2004) and Dawn Brancati, "Winning 
Alone: The Electoral Fate of Independents Worldwide" The Journal of Politics 70, no. 3 
(2008), 648-62. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Janine Haines, Suffrage to Sufferance: A Hundred Years of Women in Politics (North 
Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992). 
37 Peter Hain, Proportional Misrepresentation: The Case Against PR in Britain (Aldershot: 
Wildwood House, 1986). 
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PR and Stability 
While this thesis is not primarily focussed upon the relationship between PR 
and political stability, it is, nevertheless, worth making a brief comment. The 
potential for instability has long been seen by PR critics as systemic defect. 
This is because of the greater likelihood that PR elections will not produce a 
majority for a single party. The earliest (and most strident) proponent of this 
viewpoint was Ferdinand Hermens, who argued (during World War II) that the 
instability created by Germany’s proportional representation system after 
World War I had facilitated the rise of Adolf Hitler.38 Many years later, 
Bogdanor condemned this argument as a fallacy.39 
 
Suggestions of a link between proportional representation and instability have 
appeared in more recent research. For example, in the early 1970s Rae’s 
cross-national study found that PR-elected cabinets lasted for shorter periods 
than did plurality-majority cabinets. 40 In the early 1990s, Catt et al suggested 
that New Zealanders who feared instability under proportional representation 
had “a justifiable concern”.41 Some commentators (more frequently 
economists rather than political scientists) go further: they argue that when 
used in upper houses (in Australia), PR can lead to a thwarting of the 
democratic will of the people, and at other times that they hinder good 
government. The most notable example in Australia was former economics 
journalist Alan Wood,42 with Graeme Hunt being the strongest advocate for a 







38 Ferdinand Hermens, Democracy or Anarchy? A Study of Proportional Representation 
(South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1941). 
39 Bogdanor, What is Proportional Representation?, 102. 
40 Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. 
41 Helena Catt, Voters' Choice: Electoral Change in New Zealand? (Palmerston North: 
Dunmore, 1992), 63. 
42 Alan Wood, "Politics of Obstruction," The Australian, 9 February 1999, 13. 
43 Graeme Hunt, Why MMP Must Go: The Case for Ditching the Electoral Disaster of the 
Century (Auckland: Waddington, 1998). 
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The arguments raised by Hunt and especially Wood stray into the field of 
economics rather than political science, thus falling outside the scope of the 
core argument. This thesis does, however, note that a cross-national study by 
Arend Lijphart, found that, contrary to the claims of many PR critics, countries 
using proportional representation (Lijphart calls them ‘consensus 
democracies)’ generally perform better on economic and social indicators than 
do countries using plurality-majoritarian systems.44 Mackerras argues that a 
causal link is difficult to prove.45 
 
Concerns about PR thwarting the democratic will of the people have also 
gained some currency among Australian political players. Former Labor 
minister Fred Daly (in his post-retirement memoirs),46 and former Liberal Party 
Senate Whip Helen Coonan (as part of a commemorative compilation),47 both 
stressed the negative consequences of having a Senate elected by 
proportional representation. Their concerns had different origins: Daly’s 
anxieties related to the Senate’s blocking of supply during the period of the 
Whitlam Government (1972-75),48 while Coonan’s were based around the 
blocking of what she saw as positive economic reforms by the 1996-98 
Senate. The issue was still of concern to the Howard Government as late as 
2003 (by which time Coonan was a minister), when it sponsored a report 





44 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty Six 
Countries, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 255-73. 
45 Mackerras, personal conversation with author, 4 June 2018. 
46 Fred Daly, From Curtin to Hawke (South Melbourne: Sun Books, 1984), 52. 
47 Helen Coonan, "Survival of the Fittest: Future Directions of the Senate," in Representation 
and Institurional Change: 50 Years of Proportional Representation in the Senate, ed. Marian 
Sawer and Sarah Miskin (Canberra: Department of the Senate, 1999). 
48 The most comprehensive account of the 1975 constitutional crisis and the events that 
preceded it is provided by Paul Kelly, November 1975: The Inside Story of Australia's 
Greatest Political Crisis (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1995). Also see Laurie Oakes, 
Crash Through or Crash: The Unmaking of a Prime Minister (Richmond, Victoria: Drummond, 
1976). The latter book was written in the immediate aftermath of the crisis and is therefore, in 
the author’s opinion, more emotionally charged and less scholarly. 
49 Commonwealth of Australia, Resolving Deadlocks: A discussion paper on section 57 of the 
Australian Constitution (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2003). 
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On the supply issue, this thesis notes that, of the nine occasions between 
1967 and 1998 when a supply crisis occurred, in only two cases (at federal 
level in 1974 and 1975) was a PR-elected upper house responsible for 
blocking supply. Seven of the other cases involved conflict between lower and 
upper houses both elected via plurality or majoritarian methods, while the 
other (Tasmania in 1948) saw a lower house government elected by PR 
having its supply blocked by an upper house elected under a majoritarian 
system.50 
 
On the issue of blocking or seeking to amend legislation, this thesis 
acknowledges that some (mostly state) governments may not have had the 
same easy passage of their legislation through upper houses as was often the 
case in a pre-PR period. However, it is also argued that government carries 
on nonetheless, and therefore there is no substantive issue of stability. 
 
The other opportunity for instability in any parliament is where no party holds a 
majority in the house of government. Because such a scenario is more likely 
to occur in a PR-elected house than a plurality / majoritarian one, the former 
method, so its critics say, is more likely to produce instability than the latter 
when so used. 
 
This thesis notes that, in the first half of the twentieth century, Tasmania had a 
remarkable record of governments holding majorities and or lasting their full 
term: except for the 1948 supply crisis, only in 1912 was a parliament 
dissolved a year or more ahead of schedule, and that only because of party 
defections. Such a phenomenon is even more remarkable considering the 
obvious potential, as happened in the 1950s, for a 30 member house elected 





50 For an account of these supply crises and their eventual resolution, see Geoff Gallop, A 
State of Reform: Essays for a Brighter Future (Perth: Helm Wood, 1998), 17-27. 
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This thesis concedes that hung parliaments and early elections became more 
frequent in Tasmania after the Greens’ arrival, but it is also noted that South 
Australia, whose lower house is closest to Tasmania in terms of numbers, has 
elected more hung parliaments than Tasmania over the last sixty years. 
 
The other two antipodean jurisdictions using proportional representation to 
elect their house of government show a very strong pattern of stability: of the 
sixteen elections held in the ACT and New Zealand since PR’s adoption, all of 
the parliaments elected have lasted a full term, give or take a month or two, 
and only the 1989-92 ACT parliament saw a mid-term change of government. 
Ireland and especially Malta also conform to a pattern of rare early elections.51 
 
 
Previous Research on Proportional Representation 
 
 
Proportional Representation theorists (nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries) 
Narelle Miragliotta has noted that Thomas Hill (an English schoolmaster) was 
the first person to devise a (STV) system of proportional representation, and 
that his ideas were later refined by Danish mathematician Carl Andre and 
English Barrister Thomas Hare, working independently of each other.52 Jack 
Wright also acknowledges Hill’s contribution to knowledge and use of STV.53 
The works of both men were totally theoretical in nature: at the time of their 
writing in the 1850s, no major democracy used proportional representation at 
national or provincial level. Both men died in the 1890s and consequently did 
not live to see the systems they advocated put into practice. 
 
51 Ian Gorvin, ed., Elections Since 1945: A Worldwide Reference Compendium (London: St 
James Press, 1989), 168-72; David M. Farrell, Electoral Systems: A Comparative 
Introduction, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 121-52, and Wolfgang Hirczy and John Lane, 
“Malta: STV in a Two-Party System, in Elections in Australia, Ireland, and Malta under the 
Single Transferable Vote, ed. Shaun Bowler and Bernard Grofman (Michigan: The University 
of Michigan Press, 2000), 178-204. 
52 Narelle Miragliotta, Determining the Result: Transferring Surplus Votes in the Western 
Australian Legislative Council (Perth: Western Australian Electoral Commission, 2002), 1. 
53 J. F. H. Wright, Mirror of the Nation's Mind: Australia's Electoral Experiments (Sydney: Hale 
& Iremonger, 1980). 
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Hare’s original 1857 work, Machinery of Representation, advocated the 
representation of Britain as one whole constituency. Under Hare’s original 
idea, the quota for election was to be determined by dividing the number of 
votes cast by the number of members to be elected, with the surplus seats to 
be distributed at random. (A similar system is used nowadays to elect national 
parliaments in the Netherlands and Israel.) Later works by Hare suggested 
that the adoption of proportional representation would reduce levels of 
corruption within government.54 
 
Hare’s ideas were enthusiastically advocated by English thinker and politician 
John Stuart Mill, one of whose major concerns in relation to this thesis was, in 
an era of campaigns for greater voting rights, to find a method to prevent the 
domination of the educated minority by a poor, uneducated majority.55 Mill had 
views about the (lack of) extension of voting rights that would be an anathema 
to modern-day liberals and social democrats, but said little about electoral 
mechanics beyond support for Hare’s original idea of a single nationwide 
constituency. 
 
Electoral mechanics were, however, at the forefront of the thinking of 
Australian advocates of proportional representation, most notably South 
Australian writer Catherine Helen Spence and Tasmanian lawyer Andrew 
Inglis Clark. They were writing in the context of limited use of proportional 
representation methods (until 1897, PR was only being used in some local 
government elections), but they had begun to address their minds to 
questions such as the number of members to be elected per district, a 
concept later to be known as district magnitude. In 1893 Spence turned her 
attention to the question of district magnitude, and asserted the belief that “no 
 
 
54 Newman, Hare-Clark in Tasmania, 11-12. Newman does not elaborate on why Hare 
thought PR would reduce levels of corruption. 
55 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, (London: Longman, 
1865). 
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constituency should be less than to return six men. I should prefer seven or 
eight.”56 
 
There are two striking aspects about this observation. First, Spence was 
writing before her campaign to enfranchise women had success in South 
Australia (hence her reference to men). Second, Spence’s preferred minimum 
magnitude of seven also happens to be the magnitude, it will be argued, when 
no major party enjoys a particular advantage over any other major party. 
Spence could not have known this as Australia’s organised political parties 
were still in their infancy, but her comments, viewed from over one hundred 
years later, show remarkable foresight. 
 
Other Australians of the time, such as Victorian mathematics professor 
Edward Nanson and the Ashworth brothers, showed interest in electoral 
matters, but in international terms, electoral systems study, for the first half of 
the twentieth century at least, were what Lijphart was later to refer to as ‘an 
underdeveloped field’.57 The small volume of research published in the 
immediate post-WWII period had the weakness of being very polemical in 
nature, either in support of it, (such as Hoag),58 or against it (such as 
Hermens).59 
 
The first attempt to construct a general theory about electoral systems to be 
applied cross-nationally was by Maurice Duverger in 1951, and the first 
English translation was not published in until 1954.60 As noted above, he 
proposed two theories, one of which was called a ‘law’, and the other a 
‘hypothesis’. The law, as he saw it, was that single-member plurality systems 




56 Catherine Helen Spence, "Effective Voting," (Adelaide: Burden & Bonython, 1893). 
57 Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, 47. 
58 C.G. Hoag and G.H .Hallett, Proportional Representation (New York: MacMillan, 1926). 
59 Hermens, Democracy or Anarchy? 
60 Duverger, Political Parties. 
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double-ballot systems and multi-member proportional representation systems 
tended to lead to multi-party systems. 
 
The first attempt to disprove Duverger’s theories was made by J.G. Grumm, 
who argued that in many cases, existing party systems had an influence on 
choice of electoral system rather than the other way round.61 Colomer made a 
similar argument many years later.62 On the other hand, William Riker and 
Giovanni Sartori attempted a refinement of ‘Duverger’s Law’ in search of a 
general explanation for occurrences of a multi-party polities in spite of 
plurality-majority electoral systems.63 In turn, and later, Duverger himself 
attempted a revision of his original theory in light of developments over the 
previous forty years.64 
 
In the meantime, Douglas Rae produced a cross-national study (first 
published in 1967, but referred to in this thesis as 1971 edition).65 As well as 
coining the term ‘district magnitude’, Rae advanced a series of propositions 
about how electoral systems operated similarly to, as well as different from, 
other electoral systems across 20 democracies. Rae also coined the term 
‘manufactured majorities’, in other words, a situation whereby a party can win 
a majority of seats without winning a majority of votes. Rae argued that both 
proportional representation systems as well as plurality systems, could 
produce such a phenomenon. As will be seen, there are number of examples 
of Australian PR elections producing such majorities, for example the 2004 
Senate election. This thesis examines the circumstances under which they 
occur. 
 
61 J.G. Grumm, "Theories of Electoral Systems," Midwest Journal of Political Science 2 
(1958), 357-76. 
62 Colomer, "It's Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or Duverger's Laws Upside Down)". 
63 William Riker, "Duverger's Law Revisited," in Electoral Laws and Their Political 
Consequences, ed. Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), 
19-42. 
64 Maurice Duverger, "Duverger's Law Forty Years Later," in Electoral Laws and Their Political 
Consequences, ed. Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), 
69-84. 
65 Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. 
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Not long after the publication of Rae’s later edition, Enid Lakeman published 
How Democracies Vote,66 and followed it some years later with Power to 
Elect.67 While the first, because of its coverage of both proportional and non- 
proportional systems, is much longer, both make strong cases in favour of 
proportional representation. Lakeman picks out the major strengths, as she 
sees them, of the two types of PR systems, with list systems being seen as 
providing fair shares for political parties, and STV systems as giving voters 
greater control over who is elected to parliament.68 
 
A series of publications about electoral systems (the first few pertaining to 
Duverger’s theories) was compiled in the 1980s by Bernard Grofman and 
Arend Lijphart.69 Rein Taagepera and Mathew Shugart published Seats and 
Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems in 1989.70 In it they 
accepted the general thrust of Duverger’s hypotheses, but attempt a 
refinement via logarithmic equations and consideration of issue dimensions. 
One chapter is of particular interest: it is called ‘[m]agnitude: the decisive 
factor’.71 The authors argue that until then, magnitude had received less 
attention than it should have. This thesis similarly argues that, the work of 
Mackerras excepted, district magnitude has also received less attention in 
Australia than it should have. Taagepera and Shugart detail many useful 
statistical indices, for example a method for calculating the number of effective 
parties in a political system. They also confirm Rae’s earlier finding that 
proportionality tends to increase with increasing magnitude. This thesis goes 
further and argues that, in the Australian context, preference allocation rules 
can play just as important a role. 
 
 
66 Enid Lakeman, How Democracies Vote: A Study of Electoral Systems, 4th rev. ed. 
(London: Faber, 1974). 
67 Enid Lakeman, Power to Elect: The Case for Proportional Representation (London: 
Heinemann, 1982), 54. 
68 Ibid., 80. 
69 Grofman and Lijphart, eds, Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences. 
70 Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes. 
71 Ibid., 112-25. 
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Writers that followed Taagepera and Shugart tend to have a nation or system 
specific focus rather than a cross-national one. Shaun Bowler and Bernard 
Grofman’s edited work, Elections in Australia, Ireland and Malta under the 
Single Transferable Vote, and Matthew Shugart and Martin Wattenberg (eds) 
Mixed Member Electoral Systems72 are the most notable examples of such an 
approach. Colomer’s 2006 paper is an exception, as was that of Pippa 
Norris.73 Both Colomer and Norris attempted to establish a link between 
electoral systems, proportionality and the number of effective parties. In 2012, 
Lijphart’s Patterns of Democracy pays some attention to, among other things, 
the link between district magnitude and proportionality in electoral systems. 74 
 
A different approach is taken in a slightly earlier book, David Farrell’s Electoral 
Systems: A Comparative Introduction.75 For each specific electoral system, 
Farrell picks out one particular jurisdiction that uses the system and lists a 
series of election results under that system before devoting later chapters to 
general issues of electoral systems, including stability. His chapter on Ireland 
is the most useful for the purposes of this thesis because that country’s use of 
the Single Transferable Vote system makes it a valuable tool of comparative 
analysis. 
 
Work on STV Electoral Systems in Australia 
At the time of the adoption of proportional representation for Senate elections 
in 1949, only two Australian jurisdictions, Tasmania (House of Assembly since 
1909) and New South Wales (Legislative Assembly 1920-1925) had used PR. 
It is not surprising there was little research on the practical workings of PR 
systems in Australia. It was not until 1980, by which time the NSW and South 
 
 
72 Matthew Soberg Shugart and Martin Wattenberg, eds, Mixed Member Electoral Systems: 
The Best of Both Worlds? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
73 Norris, "Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems." 
74 Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy. 
75 David M. Farrell, Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2001). 
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Australian Legislative Councils and the Australian Capital Territory Legislative 
Assembly had joined the PR family, that an Australia-wide analysis of PR (and 
other electoral systems too) was published in book form, when the president 
of the NSW branch of the Proportional Representation Society, J.F.H. Wright, 
published Mirror of the Nation’s Mind: Australia’s Electoral Experiments.76 
 
Wright examined the systems that were used to elect Senators before the 
adoption of PR in 1948, casting a poor light on their fairness, and then later 
making references to the operation of PR in the Senate and in Tasmania. The 
book is very much an argument for what Wright calls the quota preferential 
system (but is generally called the Single Transferable Vote). Wright also 
advocates the use of having an odd number of members to ensure that a 
party winning more votes than another party can win more seats.77 
 
Other Australian works that offer analysis of multiple jurisdictions include 
those of Colin Hughes, who covers the Senate, Tasmania and New South 
Wales, and David Farrell et al, in which the co-authors assess the workings of 
all Australian jurisdictions using STV (only Victoria’s Legislative Council has 
introduced PR since its publication), and also covering Ireland and Malta.78 
The authors examine the various STV jurisdictions and assess their 
performance in terms of proportionality, levels of democratic choice and the 
ability of certain systems to produce manufactured majorities.79 
 
Results of individual Senate elections in the last three decades of the 
twentieth century received some detailed analysis from Hughes and 




76 Wright, Mirror of the Nation's Mind. 
77 Ibid., 149. 
78 David M. Farrell, Malcolm Mackerras, and Ian McAllister, "Designing Electoral Institutions: 
STV Systems and their Consequences," Political Studies 44, no. 1 (1996), 24-43. 
79 Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. 
80 Mackerras, The Mackerras 1993 Federal Election Guide. This edition gave an extensive 
analysis of the unusual results of the 1990 Senate election. 
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of Senate elections since the adoption of PR was a 1999 conference 
commemorating fifty years of proportional representation in the Senate, at 
which several noted academics, as well as then serving and former politicians, 
presented papers which were later published as a book edited by Marian 
Sawer.81 
 
Mackerras made a most valuable contribution to knowledge of Senate 
elections in a paper presented at a 2006 conference commemorating John 
Howard’s tenth year as Prime Minister.82 He explains how Howard was able to 
obtain a majority in the Senate after the 2004 election in spite of falling well 
short of 50% of the vote in that chamber’s election. 
 
In more recent years, the unusual results of the 2013 Senate election 
produced a greater than usual interest among academic observers and 
journalists alike. Mackerras made his usual substantial contribution, and he 
was joined in debate by ABC election analyst Antony Green, who had a 
different point of view,83 and Victorian academic Nick Economou.84 Also 
making a contribution to the debate, via their blogs, were Tasmanian 
academic Kevin Bonham, and Perth-based William Bowe (writing as ‘the Poll 
Bludger’).85  
 
A slightly earlier book, Australian Electoral System: Origins, Variations and 
Consequences by Farrell and McAllister, makes general claims about STV,  
 
81 Marian Sawer and Sarah Miskin, eds, Representation and Institutional Change: 50 Years of 
Proportional Representation in the Senate, vol. 34, Papers on Parliament (Canberra: 
Department of the Senate, 1999). 
82 Mackerras, "Howard's Plan for Senate Control". 
83 Antony Green, Is it Time for a Fundamental Review of the Senate’s Electoral System?, 
Papers on Parliament (Canberra: Australian Senate, 2014). 
84 Economou, "An Instance of Cartel Behaviour". 
85 Bonham’s blog can be found at http://kevinbonham.blogspot.com.au, while Bowe’s can be 
found at https://www.pollbludger.net/. 
26  
noting its rarity, and also makes a rudimentary summary of the various STV 
systems operating in Australia. However, little detailed analysis is provided. 86 
 
Works about the Australian states 
The most comprehensive study of the operation of the Hare-Clark system in 
Tasmania was published in 1992 by Tasmania’s parliamentary librarian, Terry 
Newman.87 Earlier work on Tasmania tended to focus on individual elections 
rather than the overall picture, but there were two exceptions in the work of 
Wilfrid Townsley and Sharman et al, the latter also focussing on Western 
Australia.88 A focus of the former work that is addressed in this thesis was 
Townsley’s attempts to find an explanation why, at the time of writing, minor 
parties had not been able to flourish under Hare-Clark, while independents 
had.89 In the last twenty years the pattern has reversed: this will be discussed 
further in chapter seven. 
 
Three publications have analysed the use of proportional representation in the 
Western Australian Legislative Council since 1989. Mike Pepperday’s 
Masters’ Thesis90 and Narelle Miragliotta’s document written on behalf of the 
Western Australian Electoral Commission91 were both published in 2002, and 
hence do not cover the move to six-member districts after the 2005 election. 
Harry Phillips’ pamphlet, Proportional Representation in Western Australia, 
covers the 2008 election, but not that of 2013 or 2017. 92 This thesis fills that 
gap in the literature, and also provides some analysis of the Victorian 
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Legislative Council and the ACT Legislative Assembly, both of which have 
received little, if any, attention. 
 
Writings on Overseas Comparisons: Ireland and Malta 
The above countries are useful points of comparison with Australia because of 
their long-term use STV at the national level. Writings on New Zealand 
elections, especially those held after the adoption of a mixed member 
proportional system, are less useful because they do not deal with issues 
relating to district magnitude and preference allocation rules, although some 
offer useful insights on how different electoral systems affect minor party and 
independent success rates. 
 
Michael Gallagher has devoted much of his academic work to the study of 
single transferable vote systems, with the greatest emphasis placed on 
elections in Ireland. One of Gallagher’s articles attempts to analyse which 
political parties are favoured by particular district magnitudes.93 That is 
something that has not been substantially analysed in Australia, and 
something this thesis will address. Gallagher’s more recent research includes 
a more general analysis of proportionality in STV systems, an analysis of MP 
turnover in Ireland, and also covers Malta.94 Gallagher’s most valuable 
contribution for the purposes of this thesis is the devising of the Gallagher 
Least Squares Index, which is used to measure the level of disproportionality 
at a single election, or series of elections, under any given electoral system. 
 
Malta has remained a strictly two-party polity since 1966, which makes it quite 
atypical among STV jurisdictions which, for the most part, have allowed for the 
election of minor parties, independent candidates or both. It also continues to 
have a very low percentage of female MPs. Two studies analysing the latter 
 
93 Gallagher, "Disproportionality in a Proportional Representation System". 
94 Michael Gallagher, "The (Relatively) Victorious Incumbent Candidate under PR-STV: 
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two phenomena have been written: one by Wolfgang Hirczy and John Lane,95 
dealing mostly with electoral mechanics and the representation of parties, 
while the other, written by Hirczy alone, argues against the proposition that 
STV systems assist women.96 
 
The most useful book on New Zealand’s electoral reforms is by Catt et al, 
published in the early stages of the referendum process which resulted in the 
adoption of MMP. In summarising the features of the alternative electoral 
systems, the book provides insights into the likely impact of each on partisan 
representation. A 1998 conference paper written by Mackerras, in which MMP 
is criticised because of the way it assists some parties and hurts others, and 
argues that an STV or parallel system would be much fairer, gives other 
relevant research on the NZ reforms.97 
 
Election-specific publications from New Zealand provide minimal analysis of 
the issues analysed in this thesis. A study of the 1996 election edited by Jack 
Vowles98 and the study of the 1999 election, also co-edited by Vowles, pay 
next to no attention to partisan impact,99 and the same is true of the Vowles et 
al 2002 election compilation.10 
 
 
95 Hirczy and Lane, "Malta: STV in a Two-Party System". 
96 Wolfgang Hirczy, "STV and the Representation of Women," Political Science and Politics 
28, no. 4 (1995), 711-15. 
97 Mackerras, "Prospects for Electoral Reform in New Zealand". 
98 Jack Vowles, Voters' Victory?: New Zealand's First Election Under Proportional 
Representation (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998). 
99 Jack Vowles et al., Proportional Representation on Trial: The 1999 New Zealand General 
Election and the Fate of MMP (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2002). What attention is 
devoted to the mechanics of the electoral system (in Chapters 5 & 6) analyses the impact of 
tactical and split ticket voting. 
100 Jack Vowles et al., Voters' Veto:The 2002 Election in New Zealand and the Consolidation 
of Minority Government (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2004). 
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Election Statistics 
In addition to official election returns, this thesis has been assisted by the 
books of Australian election result summaries provided by Colin Hughes,101 
and information on overseas elections provided by Ian Garvin and Adam 
Carr.102 Unfortunately there is a seven-year gap in the election statistics 
provided by the two, although for the three principal overseas countries 
mentioned, official and unofficial sources are sufficient to fill in the gaps. 
 
Theoretical Framework and Methods 
This thesis will examine a range of arguments relating to proportional 
representation and its use in various jurisdictions in Australia. It will also 
challenge many of the assumptions about it that currently appear in the 
literature. This will be achieved through detailed studies of the Australian PR 


























101 The first of these was Colin A. Hughes and B. D. Graham, A Handbook of Australian 
Government and Politics, vol. 1 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1968). 
Hughes published three further volumes under this title, the fourth volume covering elections 
held up to and including 1999. 






District Magnitude, Proportionality and the Number of Parties 
 
 
The Importance of district magnitude (defined as the number of members to 
be elected in a district or series of districts) is well recognized in international 
political science literature. The term was first used by Douglas Rae in 1967,1 
although, as Taagepera and Shugart have pointed out,2 the number of 
members elected per district was of interest to political scientists before Rae 
undertook his cross-national empirical analysis.3 In 1975 Michael Gallagher 
wrote about the impact of district magnitude on the partisan composition of the 
Irish lower house (the Dail). Taagepera and Shugart have called it ‘the 
decisive factor’ in one of their chapters,4 while Malcolm Mackerras drew 
attention to its importance in determining results of Australian Senate 
elections in books5 and articles6 he has written on federal elections, as well as 
referring to district magnitude in an article on British and New Zealand 
politics.7 Mackerras was also a co-author of a 1998 article by Farrell et al., 
which argued the vital importance of district magnitude in elections conducted 
under an STV electoral system,8 citing evidence from Australia, Ireland and 
Malta. 
 
It is notable, however, that before Rae and since Taagepera and Shugart, 
overseas writers have placed much less emphasis on district magnitude as a 
decisive factor. Duverger refers to district magnitude only indirectly in his 
original ‘law’ and paid little attention to its effects beyond a distinction between 
single-member and multi-member systems. Gallagher also made only brief 
 
 
1 Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. 
2 Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, 55. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Mackerras, The Mackerras 1993 Federal Election Guide. 
6 Mackerras, "Howard's Plan for Senate Control". 
7 Mackerras, "Prospects for Electoral Reform in New Zealand". 
8 Farrell, Mackerras, and McAllister, "Designing Electoral Institutions". 
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reference to it in a 1991 article, and there is only oblique reference to district 
magnitude in an article by Norris.9 A more recent paper by Colomer 
deliberately downplayed the importance of district magnitude, although noting 
that a small number of large parties prefer a system with lower magnitudes,10 
and a large number of small parties prefer a higher magnitude system. 
 
Australian writers apart from Mackerras have tended to focus more on ballot 
paper numbering requirements than on magnitude. Antony Green 
emphasised the confusion created by the compulsory preferences/ticket 
voting system used for the Senate in his review of the 2013 Senate 
election.11 He adopted the same approach in a 2014 public lecture delivered 
in Canberra.12 Nick Economou also paid very little attention to district 
magnitude in a paper written after changes were made to the Senate voting 
system.13 
 
The impact that differing district magnitudes have had on state (and the 
Australian Capital Territory) elections in Australia has received virtually no 
attention, and this thesis aims to address a significant gap in the literature by 
assessing what partisan advantage, if any, has accrued from such 
magnitudes in various PR elections. In one of the few studies carried out that 
related to a particular Australian jurisdiction, the workings of the Western 
Australian Legislative Council since the adoption of proportional 
representation for the 1989 election, Harry Phillips does not refer specifically 
to the impact of changes to levels of district magnitude that took place after 
the 2005 election.14 
 
 
9 Norris, "Choosing Electoral Systems". 
10 Colomer, "It's Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or Duverger's Laws Upside Down)". 
11 Green, "Explaining the Results". 
12 Green, Is it Time for a Fundamental Review of the Senate’s Electoral System? 
13 Economou, "An Instance of Cartel Behaviour". Economou has also voiced his opinions in a 
public lecture. See Nick Economou, "Above the Line: Changes to the Way We Vote for the 
Senate," (Melbourne: University of Melbourne, Electoral Regulation Research Network 
Newsletter, October 2016). 
14 Phillips, Proportional Representation in Western Australia. 
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A central argument of this thesis is that while district magnitude is an 
important factor in determining the partisan composition of a parliament 
elected under STV, the system has a preferential component as well as a 
proportional one and, consequently, laws relating to the distribution of these 
preferences can have an equal or bigger impact upon outcomes, especially in 
relation to the overall proportionality of the system and the number of parties 
elected to parliament. The results of the 2013 Senate election and some state 
elections held subsequently illustrate the fundamental importance of a ticket 
voting option, or the lack of such an option, and the question of whether 
preference distributions are optional or compulsory. 
 
In the 2013 Senate election, three parties that had never previously won a 
seat in federal parliament were elected. This caused much angst among 
major party politicians, who in 2014 suggested certain legislative changes to 
the system to reduce the chance of micro parties being elected15. Many of 
these changes were legislated for by Malcolm Turnbull six months after 
becoming Prime Minister, via the Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Act 
2016. In addition to analysing the success or otherwise of various parties, this 
chapter will analyse the impact of voting requirements and counting methods 
on the success or otherwise of minor parties and micro parties. 
 
New South Wales and South Australia differ from the other Australian 
jurisdictions in that they use state-wide PR, with staggered terms for the 
Legislative Councils. The other jurisdictions have divided their state or territory 
into regions, enabling them to elect all members at one time. The staggered 
terms in NSW and SA ensure that the quota for election is not considered too 
low and reflects earlier concerns about the perceived value of overlapping 




15 Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Second Interim 
Report on the Inquiry into the Conduct of the 2013 Federal Election: An Assessment of 
Electronic Voting Options, 2014. 
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Later chapters examine questions regarding which parties are advantaged or 
disadvantaged by different magnitudes, so this chapter concentrates on the 
effect of district magnitude and ballot paper numbering requirements on the 
number of electoral and parliamentary parties emerging in different 
circumstances. It examines in greater detail the impact the changes in district 
magnitude in Tasmania have had on that state’s three main parties, and the 
apparent deviating case thrown up by Victoria which, at the 2010 election at 
least, produced a situation where the Liberal and National Parties enjoyed an 
advantage in spite of an apparently unfavourable district magnitude of five. 
 
Wright has suggested that the multiplicity of parties alleged to occur under 
proportional representation systems actually applies only to list systems, 
because of the inability of a voter to distinguish between the candidates of 
their preferred party that they like and those that they do not.16 Enid Lakeman 
makes the same point more cautiously: she suggests (in the context of Israeli 
politics) that party list systems do not discourage the emergence of many 
parties, while STV systems probably would.17 
 
The Range of Magnitudes 
At a federal level the magnitudes used in the Senate have ranged from a low 
of two (in the two represented territories since 1975) to a maximum of twelve 
in the various states at the double dissolution elections of 1987 and 2016. By 
far the most common magnitudes used in Senate elections since 1949 have 
been five (for half-Senate elections between 1953 and 1980) and six (at all 
half-Senate elections since 1990 and occasionally in the pre-1974 period). 
The other magnitudes used have been seven (at the transition elections of 
1949 and 1984) and ten (at the double dissolution elections of 1951, 1974, 






16 Wright, Mirror of the Nation's Mind, 146. 
17 Lakeman, Power to Elect, 78. 
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In the states, five, six and seven have been the most popular numbers of 
members per district. Since the adoption of state-wide Hare-Clark in 1909, the 
Tasmanian House of Assembly has used, at various times, five-, six- and 
seven-member districts, though always the same number per district at any 
particular election. The Victorian Legislative Council has used five-member 
districts for every election since 2006, while the ACT Legislative Assembly 
and the WA Legislative Council (from 1989 to 2005) have used a combination 
of five- and seven-member districts. Western Australia reverted to solely six- 
member districts for the 2008 election, while the ACT used solely five-member 
districts at the 2016 election. 
 
The other, less common, numbers to be used have been three, eleven, fifteen 
and twenty-one. The New South Wales Legislative Assembly used a 
combination of three-member and five-member districts during its brief 
flirtation with STV in the 1920s, while that state’s Legislative Council has used 
15-member districts (from 1978 to 1991) and 21-member districts (since 
1995). The South Australian Legislative Council has used eleven-member 
districts to elect its Legislative Council since 1975. 
 
By definition, single member electorates are not proportional, and two- and 
three-member electorates using plurality systems have been used for both the 
federal Senate (before 1949, and the South Australian House of Assembly 
(before 1938) and the Legislative Council (before 1975). These types of 
systems are not included in this analysis. 
 
The Single Transferable Vote method has been the proportional 
representation system overwhelmingly used in Australia. This chapter will 
provide a detailed analysis of the proportionality produced by these different 
magnitudes, and also whether the degree of proportionality and the number of 
parties produced by the results matches the theories of political scientists or 
conforms to the patterns observed in other countries. The argument being 
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made here is that results are frequently produced which defy conventional 
theory, because of the proportional component of the system. 
 
How is the number of parties measured? 
At first glance, the question seems easy to answer: the number of parties 
represented in a parliament equals the number of parties. However, an 
eloquent argument raised by Taagepera and Shugart is that not all parties 
gaining representation in parliament should be given the same weight.18 They 
therefore adopted a formula originally invented by economists to take into 
account the relative voting strengths of the various parties. This formula was 
obtained by calculating the sum of the squares of the percentage levels of 
representation gained by the relevant parties (they called it the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman concentration index), and then the number one was divided by the 
result to obtain the number of parties.19 Except in a situation where one party 
won all available seats, the concentration index would always be less than 
one, and the number of parties therefore always greater than one. Often the 
final result for the number of effective parties (N) will be a number with a 
single decimal place. 
 
How is proportionality measured? 
There have been several methods used over the years to measure the levels 
of proportionality in electoral systems all of which have been analysed by 
Gallagher. Such indices include Loosemore-Hanby, Rae, Gallagher’s own 
Least Squares Index, and Lijphart’s slightly modified version of the latter, 
which eliminates the votes and seats gained by ‘others’.20 This thesis takes 
the view that a form of Least Squares Index is the best one to use for, as 
explained by Gallagher himself, it strikes a happy medium between 
Loosemore-Hanby, which underestimates levels of disproportionality by 
 
18 Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, 77-78. 
19 Ibid., 79. The authors initially envisaged using this index based on the vote shares of the 
parties, but seat shares are more relevant to the argument being made in this chapter. The 
same modification was made many years later by Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, 65-66. 
20 Gallagher, "Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems". 
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minimizing the over-representation of the larger parties, and Rae’s which 
overstates levels of disproportionality by over-estimating the impact of the 
representation levels of smaller parties.21 It is also accepted that Lijphart was 
on the right track when he suggested that the original index be modified by 
excluding the amorphous category of ‘others’ from the calculation.22 In many 
elections, such a modification would not matter much. However, in the context 
of the 2013 Senate election, there were a series of what have become known 
as ‘micro’ parties, whose candidates polled a combined total of over 13% of 
the nationwide vote, but won no seats. If these are grouped together under 
the category of ‘Others’, they massively increase the disproportionality index, 
in the 2013 case by as much as five or more points, and would make the 
result look less proportional than it really was. David Farrell has agreed with 
Lijphart’s suggested modification when calculating the Least Squares Index.23 
The approach seems to be a fair one, since because ‘others’ are not running 
as a combination, the fact that their combined total wins no seats should not 
reflect on the overall proportionality of the system. 
 
In the context of this thesis, this approach poses a logistical dilemma. At what 
vote share is such a party given its own status, and at what point is it 
consigned to the ‘others’ category and therefore not regarded for the purpose 
of this analysis? The decision is made somewhat easier than it might have 
been due to results of the Senate elections in 2013 and 2016, and by the New 
South Wales Legislative Council elections in 1995 and 1999. In the former 
cases, parties with vote shares as low as 0.5% of the national vote won seats, 
while in the latter cases parties with a vote share as low as 0.2% won seats. 
This means that all unsuccessful parties with similar or higher vote shares can 
also justifiably be included in the analysis, since such an anomaly should 




21 Ibid., 40-41. 
22 Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, 145. 
23 Farrell, Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction. 
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There is a value judgment to be made about whether parties/groups polling 
very low proportions of the vote should be included in the calculation, 
especially in situations where such parties win no seats. This is especially so 
in jurisdictions where seats are allocated on a regional rather than jurisdiction 
wide basis, such as Western Australia. In that state there are cases of 
incumbent members who ran as independent candidates who would not 
qualify for inclusion on their state-wide vote, but polled a significant vote in the 
region in which they stood, and may have come close to, or indeed won, a 
seat. It has been decided to include such candidates for the purposes of this 
analysis. 
 
Whatever judgement is made about the inclusion or otherwise of such 
parties/groups, it is clear that different scholars may come up with slightly 
different figures for a jurisdiction. Hence this thesis has Least Squares Index 
figures provided by Mackerras (for the Senate),24 and Phillips (for Western 
Australia) to compare itself with.25 As a general rule, the inclusion of each 
additional party/group polling around 0.5% or slightly less will increase the 
Least Squares Index by 0.1 or at most 0.2, while any party/group polling 0.2% 
or less will have no impact on it. The inclusion of either type of party/group 
has (as would be expected) no impact on the measurement of the number of 
parliamentary parties, hereafter referred to as N(s), and has only a minor (if 
any) impact on the measured number of electoral parties, hereafter referred to 
as N(v).26 
 
The Senate 1949-2016 
Legislation to introduce proportional representation for Senate elections was 
passed by the Chifley Labor Government in 1948. While a single transferable 
vote system of PR remains in place today, both district magnitudes and ballot 
paper numbering requirements have undergone several changes over the 
 
24 Mackerras, "Howard's Plan for Senate Control". 
25 Phillips, Proportional Representation in Western Australia. 
26 The subscripts ‘v’ and ‘s’ refer to votes and seats respectively. 
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years. District magnitudes have ranged from two (in each of the two territories 
since they gained Senate representation at the 1975 election) to twelve (in all 
states at the double dissolution elections of 1987 and 2016). At other times, 
district magnitudes of five, six, seven and ten have been used. 
 
Ballot paper numbering requirements, on the other hand, have gone through 
three distinct phases. In the first 34 years of proportional representation, 
voters were required to number candidate boxes from 1 to the number of 
candidates standing in their state or territory, in sequential order, in order to 
cast a valid vote. Not surprisingly, as candidate numbers grew, the informal 
vote rate became very high (at nearly 10% in 1983) and was the major 
motivation behind the Hawke Government’s decision to make changes to the 
system before the 1984 election. 
 
Under the new arrangements, party boxes were printed above the various 
party’s candidates and a horizontal black line. Voters had two methods of 
casting a valid vote: they could vote for a party box above the line (also known 
as a ticket vote), or they could vote for all candidates below the line, as 
before, although strict sequential numbering was no longer required. This 
system lasted until the 2013 election, by which time so-called ‘preference 
whispering’27 had brought the system into disrepute. At the 2016 election 
group voting tickets were no longer allowed, and voters had a wider range of 
choices, both above and below the line, for casting a valid vote. 
 
As a result of the various changes, there exists a vast array of data to assess 
the impact of both factors on the overall proportionality of the system and the 
number of electoral and parliamentary parties that emerged, although there 




27 An agreement between several small parties to exchange preferences amongst themselves 
before preferencing any other party. 
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It is possible, however, to group the various elections into six distinct 
magnitude (or combination of magnitudes) groups. Some of them did maintain 
the same ballot paper numbering rules across their period of use. The 
average Least Squares Index figures and average number of electoral and 
parliamentary parties across the magnitudes are shown in the table below: 
 
Table 2.1 Least Squares Index and Number of Parties: Senate 
Elections, 1949-2016 
 
Magnitude LSQ (Evans) LSQ (MM) N(v) N(s) 
5 4.50 4.24 2.57 2.30 
5 & 6 5.63 5.59 2.56 2.24 
6 5.60 5.45 3.21 2.64 
7 4.39 4.39 2.54 2.28 
10 3.47 3.30 2.40 2.22 
12 4.04 3.13 3.59 3.04 
Sources: Calculations based on figures provided by Colin Hughes, A Handbook of Australian 
Government and Politics, Vols 1 – 4 and in Malcolm Mackerras, “Submission By Malcolm 
Mackerras To The Joint Standing Committee On Electoral Matters”, submission to the inquiry 
into and report on all aspects of the conduct of the 2016 Federal Election and matters related 
thereto, available at: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/ 
Electoral_Matters/2013_General_Election/Submissions. 
 
A general pattern for proportionality to increase as district magnitude 
increases (as Rae originally argued was the case) is evident from the above 
table. The notable exceptions are in the 10-12 differences, and the 
combination of five- and six-member divisions as compared with solely five- 
member divisions in the pre-1984 period. Only in the case of seven-member 
and twelve-member divisions do ballot paper numbering requirements cut 
across district magnitude, save for the fact that the five-member and ten- 
member figures are partially influenced by the inclusion of territory elections in 
the last two of each in 1975, 1977, 1980 and 1983. 
 
There is also a clear pattern in the effective number of parties, but it appears 
to be affected much more by ticket voting than by magnitude. It is true that the 
highest index for both N(v) and N(s) occurred in the elections with twelve- 
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member districts, but it was partly influenced by the fact that a ticket voting 
system was in place for one of them. It is clear, however, that there was a 
consistently higher average for the solely six-member elections than in the 
solely ten-member elections. 
 
It is important to note that N(v) rose slightly at the 2016 election (after the 
abolition of ticket voting) while N(s) fell slightly. The early evidence is that the 
change to the electoral system has made it harder for smaller parties to be 
elected to the Senate (in spite of the lower double dissolution quota 
theoretically making it easier) as it has not reduced the tendency of voters to 
vote for such parties. Whether this pattern continues in future elections when, 
presumably, the most common magnitude will be six, or whether Rae’s distal 
effect will have a reductive impact on N(v) as well, remains to be seen. 
 
The New South Wales Legislative Council 
Proportional representation was first used for elections for the New South 
Wales Legislative Council in 1978. In previous years, its members had been 
elected via an indirect method, whereby Legislative Assembly and non-retiring 
Legislative Council members elected 15 colleagues by proportional 
representation.28 
 
At the first proportional representation election, 15 members were chosen, 
and two other batches of 15 members were elected in 1981 and 1984. This 
pattern was to remain in place until the 1995 election, when three batches of 
15 became two batches of 21, with the second batch chosen in 1999. The 
pattern of 21 members at alternate Assembly elections remains in place to 
this day. 
 
What did change, however, were the voting options available to the voter to 
cast their Legislative Council vote. Initially voters were required to vote for at 
 
 
28 See Wright, Mirror of the Nation's Mind, 127. 
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least ten candidates in order of preference (this requirement was increased to 
fifteen at the 1995 election), with the option to vote for more candidates if they 
wished, but with no option to vote for a party ticket above the line.29 In 1988 
an above the line ticket option was introduced.30 The ballot paper for the 1999 
election was so large (dubbed a beach towel or a tablecloth by some 
observers),31 that the parliament took steps to discourage micro parties from 
standing for election. It did so by abolishing the use of preference tickets, but 
allowed voters to cast a ‘1’ vote for their preferred party above the line, and 
give further preferences for parties if they wished, while the requirements for 
casting a valid vote below the line remained the same. 
 
The usual practice of the parties and groups that stand candidates has been 
to offer a slate of fifteen candidates, and recommend, via their “how to vote” 
cards, that their supporters simply vote ‘1’ above the line. Any voter doing so 
(as a substantial majority did) ensured that if that vote elected one or more of 
the party’s candidates, subsequent preferences would flow to lower placed 
candidates of that party but go no further. The parties acting in this way thus 
freed themselves from the obligation to recommend further preferences. 
 
The numbers of parties elected to the Legislative Council have tended to 
follow distinct chronological patterns, although they have not always been 
commensurate with changes to either the district magnitude or voting option.32 
Just two groups were elected in 1978; four were elected in 1981 and three in 
1984. In both 1988 and 1991 there were four groups elected, but the numbers 




30 Michael Hogan et al., The People's Choice: Electoral Politics in Twentieth Century New 
South Wales, vol. 1, New South Wales State Election Series (Sydney: Parliament of New 
South Wales ; University of Sydney, 2001). 
31 Sydney-based ABC journalist Quentin Dempster used the latter term when compere on 
election night in 2003, while referring to the 2003 ballot paper as a tea towel. 
32 Michael Hogan et al., The People's Choice: Electoral Politics in Twentieth Century New 
South Wales, vol. 3, New South Wales State Election Series (Sydney: Parliament of New 
South Wales ; University of Sydney, 2001). 
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increase in the district magnitude). These results partially validated the 
conventional wisdom that the number of parties elected tends to increase with 
higher magnitudes. However, the fact that number of elected parties went 
down again after the banning of group preference tickets suggests that the 
availability of such an option might have boosted party numbers in 1995 and 
1999 as much as the increase in magnitude. Further examination is required 
to determine the overall impact of the two factors. 
 
The nature and timing of the changes to the number of members elected at 
each election as well as the available methods of voting mean that the relative 
impact of district magnitude and preference tickets can be compared. The 
rough-sketch measurement of the number of parties suggest that district 
magnitude is of a more vital importance than the presence or absence of 
preference tickets, but it is argued here that the more scientific Gallagher 
Least Squares Index and the Taagepera-Shugart measurement of the number 
of parties is a more accurate measurement. 
 
The averages for the Least Squares (LSQ) Index and the indices for the 
number of electoral (hereafter referred to as N(v)) and parliamentary 
(hereafter referred to as N(s)) parties was as follows for the four distinct 
periods: 
 
Table 2.2 Least Squares Index and Number of Parties: New 
South Wales Legislative Council Elections, 1978-2019 
 
Years LSQ Index N(v) N(s) 
1978-1984 3.98 2.44 2.22 
1988-1991 4.10 2.81 2.59 
1995-1999 5.07 4.05 3.72 
2003-2019 4.63 3.58 3.08 
Sources: Calculations based on figures provided by Colin A. Hughes, A Handbook of 
Australian Government and Politics, Vols 3 & 4, 298-311 (for elections held 1978-99) and the 
NSW Electoral Commission website: https://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/Elections/past-results 
for more recent elections (accessed 15 April 2019). 
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The overall evidence is that the number of electoral and parliamentary parties 
is higher under conditions of higher district magnitudes and no preference 
tickets than a combination of lower district magnitude and preference tickets. 
This suggests that, on balance, district magnitude is slightly more important 
than ballot paper numbering requirements in terms of the number of parties 
emerging. However, it is clear that a combination of the higher magnitude and 
preference tickets produced the largest number of parties. 
 
The size of the Least Squares Index under the varying conditions produces 
results that, to some extent, contradict the conventional wisdom that 
proportionality increases as district magnitude increases. The fact that the 
highest level of disproportionality occurred under a combination of district 
magnitude of 21 (DM 21) and preference tickets suggests that preference 
allocation rules might have played a bigger role in producing the 
disproportionality than the magnitude level. Why there was more 
disproportionality under DM 21 after 1999 than in the DM 15 period between 
1988 and 1991 remains a puzzle requiring further investigation. 
 
Two other aspects of the results in New South Wales warrant further 
comment, namely the size of the informal vote and the levels of partisan 
advantage enjoyed by the larger parties. Perhaps surprisingly, the informal 
vote rate actually rose from an average of 5.85% between 1978 and 1984 to 
an average of 6.76% between 1988 and 1999, the opposite of what occurred 
after the introduction of ticket voting for the 1984 Senate election. This would 
tend to suggest that voters did not regard the marking of at least ten 
candidates on the ballot paper as too onerous a task. If anything, the fact that 
the informal vote rate was at its highest in the 1995-1999 period suggests that 
the size of the ballot paper might have been the major factor pushing up the 
informal vote rather than a requirement to number five more candidates below 
the line. 
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The changes in magnitude and ticket voting arrangements does not appear to 
have had much of an impact on the levels of partisan advantage enjoyed by 
the larger parties. The average levels of over/under-representation for larger 
parties across the four distinct periods was as follows: 
 
Table 2.3 Levels of Partisan Advantage / Disadvantage for the 
Main Parties: New South Wales Legislative Council Elections, 
1978-2019 
 









1978-1984 +2.34% +2.78% -0.81% -1.10% 
1988-1991 +2.60% +0.93% +2.03% +1.97% 
1995-1999 +1.84% +0.45% +1.67% +1.15% 
2003-2019 +2.55% +2.22% +1.39% -1.19% 
* Call to Australia and Christian Democratic Party 
Sources: Calculations based on figures provided by Colin A. Hughes, A Handbook of 
Australian Government and Politics, Vols 3 & 4, 298-311 (for elections held 1978-99) and the 
NSW Electoral Commission website: https://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/Elections/past-results 
for more recent elections (accessed 15 April 2019). 
 
There is little difference in levels of major party representation under DM 15 
as compared with DM 21, although both major party blocs, and especially 
Liberal-National, do better under systems without preference tickets in 
comparison with those with preference tickets. The relative ease of casting a 
valid vote below the line during the ticket voting period (1988-99) probably 
moderated this factor to some degree. As the next chapter will show, a 
combination of ticket voting above the line and compulsory preferential voting 
below the line has the greatest reductive effect on major party representation. 
For the record, the Greens, once they gained representation, tended to be 
slightly more over-represented under ticket voting conditions. 
 
South Australia 1975-2014 
Since adopting proportional representation in 1975, South Australia has used 
three slightly different types of PR system. The 1975 and 1979 elections used 
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a party list system, with voters only allowed to vote for two groups in order of 
preference.33 In 1982 the system became candidate based, with voters 
required to number at least as many squares as there were candidates to be 
elected, namely eleven. 
 
This system lasted for just one election, as the Bannon Labor Government 
elected at the corresponding House of Assembly election moved to the 
system which, district magnitude excepted, was essentially the same system 
which had recently been adopted for the Senate, and became so controversial 
after the 2013 Senate election. The ostensible reason for the change was the 
level of the informal vote, which stood at over 10% in 1982 in spite of the 
relatively easy requirements to cast a formal vote. The Senate voting system 
existing at the time would regularly see levels of informal voting of 9-10% in a 
situation where voters were required to number all squares to cast a valid 
vote. 
 
The change caused little public controversy at the time, although it should be 
noted that the Liberal Party opposed the change in parliament. The lack of 
controversy was not surprising in view of the results of the elections: each 
returned a configuration of five Labor, five Liberal and one Australian 
Democrats. The same was to occur in 1989, when it became the fairness of 
the House of Assembly voting system that was in question,34 before the 
Liberal Party gained an extra seat at Labor’s expense in 1993. The averages 
of the respective indices for the three elections were N(v) 2.79, N(s) 2.34 and 
LSQ 6.39. It was noticeable that in spite of the opportunities provided to 





33 For details and analysis on changes to the SA Legislative Council voting system, see Dean 
Jaensch, Community Access to the Parliamentary Electoral Process since 1850 (Adelaide: 
State Electoral Office, 2003). 
34 For an account of the issues relating to the House of Assembly electoral system, see Glynn 
Evans, "Fairness and Unfairness in South Australian Elections," Masters Thesis (University of 
Adelaide, 2005). 
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remained low at both electoral and parliamentary levels, with only three 
parties gaining Legislative Council seats. 
 
This pattern was to change significantly at the 1997 election when Nick 
Xenophon, running on an anti-poker machine platform, won a seat in the 
Legislative Council, along with two Australian Democrats and four each from 
the Liberal and Labor Parties. There were also four parties/groups elected in 
both 2002 and 2006, and five parties/groups won seats at each of the 2010 
and 2014 Legislative Council elections. It should be mentioned that it was not 
always the same collection of parties/groups that won election, although it is 
remarkable that since 1997 there has only been one occasion when Liberal 
and Labor did not win exactly four seats each.35 
 
The increase in the number of parliamentary parties also manifested itself in 
the indices, with the average N(v) for the 1997-2014 period averaging 3.70, 
N(s) averaging 3.38 and LSQ averaging 6.64. These changes demonstrate 
that small changes in party system configuration can take place as a result of 
changed voter behaviour without any fundamental changes in the electoral 
system, although having the impact of reinforcing the nature of the system 
rather than altering it. 
 
The Overall South Australian Pattern 
Since 1975, South Australia has used three slightly different methods of 
proportional representation to elect its Legislative Council, though always with 
the constant that the district magnitude was set at eleven. The average for 










35 The exception was in 2002 when the Liberal Party won five seats. 
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Table 2.4 Least Squares Index and Number of Parties: South 
Australian Legislative Council Elections, 1975-2018 
 
Years LSQ Index N(v) N(s) 
1975-1979 4.91 2.68 2.38 
1982 4.51 2.49 2.37 
1985-2018 6.55 3.36 3.12 
Sources: Calculations for election 1975-1997 based on figures provided by Colin Hughes, A 
Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, Vol. 3, 208-214 and Vol. 4, 341-349. For 
elections 2002-2018, see Electoral Commission of South Australia: 
https://www.ecsa.sa.gov.au/elections/past-state-election-results (accessed 13 August 2018). 
 
The figures do suggest that the system of compulsory preferential voting and 
ticket preferences helped to produce a situation where more parties proliferate 
at both electoral and parliamentary levels, though a causal relationship is hard 
to prove. The increase in the Least Squares Index under the post 1985 
system, is clearly suggestive of a system that encouraged micro parties to 
stand and then largely denied them representation, thus increasing the overall 
disproportionality of the system, and negating the positive impact that the 
relatively high district magnitude may have had on this factor. 
 
It is notable that in comparison to the situation in New South Wales, the 
requirements for numbering a ballot paper appear to have had a greater 
impact on influencing the number of parliamentary parties more so than the 
somewhat lower district magnitude. The fact that the Least Squares Index is 
higher for South Australia than in New South Wales (regardless of whether 
the latter used DM 15 or DM 21) indicates that district magnitude is more 
important than ballot paper numbering requirements in determining overall 
proportionality. However, the number of both electoral and parliamentary 
parties has been higher in South Australia than in New South Wales since the 
latter banned group preference tickets, suggesting that, at these higher 
magnitudes at least, ballot paper numbering requirements play a more 
important role in determining the number of parties in the polity. The 
propensity of non-major party voters to concentrate their vote behind a single, 
usually centrist, party may play a role in this phenomenon. 
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As in New South Wales, the South Australian Legislative Council system is 
relatively even-handed in the way it distributes seats to the two major parties. 
The Labor Party was over-represented by an average of 1.99% across the 
eleven elections, while the Liberal Party was over-represented by an average 
of 1.25% during the same period. If the first three elections (with no 
preference tickets) are excluded, Labor becomes slightly more-over- 
represented and the Liberal Party slightly less over-represented, thus 
suggesting a slightly different pattern from that of New South Wales. 
 
The new rules put in place for the 2018 election resulted in higher levels of 
both N(v) (4.33) and N(s) (3.27) than the averages over the previous eight 
elections, although the experience of the 2016 Senate election (after similar 
rule changes) suggested a reductive effect on the number of parliamentary 
parties. The LSQ figure was also higher at 7.64, with the Labor Party having 
the highest level of over-representation. The Liberal Party was also over- 
represented, but early evidence suggests that parties of the right as a whole 
are disadvantaged by the new system.36 
 
The Western Australian Legislative Council 1989-2013 
In the eight elections held in Western Australia prior to the adoption of 
proportional representation for the 1989 election, the Legislative Council was 
elected via a system of provinces made up from two or more neighbouring 
Legislative Assembly districts. Each province had two members, with just one 
elected for overlapping terms at alternate elections held in conjunction with an 




36 If the Liberal Party, the Australian Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats are classified 
as parties of the right, this combination received 38.1% of the vote but just 36.4% of the seats 
(the four seats won by the Liberal Party). By contrast, parties of the left (Labor and Green) 
won 45.5% of the seats on a combined vote of 34.7%. This figure rises to 38.8% if 
unsuccessful parties of the left (Animal Justice and Dignity) are included in the total left vote. 
Results have been obtained from the Electoral Commission of South Australia website 
(www.ecsa.sa.gov.au/elections/past-state-election-results (accessed 13 August 2018). 
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The system was characterized by a heavy, though not always consistently 
applied level of malapportionment in favour of non-metropolitan areas.37 As 
members were elected on the basis of single-member elections, the system 
did not allow for the election of many parties. Between 1965 and 1986 the 
average N(v) was 2.51, while the average N(s) was 2.33. The average Least 
Squares Index for the period was 15.70. 
 
A system of proportional representation was introduced for the 1989 election, 
and a combination of four five-member regions and two seven-member 
regions was also used at elections held in 1993, 1996, 2001 and 2005. The 
system was certainly more proportional than the old system, with the average 
Least Squares Index being 5.95.38 The number of parties did not change 
nearly as dramatically, with N(v) averaging 3.09 and N(s) averaging 2.71.39 
For the 2008 election, the system was changed to one of six six-member 
regions. The system also applied at the 2013 and 2017 elections. At the three 
elections held so far, the Least Squares Index has averaged 7.46, suggesting 
that the system produced a slightly less proportional result than the 1989- 
2005 system. The average N(V) rose to 3.29, while the average N(s) rose to 
3.37. 
 
The results of these elections suggest that small changes in district 
magnitudes have very little impact on the number of parties drawing enough 
votes to make an impact on N(v). The rise in N(s) might indicate that it was 
 
37 For a detailed account of how the system operated and how it came to be changed, see 
Pepperday, "Improving Democracy Through Elite Power Struggle". 
38 This is the author’s own calculation. The Phillips average for the same five elections is a 
somewhat higher 6.66, but there is a large discrepancy between the Evans and Phillips 
figures only in 1996. The latter’s high figure for this election appearing to be caused by a 
miscalculation due to the difficulty created by the fact that the Liberal and National Parties ran 
a joint ticket in Agricultural, but separate tickets in the two other country regions. See Phillips, 
Proportional Representation in Western Australia, 101. 
39 The average N(s) figure is probably a little lower than it should be because of a decision of 
the author to group Liberal and National together for the 1996 election. Because Liberal- 
National ran a joint ticket in one region at that election but not in other regions, a separation of 
groupings would make the overall results look less proportional than they really are. 
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slightly easier for minor parties to win seats under the new system, but this 
thesis argues, in Chapter 4, that this is more likely due to the fact that, 
especially in 2017, minor parties had learned how to ‘game’ the system. It will 
also be argued, however, that the new district magnitude did have a 
significant impact on the way it advantaged or disadvantaged the major 
parties. 
 
The Victorian Legislative Council 
Prior to the 2006 election, the Victorian Legislative Council, like its Western 
Australian counterpart prior to 1989, had been elected via a system of single- 
member provinces consisting of a series of neighbouring Assembly districts, 
with half its members elected at each election. The partisan impact of the 
system will be examined more closely in a later chapter. Like most single- 
member electoral arrangements, the system did not allow for a large number 
of parties. In Council elections held between 1979 and 2002 (the earlier year 
has been chosen as a starting point because it represented a return to 
competitive elections after a series of landslide Liberal victories),40 the 
average number of electoral parties averaged 2.61 across the eight elections, 
while the index for parliamentary parties for the same period was 2.24. The 
Least Squares Index was a very high 13.43,41 this number inflated by 
landslides to the Liberal-National Coalition in 1992 and 1996 and a super- 
landslide to Labor in 2002. 
 
A proportional representation system was introduced for the 2006 election, in 
which the state was divided into eight regions electing five members each. As 
with the previous system, these regions were made up of complete 
 
 
40 So comprehensive were these victories that the Liberal Party never needed 
Country/National Party numbers to form government. In these circumstances, the latter was 
sometimes willing to exchange preferences with Labor, provoking then Liberal Premier Henry 
Bolte to call the Country Party ‘political prostitutes’. See Fred Daly, The Politician Who 
Laughed (Melbourne: Hutchinson of Australia, 1982), 37. 
41 If the figures for earlier elections were included, the LSQ average would be even higher as 
this index reached 20.20 in 1976, 20.59 in 1973 and 20.28 in 1970. The other indices are 
hardly altered by the inclusion of earlier elections. 
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neighbouring Assembly districts, in this case numbering eleven per region. 
The results of the four elections held so far under the system have produced 
more proportional results than the previous system, though perhaps not as 
proportional as advocates of proportional representation would have hoped. 
The number of parties indices and the Least Squares Index for the three 
elections were as follows: 
 
Table 2.5 Least Squares Index and Number of Parties: 
Victorian Legislative Council Elections, 2006-18 
 
Year LSQ Index N(v) N(s) 
2006 5.87 3.28 2.67 
2010 8.65 3.05 2.27 
2014 5.42 3.88 3.31 
2018 7.87 3.94 3.43 
Average 6.83 3.54 2.92 
Source: Calculations based on Victorian Electoral Commission figures available at 
https://www.vec.vic.gov.au/Results/results-state.html (accessed 15 January 2019). 
 
The relatively high least square average indicates that the quota of 16.7% had 
a reductive effect on the representation levels of small parties, even if a ticket 
voting option enabled the election of some of them. The average rise of 0.93 
in N(v) was to be expected, given that the change to the system would have 
created a feeling among small parties that they at least had a chance of 
election, whereas under the old system, most of them would have considered 
their election chances as being negligible. The rise in the number of 
parliamentary parties (a slightly smaller average of 0.68) is also to be 
expected, given that the high quota is a much greater barrier to actual election 
chances of smaller parties than it is to enticing voters to vote for them. 
 
Under a single transferable vote system, voters can cast their vote for a very 
small party in the knowledge that if that party fails to elect a candidate; their 
vote will transfer to a larger party of their choice, save for the case of voting 
below the line to exhaust their vote. These technical issues will be examined 
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more closely when discussed later in chapters on partisan advantage. What is 
noticeable is that while the 2006-18 LSQ average is over two points higher 
than for 2003-2015 New South Wales, the differences in N(v) and especially 
N(s) are much smaller (only 0.03 for the latter) in spite of the much lower 
quota in New South Wales theoretically improving the election chances of 
smaller parties. 
 
Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory 
These two jurisdictions are considered together because, apart from the 
ACT’s use of a system more closely resembling a party list system in 1989 
and 1992, they have both maintained the purest of candidate-based STV 
systems, with no party ticket vote allowed, and allocations of preferences 
beyond a voter’s first choice largely optional. Perhaps the most important 
difference between them and the upper houses so far examined is that when 
Tasmanian and ACT voters vote in their Assembly elections, they choose a 
government. In theory, it is arguable that this ought to make it more likely that 
more voters will vote for the two parties capable of forming government. The 
fact that analysis of other jurisdictions has shown that the more preference 
distributions become the responsibility of voters, the fewer effective parties 
emerge, suggests another reason why the two jurisdictions ought to have 
fewer effective parties. Is this actually the case? 
 
The nature of Tasmanian elections makes the classification of ‘others’ more 
problematic than in the mainland states. Especially in the pre-1960 period, it 
was very common for one or more independent candidates to poll significant 
vote shares, but by definition in one division only. More often than not, at least 
one such candidate was elected. It therefore makes sense to include a 
category of Independents/Others in the calculation tables. In more recent 
elections, and especially since the rise of the Greens, independent success 
has been much rarer, though happily (for the purposes of this thesis), their 
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overall vote has been too low to have much of an impact on overall 
calculations. 
 
There have been three distinct periods, divided by their differing district 
magnitudes. The average least squares indices and effective number of 
parties have been as follows: 
 
Table 2.6 Least Squares Index and Number of Parties: 
Tasmanian House of Assembly Elections, 1909-2018 
 
Years LSQ Index N(v) N(s) 
1909-1956 (DM 6) 3.59 2.31 2.17 
1959-1996 (DM 7) 4.36 2.41 2.20 
1998-2018 (DM 5) 6.01 2.78 2.36 
Source: Calculations based on figures provided by Tasmanian Electoral Commission: 
https://www.tec.tas.gov.au/House_of_Assembly_Elections/index.html (accessed 15 October 
2018). 
 
The above figures show that a district magnitude of five produced a somewhat 
more disproportional result than did magnitudes of six or seven, as Rae’s 
differential proposition had suggested.42 However, the fact that DM 7 
produced a more proportional result than DM 6 is a contradiction of 
conventional wisdom as well as of the federal pattern mentioned earlier. 
Possible reasons for the relative proportionality of the 1909-56 period will be 
explored further in Chapter Four. 
 
A comparison can be made with the Victorian Legislative Council for the 1998- 
2013 period, as the district magnitude was exactly the same, and three of the 
Tasmanian elections were held in the same calendar year as those in Victoria. 
It is notable that both N(v) and N(s) are lower for Tasmania than Victoria, 
suggesting that the absence of ticket voting in Tasmania does indeed have a 
reductive impact on the number of electoral and parliamentary parties. The 
extent to which ballot paper numbering requirements are a causal factor as 
 
42 Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. 
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distinct from its house of government status of the Tasmanian and ACT 
assemblies, is impossible to distinguish without information from opinion poll 
data on voter attitudes. 
 
The Australian Capital Territory data does, however, tell us something about 
whether the Tasmanian experience is part of a general trend in a government- 
electing STV house and provides more information about the combined 
effects of the two main determining factors. A comparison can also be made 
with Western Australia because of the use of varying magnitudes within the 
same elections. 
 
Table 2.7 Least Squares Index and Number of Parties: 
Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly Elections, 
1989-2016 
 
Year LSQ N(v) N(s) 
1989-1992 (DM 17) 12.51 6.34 3.53 
1995-2012 (DM 5/7) 7.94 3.48 2.69 
2016 (DM 5) 9.15 3.37 2.32 
Source: Calculations based on figures provided by Elections ACT: https://www.elections.act. 
gov.au/elections_and_voting/past_act_legislative_assembly_elections (accessed 16 October 
2017). 
 
A number of notable points can be made about this table. Firstly, it is the case 
that the combined five- and seven-member magnitude produced a more 
proportional result than the purely five-member election of 2016, although the 
quasi-list system of 1989-1992 was the least proportional of all. Secondly, a 
comparison of the 1995-2012 period with that of Western Australia 1989-2005 
(a reasonable exercise because in each case there were two five-member 
regions for every seven-member region, thus eliminating one independent 
variable) shows that, although the difference in N(s) is very slight, a 
comparison suggests that the absence of ticket voting in the ACT follows the 
detectable pattern of such situations having a reductive effect on the number 
of parliamentary parties. 
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Such a trend is not evident in the size of N(v), with the WA Legislative Council 
producing a higher value than in the ACT. This is not completely surprising, 
since while the absence of ticket voting might make it harder for tiny parties to 
be elected, it provides no disincentive for voters to vote for such parties. What 
it does suggest is that the ACT Assembly’s status as a house of government 
provided no inclination for voters to vote for the larger parties in greater 
numbers. As a general rule, a low large party vote produces a higher N(v). 
 
Overall Conclusion 
The general pattern evident from Australian jurisdictions using a single 
transferable vote system of proportional representation is that, in terms of 
proportionality as measured by the Least Squares Index, district magnitude 
remains the most important factor, and that, as a general rule, Rae’s 
differential proposition that proportionality increases as district magnitude 
increases remains largely valid, notwithstanding some contradictory cases 
around the five-six-seven and ten-eleven-twelve clusters. Ballot paper 
numbering requirements can have a negative (or enhancing) impact on 
overall proportionality, but the pattern varies according to the electoral 
geography of particular jurisdictions. 
 
In terms of numbers of electoral and parliamentary parties emerging, another 
clear pattern is evident: the absence of ticket voting, or more precisely, the 
inability of parties to direct (as distinguished from an ability to suggest to 
voters via how to vote cards) their preferences to specified other parties has 
an overall reductive impact on the number of parties emerging, especially on 
N(s). This pattern generally prevails quite independently of district magnitude 
size. It is only when DM hits a (very high by world standards) level of 21 that, 
as conventional wisdom would have it, the increasing magnitude has an 
enhancing effect on the number of parliamentary parties. The effect of ballot 
paper numbering requirements on N(v) is not nearly as stark, which makes 
logical sense, as under any STV system voters can still vote for micro parties 
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in the knowledge that, in the event of that party failing to win representation, 
they are allowed to transfer their second and later preferences to parties that 
can and will win representation. 
 
Where district magnitude can have a decisive impact on the politics of a 
jurisdiction is in facilitating levels of partisan advantage enjoyed (or 
disadvantage suffered) by certain political parties. The following chapters, 
beginning with Chapter 3 on Senate elections, explore general patterns of 






District Magnitude and Partisan Advantage in the Senate 
 
 
In the previous chapter it could be seen that although the widely accepted 
belief that (a) overall proportionality and (b) the number of elective parties 
tend to increase as district magnitude increases is correct in general terms, 
the relationships in Australia can be quite variable, largely because of 
differences in ballot paper numbering rules in the various PR jurisdictions. It 
must be acknowledged that Rae’s own diagram suggests that, especially 
around the 5-7 magnitude range, the relationship between magnitude and 
proportionality was not completely curvilinear, and that the line contained 
some irregularities1 
 
The tables included in the last chapter would also suggest the likelihood of 
irregularities in the 10-12 magnitude range, but they additionally indicate the 
likelihood that preference allocation rules can have as much of an impact on 
the number of elective parties as the magnitudes themselves. The New South 
Wales Legislative Council results from elections since 1978 provide the 
strongest illustration of the latter point. 
 
This chapter refers specifically to Senate elections held since the adoption of 
proportional representation in 1948, and more specifically, the partisan 
advantage or disadvantage incurred by the major political parties under the 
various magnitudes used. It will be argued that the combination of six-member 
districts (for the states) and two-member districts (for the territories) that 
applied at Senate elections between 1990 and 2013 exhibited a systemic bias 
in favour of the Liberal and National Parties, and often, though not always, 




1 Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 116. 
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It will be argued that such was not the case between 1949 and 1987, when 
district magnitudes of states ranged from five to twelve: both major party blocs 
were usually over-represented by roughly similar amounts. In elections where 
either ten- or twelve-member divisions were used (the double dissolution 
elections held in 1951, 1974, 1975, 1983, 1987 and 2016) results generally 
showed some level of bias in favour of the conservative parties, thus lending 
weight to the idea that even-numbered districts favour the conservative 
parties, but also suggesting that ten- and twelve-member division did not 
favour them as much as did six-member divisions. The most recent double 
dissolution election in 2016 does suggest, however, that any disadvantage 
suffered by the Labor Party in previous elections did not apply in 2016. The 
extent to which the new voting rules for the Senate introduced ahead of the 
2016 election played a role in this will be examined later in the chapter. 
 
Five-member districts applied in most states at half-Senate elections held 
between 1953 and 1980, although there were occasions (before 1977) when if 
a senator elected at the previous half-Senate election vacated their seat 
during the first half of their own term, the state from which the senator came 
would elect six senators. 
 
The district magnitude of six applied at all state Senate contests from 1990 to 
2014, due to the enlargement of the Senate that took place in 1983 and the 
absence of a double dissolution during the 1990-2014 period. Seven-member 
districts applied for each state for the transition elections of 1949 and 1984, 
while ten-member districts were used at the double dissolution elections of 
1951, 1974, 1975 and 1983. The largest magnitude to apply at a Senate 
election was the double dissolution general election for all senators in 1987 
and the most recent election in 2016, when each state elected twelve 
senators. 
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The fact that the current mix of magnitudes appears to favour the Liberal and 
National Parties might lead some people to question the democratic 
legitimacy of the system, but the 2013 Senate election results raised much 
wider questions in relation to the allocation of Senate preferences and the fact 
that many more minor party and micro party senators were elected than is 
usually the case and, in some cases, on miniscule proportions of the vote. 
There was considerable doubt across some of the states as to whether the 
result actually reflected voters’ preferences. This is potentially due to the 
Senate voting system that was in place from 1984 to 2014, which created a 
wider range for “unthinking” votes to be cast. 
 
Because of the rarity of use of single transferable vote methods in other 
countries, there is little international comparison available. Gallagher has 
made some study of the Irish experience with STV in Ireland’s lower house, 
and has found that the two largest parties in general, and the largest party in 
particular, will usually be over-represented.2 Malta, the only other country 
using STV to elect its lower house, has a strictly two party system and 
therefore atypical. Nonetheless, it is notable that in a system using five- 
member districts throughout, there have been a few examples where the 
Nationalist Party has won a majority of votes, yet the Labour Party has won a 
majority of seats. Top up seats have since been legislated for to deal with this 
problem. 
 
Wolfgang Hircszy’s analysis of Maltese elections does give some clues as to 
part of the reason for the lack of success of minor party and Independent 
candidates, and also the type of conditions in Australia that might limit the 







2 Gallagher, "Disproportionality in a Proportional Representation System". 
60  
The intricacies and idiosyncrasies of the 2013 Senate election will be 
analysed later in the chapter. But before that, it is useful to consider the two 
seat contests that have taken place in the two territories since they gained 
Senate voting rights in 1975. These represent a small part of the system that 
provides the Liberal-National coalition with a distinct advantage during the 
period 1984-2013. 
 
Two-member Districts in the Territories: Always One Each 
Since the first election for territory Senate seats in 1975, both territories have 
elected the same party configuration at every election, namely one each for 
Labor and Liberal in the Australian Capital Territory, and one each for Labor 
and Country Liberal Party (CLP) in the Northern Territory. 
 
There are good logical reasons why this should be the case. Under a two- 
member system the quota becomes 33.33% of the vote plus one vote. It is 
extremely rare for either major party to fall below this figure. The Liberal Party 
has failed to reach the figure in just four ACT Senate elections, namely in 
1983 (31.67%), 1984 (31.9%), 1998 (31.15%) and 2013 (33.08%), but in each 
case they received enough preferences to retain their seat. The Labor Party 
has never dropped below quota level in the ACT. In the Northern Territory 
Labor and Country Liberal have fallen short of a quota on just one occasion 
each: Labor’s lowest vote was 32.8% at the 2013 election,3 while the low point 
for Country Liberal was 32.46% in 1987.4 
 
Consequently, the two major parties have always won 50% of available seats 
in each territory. This has meant a slight over-representation for both parties 
in the Northern Territory. Labor has managed to poll over 50% on just three 
occasions (1987, 1990 and 1993), while the CLP polled over 50% just once, in 
 
 
3 Australian Electoral Commission, https://results.aec.gov.au/17496/Website/SenateState 
FirstPrefsByGroup-17496-NT.htm (accessed 13 March 2019). 
4 Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, 24th ed., (AGPS, Canberra, 
1984), 405. 
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1975. As a result, the average levels of over-representation for the two major 
parties are very similar: 6.8% for Labor and 6.1% for Country Liberal. 
 
The ACT is a different matter. The Labor Party has polled over 50% on only 
two occasions (1980 and 1983), but has nearly always had a substantial lead 
over the Liberal Party. Only in 1975 did Liberal outpoll Labor (by 43.6% to 
37%), and there were only two other elections (1977 and 2013) when Labor’s 
lead over Liberal was smaller than 5%. The average level of Labor over- 
representation is 6.4%, while for Liberal it is a very large 15.2%, ranging from 
a low of 6.43% in 1975 to a high of 18.8% in 1998. Is this an indication that 
even-numbered electorates favour parties of the right? The best answer to 
this question is: not on its own. The ACT has always been the weakest 
jurisdiction for Australia’s conservative parties, even in 1975, but it is fortunate 
from their point of view that they have always been able to maintain a vote 
above 30%. 
 
A slightly lower vote might have seen them fail to win a seat, which would 
have left them grossly under-represented. The ACT situation is more an 
indication that the stronger party is not quite strong enough to win two seats, 
or help elect a minor party rather than being disadvantaged by two-member 
districts per se. The Northern Territory situation, where the votes are evenly 
matched, does not provide evidence to support the idea of a systemic bias 
against parties of the left. 
 
The ACT results do, however, suggest a systemic bias against the third 
largest party. This was a scenario that Taagepera and Shugart suggested 
could be predicted almost by definition.5 In the late twentieth century the 
Democrats were the main victim, with healthy votes of 11.9% in 1983 and 
16.7% in 1998 failing to yield a seat. In the twenty-first century, it has been the 
Greens who have suffered. Votes of 21.47% in 2007 and 22.97% in 2010 did 
 
5 Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes. 
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not win them a seat. It is a problem that will probably always exist: the ACT is 
never likely to have a sufficient population to justify having more than two 
senators. One solution might be to subsume the ACT into NSW for the 
purposes of Senate elections: there is nothing in the Australian Constitution to 
prevent this from happening (though this would exacerbate the level of under- 
representation in the Senate currently experienced by NSW). 
 
Senate Elections in the States, 1949-2010 
Until the enlargement of the Senate to twelve senators per state in 1984, the 
most common district magnitude for Senate elections was five. The 
exceptions occurred in 1949, when seven senators were elected in each 
State, the double dissolution elections of 1951, 1974, 1975 and 1983, when 
ten senators per state were elected, and on occasions where a senator not 
due to face re-election at a half-Senate election had died or resigned mid- 
term, in which case that senator’s state would elect six senators. The latter 
situation occurred in Western Australia and Tasmania in 1953, Victoria and 
New South Wales in 1958, South Australia in 1961 and again for both Victoria 
and New South Wales in 1970. Those elections were therefore a mix of five- 
member and six-member contests, while all states chose five senators in 
1955, 1964, 1967, 1977 and 1980. 
 
These elections, and the mainly five-member elections of 1953, 1958, 1961 
and 1970, can be broken down into three distinct periods. The 1953 election 
(the first separate half-Senate election) stands alone as the one held at a time 
when Senate contests were still two-party affairs. All Senate elections held 
from 1955 to 1970 were characterised by the significant presence of a minor 
party of the right, the Democratic Labor Party (DLP). By 1977, the DLP had 
lost all its Senate seats and its influence was waning, but a minor party then 
regarded as centrist, the Australian Democrats, had appeared on the scene, 
and played an important role in the 1980 election as well. 
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In addition to the different magnitude levels, the distinctive feature of the 
Senate voting system was the requirement that voters number the squares 
beside every Senate candidate: failure to do this rendered the vote informal. 
Not surprisingly, the informal vote across these elections was very high, 
ranging from a low of 4.6% in 1953 to a high of 10.8% in each of 1949 and 
1974.6 What effect this factor had on levels of partisan support is not 
completely clear (although the anecdotal evidence quoted by Wright suggests 
that it significantly hurt the Labor Party).7 But it is highly likely such 
considerations were at the heart of the Hawke Government’s move to change 
the voting system in 1984, and that it played a role in the controversy 
surrounding the result of the 2013 Senate election. 
 
1953 stands alone as the only half-Senate election held which did not involve 
the presence of a significant minor party. In this election, the four states 
electing five members gave Labor 50.9% of the vote and 11 of the 20 seats 
(55%) while the Liberal-Country Party received 44.01% of the vote and 9 
seats (45%).8 At this election, the Labor Party were over-represented by 
4.1%, which may make it appear that five-member districts advantaged Labor 
at this election, but it was notable that these results included three of the four 
states where Labor outpolled the Liberal and Country Parties, namely New 
South Wales, Victoria and South Australia, and were therefore able to win 
three of the five seats in those states. In both Western Australia and 
Tasmania, where six senators were chosen, neither major party received 50% 
of the primary vote, so we cannot be certain who would have won the fifth 
seat if five had been chosen.9 
 
 
6 Mackerras, "In Defence of the Present Australian Senate Electoral System". 
7 Wright, Mirror of the Nation's Mind, 112-13. 
8 Results of this and other Senate elections up to and including 1964 have been obtained 
from Colin A. Hughes and B. D. Graham, Voting for the Australian House of Representatives, 
1901-1964 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1974). Results of the 1967 and 
1970 elections have been obtained from Colin A. Hughes, A Handbook of Australian 
Government and Politics 1965-1974, vol. 2 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 
1977). 
9 Hughes and Graham, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, 1. 
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The apparent picture of Labor advantage in five-member seats was not to last 
after the arrival of the Democratic Labor Party. This party had been formed 
after the Labor split of 1955, and directed its preferences away from Labor in 
all House of Representatives seats and Senate contests, and Labor retaliated 
by giving preferences to the Liberal and Country Parties ahead of the DLP. An 
examination of these elections suggests that, while Labor was not particularly 
disadvantaged, the Liberal and Country Parties (L-CP) were significantly 
advantaged. 
 
The average over-representation of the L-CP in five-member districts was 
3.98%, while Labor was also over-represented, by an average of 1.02%. The 
brunt of under-representation was borne by the DLP (an average of -4.28%) 
and others (an average of -0.78%). It could perhaps be argued that five- 
member districts actually favoured the left, since any Liberal advantage was 
more than outweighed by DLP disadvantage. Labor’s preference allocation 
played some role in the latter phenomenon. The most obvious case where 
such a decision made a crucial difference was in Victoria in 1961, and as will 
be seen in a later chapter, the Communist Party played some part in the 
outcome too. Labor preferences also enabled the defeat of the DLP’s Vince 
Gair in the 1961 Queensland Senate election. 
 
How did this compare with results in six-member districts during the same 
period? The data set is much smaller: only in 1953 (Western Australia and 
Tasmania), 1958 (New South Wales and Victoria), 1961 (South Australia) and 
1970 (New South Wales and Victoria) did such contests take place. The 1953 
election, held before the advent of the DLP, produced an average over- 
representation of 2.01% for Labor and 1.77% for Liberal-Country. The only 
reason for the higher Labor figure is a slightly smaller vote. Provided neither 
major party’s vote dropped below 43% or rose above 57% in any constituency 
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(in this case an entire state) each major party bloc was always going to hold 
50% of the available seats. 
 
After the arrival of the DLP, it became more common for a major party’s vote 
to drop below 43%, but only in 1970 did it ever result in the DLP winning a 
seat in a six-member contest. Consequently, the average over-representation 
for Labor in such contests was 2.1%, while for Liberal-Country it was a quite 
large 5.13%. The DLP was under-represented by an average of 3.39%, while 
‘Others’ were under-represented by a still larger 4.57%. 
 
These figures tend to suggest that while six-member districts definitely 
favoured the Liberal and Country Parties, they did not significantly 
disadvantage the Labor Party at this time. Only once (in Victoria in 1970) did 
Labor fail to win three seats in a six-member contest. The only way in which it 
could be argued that five-member districts would have suited Labor more is 
that they would have obtained three seats out of five in SA in 1961 and NSW 
in 1970.10 To counterbalance this, however, they would have been reduced to 
two out of five seats in both NSW and Victoria in 1958. 
 
Moreover, Labor politicians of the day were aware that six-member districts 
could occasionally assist them. Consequently, the Whitlam Government in 
late 1973 hatched a plan which developed into what became known as the 
Gair Affair. The idea was that former DLP leader Vince Gair would accept a 
diplomatic post in Ireland, resign his Senate seat, and enable a six-member 
contest in Queensland at the scheduled half-Senate election in 1974. The 
plan fell through when Gair’s resignation signature could not be secured in 
time, and Queensland Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen was able to quickly fill the 
seat with a nominee of his own party. The other consequence was that the 
 
 
10 Labor was not disadvantaged in either case, because the extra vacancy was caused by the 
death of a Liberal Senator. A five seat contest would have produced a 3-2 Labor advantage in 
each case, thus ensuring the Senate numbers would have been the same as actually 
occurred. 
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federal opposition, then led by Billy Snedden, claimed to be so outraged by 
the Government’s trickiness that it blocked supply in the Senate, and Gough 
Whitlam opted for a double dissolution.11 There will be more analysis of this 
election when ten-member districts are discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Six-member contests have become a permanent feature of Australian Senate 
elections in recent years. But before considering them, a brief reference 
needs to be made to the last two Senate elections with five-member districts, 
namely 1977 and 1980. Two important changes to the political landscape had 
taken place. First, the DLP lost all its Senate seats in the 1974 double 
dissolution, and was no longer a relevant party by 1977. They had been 
replaced as the third force by the Australian Democrats, a party of the centre 
founded by former Liberal minister Don Chipp.12 Second, then Prime Minister 
Malcolm Fraser had secured an alteration to the constitution that required any 
departing Senator to be replaced by a member of the party they represented 
at the time of their election. In an acknowledgement that the principle of 
proportional representation requires the replacement senator to serve for the 
balance of the term, that requirement was included in the amendment. 
 
In the 1977 and 1980 Senate elections, the average over-representation for 
the Labor Party was 2.78%, while for the Liberal Party it was 3.36%. The 
average under-representation for the Democrats was 1.85% (a pattern which 
is common for third parties under five-member districts, as will be seen in later 
chapters), while for the others it was 4.08%. These figures seem to suggest a 
larger parties’ bonus per se, rather than a system favouring any particular 
major party. It could be that the higher Liberal-Country Party over- 




11 At the time there was no requirement for retiring senators be replaced by a member of their 
own party. 
12 Chipp was most notable for his performance as Customs Minister, in which he legislated to 
allow the publication of many previously banned books, including the D.H. Lawrence novel 
Lady Chatterley’s Lover. 
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would have happened in successful elections for Labor means, at the federal 
level at least, it cannot be measured. 
 
Double dissolution and transition elections in subsequent elections meant that 
normal half-Senate elections did not resume until 1990, by this time using six- 
member districts. On the basis of one election, Malcolm Mackerras was able 
to expound a theory that suggested that nearly all such half-Senate elections 
would result in a three-three split in each state between candidates of the left 
and right.13 This was generally true for subsequent elections, at least until 
2013, but the details as to exactly which parties are advantaged or 
disadvantaged within this constellation needs further investigation. 
 
Senate elections after 1990 
Until the 2013 Senate election, a common pattern existed during the eight 
previous Senate elections. Of the 48 contests between 1990 and 2010, 41 (or 
possibly 42, depending upon the classification of Nick Xenophon) produced a 
three-three split between left and right. The exceptions have been New South 
Wales in 1990 and 1998, when four senators from the left were elected, 
Tasmania in 2007 and 2010, when four Senators from the left were elected, 
Queensland and Victoria in 2004, when four Senators of the right were 
elected. South Australia’s status in 2007 is uncertain.14 
 
It is important to define what is meant by parties of the left and right. This 
thesis takes the view that Senate elections are overlaid, and therefore 
influenced, by the House of Representatives election generally held on the 
same day. In the lower house, a pattern of two-party competition between 
Labor and Liberal-National exists. Hence the parties of the left are classified 
as Labor, and all other parties tending to favour Labor with their preferences 
 
13 Mackerras, The Mackerras 1993 Federal Election Guide, 245. 
14 The uncertain Senator was Independent South Australian Senator Nick Xenophon. Given 
that he tended to vote with each major party bloc approximately half the time, it is probably 
best to regard him as being a senator of the centre rather than of the right, which is what 
would be required to bring the number of 3-3 splits to 42. 
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and, if elected to parliament, their parliamentary votes. Liberal-National, and 
other parties similarly favouring them, are correspondingly classified as 
parties of the right. 
 
The main reason for the even splits in most such contests is in the nature of 
the Droop quota. As Mackerras explains,15 14.3% of the vote is the quota 
required to win one Senate seat (when 6 Senators are being elected), 28.6% 
for two, 42.9% for three and 57.1% for four seats. The feat of achieving four 
seats should be viewed as the equivalent of getting more than 57% of the 
two-party preferred vote in a state, something that does not happen very 
often.16 
 
In a 2006 conference paper, Malcolm Mackerras claimed that half-Senate 
contests were ‘thoroughly stacked in favour of the Coalition.’17 Later in the 
paper, Mackerras explains why six-member districts favoured the Coalition. 
Rejecting an argument by then Prime Minister John Howard that the 1983 
reforms of the Hawke Government made it harder for the Coalition to achieve 
a majority, Mackerras claimed that: 
While the changes made in 1983 did make it more difficult for the 
Coalition to get a majority of seats in a state at a half-Senate election it 
was also made very easy for the Coalition to get half the seats in a 
state on a lowish share of the vote. The Liberal Party knew this, but 
they were not in the business of allowing the truth to get in the way of 
their propaganda.18 
Mackerras goes on to cite the 1993 New South Wales Senate race as an 
example of where the Coalition won the same number of seats as Labor 
despite an 8% primary vote deficit. This chapter will now analyse whether 
 
15 Mackerras, The Mackerras 1993 Federal Election Guide, 244. 
16 The Liberal-National Coalition achieved over 57.1% in both Queensland and South 
Australia in 1996, while Labor has achieved the feat three times, all in Tasmania, in 1998, 
2001 and 2010. Only in the 2010 case did such results manifest themselves into a 4-2 
majority for their relevant party bloc in the Senate. 
17 Mackerras, "Howard's Plan for Senate Control," 6. In e-mail correspondence with the author 
on 27 March 2014 Mackerras mentioned that this claim related only to the post-1984 
situation. 
18 Ibid., 12. 
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such a case is part of a more general pattern. For this purpose, the votes 
cast in the Territories were excluded from the analysis, as they have been 
analysed earlier in this chapter. 
 
Detailed Results 1990-2010 
It should be noted that the 2013 election will be treated separately, because 
the arrival of the Palmer United Party and several micro parties make 
classification of parties more difficult. If Palmer United is regarded as a party 
of the right (and its pattern of preference allocations suggest it should), the 
2013 results definitely provide further evidence of six-member districts 
favouring the conservative side of politics. The 2016 election, of course, is 
analysed separately because it was held under a fundamentally different 
voting system. 
 
The vote and seat shares for the two large party blocs in the 1990-2010 
elections were as follows: 
 



















1990 42% 47.2% +5.2% 38.24% 36.11% -2.13% 
1993 43.18% 47.22% +4.04% 43.32% 41.67% -1.65% 
1996 44% 50% +6% 36% 33.3% -2.7% 
1998 37.79% 41.67% +3.88% 37.18% 41.67% +4.49% 
2001 41.49% 50% +8.51% 34.33% 33.33% -1% 
2004 44.74% 52.78% +8.04% 33.02% 35.44% +2.42% 
2007 39.45% 44.4% +4.95% 40.3% 44.4% +4.1% 
2010 37.99% 44.4% +6.41% 35.13% 36.11% +0.98% 
Sources: Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbooks for elections 1990-1998, the Australian 
Electoral Commission website (https://results.aec.gov.au/) and Electoral Pocket Books (AEC, 
Canberra, 2001-2010). Note that votes cast in the territories have been excluded from the 
analysis. 
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It can be seen from the above table that the impact of the system on Labor is 
variable (its average under-representation is only 0.08%) the advantage given 
to the Liberal-National Coalition is obvious. Its average over-representation is 
5.88%, and the lowest over-representation ever achieved was still a relatively 
high 3.88%. Why is it so? A partial clue can be found by looking at the votes 
of minor parties and Independent candidates for the same period: 
 
Table 3.2 Vote and Seat Shares for Significant Minor Parties 




















1990 12.63% 13.39% 3.32% 2.78% 3.59% 0% 
1993 5.32% 5.56% 3.24% 2.78% 5.02% 2.78% 
1996 10.9% 13.8% 3.3% 2.78% 5.8% 0% 
1998 8.33% 11.11% 2.69% 0% 13.98% 5.56% 
2001 7.25% 11.11% 4.38% 5.56 12.58% 0% 
2004 2.09% 0% 7.67% 5.55% 12.48% 2.78% 
2007 1.29% 0% 9.04% 8.33% 9.92% 2.78% 
2010 0.60% 0% 13.11% 16.67% 13.17% 2.78% 
Sources: Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbooks for elections 1990-1998, the Australian 
Electoral Commission website (https://results.aec.gov.au/) and Electoral Pocket Books (AEC, 
Canberra, 2001-2010). Note that votes cast in the territories have been excluded from the 
analysis. 
 
It should be noted here that, at least during the time they were winning Senate 
seats, the Democrats tended to be slightly over-represented, while the Greens 
were, for the most part, under-represented. Overall the Democrats were over- 
represented by an average of 0.83%, while the Greens were under- 
represented by an average of 0.31%. However, if the figures for the parties 
only include the elections at which they enjoyed the status of the largest minor 
party, the Democrats were over-represented by an average of 2.11%, while 
the Greens were over-represented by an average of 1.33%. 
71  
The overall picture is therefore one that suggests the Liberal and National 
Parties, while still over-represented in five-member districts, are given a much 
greater advantage by six-member districts. Labor seems to fare slightly worse 
in six-member districts as compared to five, while the Democrats, the only 
minor party to compete successfully in both six-member and five-member 
districts, did somewhat better in six-member districts. The relatively poor seat 
returns achieved by the DLP in its heyday might be an indication of minor 
parties not faring so well in five-member districts, although preference 
allocations were probably the main factor hurting the DLP. 
 
Why has the Liberal-National coalition been so over-represented in six- 
member districts? Part of the answer, as Mackerras has argued,19 is that the 
Coalition needs to get its vote up to just 42.9% to win 50% of the seats in a 
district (i.e. a state), which is something it has rarely failed to do. Under a five- 
member district system, the Coalition needed to get close to 50% of the 
primary vote to win 60% of the seats. It did achieve this reasonably frequently, 
but not with the same regularity with which it could obtain 42.9% in elections 
after 1990.20 
 
A second factor at work is that, even in circumstances where the Coalition fell 
short of 42.9% in a state, it was assisted by the votes of small minor party and 
Independent candidates who were usually, though not exclusively, of a right of 
centre persuasion. Such candidates preferred the Coalition to both Labor and 
the larger minor parties, both of which sat on the left of the political spectrum. 
While in the pre-Whitlam period the largest minor party (the DLP) had a high 
enough vote to take seats from the Coalition, in the 1990s and 2000s such 
parties have rarely been strong enough to win seats for themselves. The 
exceptions have been Brian Harradine (Independent, Tasmania, 1993 and 
 
19 Ibid. 
20 1998 was an exception to this pattern, where the Coalition did not poll three quotas in any 
state. But in the 30 other contests held between 1990 and 2004, the Coalition polled three 
quotas in 20 of them. In only one of those (Western Australia in 1993) did the Coalition vote 
rise above 50%. 
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1998), Len Harris (One Nation, Queensland, 1998) and John Madigan (DLP, 
Victoria, 2010).21 This pattern altered somewhat in 2013, but even here, such 
gains for small parties of the right were mostly at Labor’s expense, as will be 
seen. 
 
Labor was not so fortunate. It competes hard for its potential third seat with 
other parties of the left. Sometimes it can win these contests, but more often 
than not, either the Democrats or Greens won those contests.22 It should be 
mentioned that four left senators were occasionally elected,23 and on even 
rarer occasions, four senators of the right were elected. 24 These rare results 
have been caused as often by strange preference allocations as by 
overwhelming vote superiority.25 
 
Before considering the 2013 Senate election, which was most unlike any other 
since the adoption of proportional representation, it is worth examining the 
results of Senate elections conducted under district magnitudes of seven, ten 
and twelve as a test for whether the odd-even pattern is at all modified by the 
higher magnitudes and, therefore, lower quotas. 
 
Seven-member Districts: 1949 and 1984 
Both the 1949 and 1984 elections were transition elections, in each case to 
allow for an increase in the size of the Senate. Under Section 24 of the 
Commonwealth Constitution, the Senate is required, as nearly as practicable, 
to be half the size of the House of Representatives. Accordingly, the 
 
 
21 Nick Xenophon and Steve Fielding are not included in this total. Xenophon did win his 2007 
seat at the expense of the Liberal Party, but he is classed as being of the centre rather than 
the right, while Fielding, unequivocally of the right, won his 2004 seat at Labor’s expense. 
22 In the 42 contests between 1990 and 2010 where three, and only three, left senators were 
elected, Labor won all three of those seats on ten occasions. 
23 The four cases were New South Wales in 1990 and 1998 and Tasmania in 2007 and 2010. 
24 The two cases were both in 2004, in Victoria and Queensland. 
25 The New South Wales and Victorian cases were caused by unusual preference allocations, 
while the Queensland and Tasmanian cases were caused by overwhelming vote superiority. 
An excellent analysis of the 1990 NSW Senate contest is provided by Mackerras, The 
Mackerras 1993 Federal Election Guide, 245. 
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membership of the Senate is increased if there has been an increase in the 
size of the House of Representatives. The 1949 election was also the first 
conducted under proportional representation, and it produced the following 
vote and seat shares: 
 
Table 3.3 Vote and Seat Shares for the Main Parties: Senate 
Election, 1949 
 
Party Vote Share Seat Share +/- level of 
representation 
Liberal-Country 50.41% 54.76% +4.35% 
Labor 44.89% 45.27% +0.38% 
Communist 2.09% 0% -2.09% 
Others 2.6% 0% -2.6% 
Source: Colin A. Hughes, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, Volume 1 
(Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1965), 379-85. 
 
There were 42 seats contested at this election. The Liberal and Country 
Parties won 23 of these seats, with that total being made up of four seats out 
of seven in every state except South Australia, where it won three. The Labor 
Party’s 19 seats were made up of four in South Australia and three in every 
other state.26 
 
The figures for this election show that the Liberal-Country Coalition gained an 
advantage from the seven-member district system. However, it is likely that 
such an advantage arises from a winner’s bonus rather than systemic bias. A 
party receiving 50% of the vote in such a district would gain 57.1% of the 
seats, and the Coalition achieved this in five states. Also, with a reasonable 
proportion of the minor party vote cast for an unsuccessful party of the left (the 
Communist Party),27 the Labor Party did not have the problem it had from the 




26 Figures provided here have been sourced from Hughes and Graham, A Handbook of 
Australian Government and Politics, 1. 
27 See Chapter Six of this thesis for a further exploration of this point. 
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A guide to how this worked in practice is provided by the 1984 Senate 
election, which coincided with the House election that saw the Hawke 
Government re-elected for a second term. It was also the first election in 
which voters were given the option of voting for a party ticket in the Senate, an 
option that was utilised by 85.3% of voters casting a formal vote.28 The vote 
and seat shares for the parties were as follows: 
 
Table 3.4 Vote and Seat Shares for the Main Parties: Senate 
Election, 1984 
 
Party Vote Share Seat Share +/-Level of 
Representation 
Labor 42.11% 42.86% +0.75% 
Liberal-National 39.6% 42.86% +3.26% 
Democrats 7.62% 11.9% +4.28% 
Other 10.67% 2.38% -8.29% 
Source: Malcolm Mackerras, The Mackerras 1993 Federal Election Guide (Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993), 223. 
 
The seat tallies were identical in five of the six states. Western Australia was 
the odd one out, returning three Labor, three Liberal-National and one Nuclear 
Disarmament Party (NDP), while the eastern states returned three Labor, 
three Liberal-National and one Democrat. 
 
Part of the reason the Liberal-National Coalition was more over-represented 
than Labor is due to the fact that, in spite of polling a lower vote than Labor, 
the Liberal-National vote did not drop below three quotas (37.5%) in any state, 
thus ensuring an overall seat share of 42.9%. Labor’s vote was also above 
three quotas in every state, and it enjoyed a primary vote lead over Liberal- 
National in all states except Queensland and Tasmania, but the strength of 
the Democrats and the Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP) meant that Labor 
did not gain any extra seats from its vote advantage as the Liberal-Country 
Coalition had in 1949. 
 
 
28 Mackerras, "In Defence of the Present Australian Senate Electoral System". 
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In three of the four states where Labor enjoyed a primary vote lead over 
Liberal-National (New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia), the fourth 
Labor candidate had a lower vote share than both the leading Democrat and 
NDP candidates at the point where all other candidates had been eliminated, 
so it was Labor preferences that ensured wins for Democrat candidates over 
NDP rivals.29 In Western Australia it was the preferences of sitting Democrat 
Senator Jack Evans that ensured victory for the NDP’s Jo Vallentine over the 
fourth placed Labor candidate. (The ticket voting option ensured that they 
flowed very strongly.) The NDP was the party most under-represented at this 
election, but their preferences helped Democrat candidates defeat 
conservative rivals in Queensland and Tasmania. 
 
This election does tend to give support to the proposition that the higher the 
district magnitude, the easier it is for minor parties to gain representation. This 
point will be revisited when the results from Western Australia, Tasmania and 
the Australian Capital Territory are examined. 
 
Double Dissolution Elections 1951, 1974, 1975, 1983 and 1987 
A comparison of these five elections is difficult given they were conducted in 
different political eras, and with the presence of different minor parties. 
However, the first three do have the twin features of having the same district 
magnitude (10 members) and a low success rates for minor party and 









29 The most notable of these NDP candidates was Midnight Oil lead singer Peter Garrett, who 
was defeated by Democrat Senator Colin Mason for the last seat in New South Wales. 
Garrett later became a Labor member of the House of Representatives between 2004 and 
2013, and a minister in the Rudd and Gillard Governments. 
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Table 3.5 Vote and Seat Shares for the Main Parties: Double 




















1951 49.69% 53.33% 45.88% 46.67% 4.43% 0% 
1974 45.94% 48.33% 47.29% 48.33% 6.77% 3.33% 
1975 51.85% 55% 40.99% 40.67% 7.28% 3.33% 
Sources: Colin, A Hughes, Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, Vol. 1 for 1951, 
385-91; Vol. 2 for 1974, 98-104; and Vol. 3 for 1975, 129-40. 
 
On average the Liberal-Country-Coalition was over-represented by 3.06%, 
Labor was over-represented by 0.51% and ‘Others’ were under-represented 
by 3.94%. The ‘Others’ figure suggests that any advantage gained by smaller 
parties due to the lower quota (9.09%) was more than counteracted by the 
polarised political climate that tends to apply at double dissolution elections. 
Under this system, a party required 54.54% to gain a sixth seat in any state. In 
1951 the Coalition achieved this in Queensland and Western Australia. In 
1974 they achieved it in Queensland, while in 1975 they achieved it in 
Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia. Conversely, a party was only at 
risk of not winning five seats if its vote dropped below 45.45%. In the first two 
of these elections, Labor suffered this fate only in the states previously 
mentioned where the Coalition won six seats. In each election this effect was 
compensated for by the fact that Labor polled above this figure in most states 
without going over 50%. In 1975, however, only in New South Wales did 
Labor win five seats. South Australia and Tasmania elected Steele Hall 
(Liberal Movement) and Brian Harradine (Independent) respectively, in 
addition to five Liberals. Consequently, Labor was slightly under-represented 
at this election. 
 
The 1983 Senate election shared the similarity with the previous three double 
dissolution elections in that it used ten-member districts, but it differed from 
them in that there was a significant minor party (the Australian Democrats) 
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with strength in several states. The representation levels for the major parties 
were as follows: 
 
Table 3.6 Vote and Seat Shares for the Main Parties: Senate 
Election, 1983 
 
Party Vote Share Seat Share +/- Level of 
Representation 
Labor 45.32% 46.67% +1.35% 
Liberal-National 40.44% 43.33% +2.89% 
Democrats 9.55% 8.33% -1.22% 
Others 4.69% 1.66% -3.03% 
Source: Colin A. Hughes, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, Volume 3, 164- 
76. 
 
Even in defeat, the Liberal-National over-representation was higher than 
Labor’s. This pattern was to repeat at the 1987 double dissolution election 
(which was fought on the basis of twelve-member districts), as the table below 
shows, but as will be seen later, the advantage was not as big as the one the 
conservative parties were to enjoy in six-member districts between 1990 and 
2010. 
 
Table 3.7 Vote and Seat Shares for the Main Parties: Senate 
Election, 1987 
 
Party Vote Share Seat Share +/- Level of 
Representation 
Labor 42.13% 41.67% -0.46% 
Liberal-National 42.64% 44.44% +1.8% 
Democrats 8.50% 9.72% +1.22% 
Others 6.73% 4.17% -2.56% 
Source: Colin A. Hughes, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, Volume 4, 221. 
 
In addition to the small advantage for the Liberal-National Coalition, it is also 
noticeable the advantage enjoyed by the two largest parties is lower than in 
Senate elections previously discussed. This is consistent with conventional 
wisdom that suggests proportionality should increase as district magnitude 
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increases. However, this pattern was not to be repeated at the only other 
Senate election with twelve-member districts, the most recent election of 
2016. As will be seen, the differing pattern of the 2016 election demonstrates 
the importance of ballot paper numbering requirements and preference 
allocation rules. 
 
The Overall Pattern 1949-2010 
It may be the case that there are too few cases of seven-, ten- and twelve- 
member district elections to make their results statistically valid. However, the 
number of two-member, five-member and six-member districts is now quite 
large. The table below shows the over-representation and/or under- 
representation levels for the main competing parties during the years in which 
particular district magnitudes were used and particular party constellations 
were in place. 
 










+10.65% +6.35% - -8.06% -9.63% -5.98% 
5 member 
(1953-1970) 
+3.90% +1.02% -4.28% - - -0.78% 
5 member 
(1977-1980) 
+3.60% +2.78% -1.05% -1.85% - -4.08% 
6 member 
(1958-1970) 
+5.13% +2.01% -3.90% - - -4.57% 
6 member 
(1990-2013) 
+5.88% -0.08% - +0.83% -0.31% -7.48% 
Sources: Colin A. Hughes, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, Volumes 1-4 
and Australian Electoral Commission website (https://results.aec.gov.au/) 
 
It can be seen here that the Liberal and Country/National Parties have 
enjoyed a higher level of representation in seats than their vote percentage 
would suggest on every occasion and set of conditions. The advantage was, 
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however, most pronounced in six-member districts, and even more so in two- 
member districts. Since a combination of these two magnitudes applied for 
Senate elections held between 1990 and 2013, it is no surprise that 
Mackerras asserted in 2006 that Senate elections ‘are stacked in favour of the 
Coalition.’30 The three Senate elections that followed showed that while the 
level of Liberal-National advantage had diminished slightly, it still existed. 
 
For the record, in the eight elections held between 1990 and 2010, the Liberal 
and National Parties were over-represented by an average of 5.78%, ranging 
from a high of 8.2% in 2001 to a low of 4.5% in 1993. There is clear evidence, 
therefore, that a combination of six-member and two-member districts 
produces a systemic bias in favour of the Coalition. On the occasions before 
the mid-1970s, where six-member districts operated, the Coalition was also 
advantaged, albeit by a smaller 5.1%. 
 
However, the post-1990 landscape differed markedly from the earlier period in 
that a systemic bias against Labor appeared in the 1990s which had not 
applied up to 1970. The main demonstrable reason would appear to be the 
fierce competition with other parties of the left for the sixth Senate place. Of 
the 42 such Senate contests where parties of the left won three, and only 
three, seats, Labor won all three in just ten of the contests. In the pre-1970s 
examples Labor had no serious competition on the left, and there was only 
one contest (Victoria in 1970) where Labor failed to win three seats out of six. 
So it is fair to say that Labor is hurt more by the changing nature of the party 
system than by six-member districts per se. 
 
The irony of this situation is that the change has resulted from legislation 
introduced by the Hawke Labor Government in 1984, which was then 
opposed by the Liberal Party but supported by the Nationals. It is also ironic 
that the Democrats, who had also opposed the expansion of parliamentary 
 
30 Mackerras, "Howard's Plan for Senate Control". 
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numbers, profited from six-member districts during the years they were a 
political force. The architect of the changes, then Labor Senator Graham 
Richardson, gives no indication in his memoirs that he envisaged such a 
situation occurring.31 
 
The contrast with the situation that applied in five-member districts is different 
in some ways, but somewhat similar in others. The figures in Table 3.8 show 
that Labor did better in five-member districts than in six-member ones, 
although the pre-1970s pattern is less stark than a comparison of 1977-80 
and post 1990 figures. Yet for the Liberal and National/Country Parties there 
was still some level of advantage, though not as great as the post-1990s 
situation. Again this is somewhat ironic, as both parties had opposed the 
introduction of proportional representation in 1948. 
 
The 2013 Senate Election 
The 2013 federal election ended six years of (mostly) divided Labor rule and 
installed Tony Abbott as Prime Minister. Such a result was not unexpected, 
but the accompanying Senate result certainly was. Four additional parties won 
at least one seat, with the Palmer United Party winning three seats (one of 
which came after a re-run of the WA Senate election following the 
disappearance of some ballot papers at the general election).32 
 
In its morning-after editorial the online journal Crikey referred to the Senate 
result and asked ‘Australia, what were you thinking there?’33 It is argued here 
that the ‘what’ should probably have been omitted: the strange results and 
especially some of the preference distributions suggest that many Australians 
cast an unthinking vote. This thesis is not being critical of those voters: as will 
be argued, the 1984-2014 Senate voting system made it very easy to cast an 
 
 
31 Graham Richardson, Whatever It Takes (Sydney: Bantam, 1994), 144-47. 
32 A summary of events leading up to the calling of a fresh Senate election is provided in the 
West Australian, "New Poll on Cards after High Court Ruling", 19 February 2014. 
33 Crikey! "Election night wrap." 8 September 2013. 
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unthinking vote, and made it much harder to cast a thinking vote than needed 
to be the case. Partly as a response to the 2013 Senate election, the 
Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Act 2016 was passed. The new rules 
introduced by this Act made it much easier for voters to clearly indicate their 
voting preferences. The impact of these changes, as measured by results of 
the 2016 double dissolution election, will be analysed later. 
 
The 2013 Senate vote (based on a combination of the general election of 7 
September 2013 and the Western Australian re-run election of 5 April 2014) 
left the Liberal and National Parties over-represented. A nationwide primary 
vote of 37.7% delivered the Liberal and National Parties 42.5% of the seats. If 
the territories are excluded, the Liberal-National vote share was 37.2% and 
their seat share was 41.7%, meaning that the conservative forces were over- 
represented by either 3.8% or 4.5%.34 It can thus be seen that, even allowing 
for the unusual nature of the Senate result, the Liberal and National Parties 
cannot claim to be disadvantaged by the system: they secured their standard 
over-representation in six-member districts. As will be seen, it is also difficult 
to justify Antony Green’s claim that preference deals among smaller parties 
may have cost the Liberal Party two or three seats.35 
 
Where the democratic legitimacy of the result can be questioned is in the 
number of minor parties to win seats in parliament with very small primary 
vote shares. The Palmer United Party won three seats (7.5% of available 
seats) with an overall vote of 5.6%, but the legitimacy of this result was not 
widely questioned. The winners of seats whose legitimacy has been 
questioned were David Leyonhjelm (Liberal Democrats, NSW), and Ricky 
Muir (Australian Motoring Enthusiasts, Victoria). The South Australian result, 
where the final results were two Liberal, one Labor, one Greens, one Family 
First and Independent Nick Xenophon, also raises issues of democratic 
 
34 Results have been obtained from the Australian Electoral Commission website, with 
appropriate adjustments made by the author. 
35 Green, "Explaining the Results". 
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legitimacy that have not been as widely questioned by journalists or the 
general public. However, the greatest question of legitimacy posed by the 
2013 Senate vote arose from the 2013 vote in Western Australia, where the 
Australian Sports Party’s Wayne Dropulich was formally declared to have won 
a seat after a recount, despite receiving only 0.23% of the overall first 
preference vote. The Australian Electoral Commission had requested that the 
High Court overturn this result on the basis that some votes had disappeared 
during the recount process.36 The High Court duly did so.37 
 
The reason for Dropulich’s short-lived success lies in the fact that the 
Australian Christians had stayed ahead of the Shooters and Fishers Party 
during the recount. Consequently, the Shooters and Fishers were then 
excluded and their preferences went overwhelmingly to the Sports Party, 
keeping them in the count. Because of the existence of the original preference 
count, we know that if the Shooters and Fishers had finished ahead of the 
Christians, the Christians’ preferences would have gone to the Shooters and 
Fishers, putting them ahead of the Sports Party and knocking the latter out. 
Even more bizarrely, the continuation of the Shooters and Fishers would have 
enabled the election of Labor’s Louise Pratt and defeating the Greens’ Scott 
Ludlam, while the latter was successful in the botched recount. 
 
The irony of this situation is that the Australian Christians had placed the 
Greens last on their preference ticket, but by staying in the count for one 
stage longer, they would have enabled the election of a Greens senator 
ahead of Labor. Even more troubling from the point of view of democratic 
legitimacy was the ability for a party’s candidate to be elected with as low a 
first preference vote as the Sports Party received (just 0.23%). It is especially 
troubling because many voters were not making a deliberate choice to prefer 
 
 
36 West Australian, "Hold new poll, AEC tells court", 21 January 2014. 
37 High Court of Australia; Australian Electoral Commission v Johnston (C17/2013), Wang v. 
Johnston (P55/2013) and Mead v. Johnston (P56/2013). The judgment was delivered on 18 
February 2014. 
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this candidate but were, in effect, hostage to unknown preference deals 
carried out by minor parties and groups, due to (and understandable) 
considering the task of numbering all squares below the line too onerous. 
 
A similar situation applied in Victoria, where the Motoring Enthusiasts’ Ricky 
Muir was elected despite receiving only 0.51% of the first preference vote and 
finishing behind twelve other parties and groups. Muir’s election did not 
depend on a close decision as to the order of elimination of unsuccessful 
candidates, but the Liberal-National coalition felt hard done by in that it won 
only two seats in Victoria after receiving 2.81 quotas, while the Motoring 
Enthusiasts won a seat in spite of receiving only 0.04 quotas. The 
consequence of the preference tickets was that small parties of the right, as 
well as some on the left, preferred the Motoring Enthusiasts to Liberal- 
National. Had the voters been allowed to vote below the line by, let us say, 
numbering from 1 to 6 with further preferences optional (an option they were 
given in 2016) there is little doubt that more of these preferences would have 
drifted off to Liberal-National (there is some evidence from Victorian 
Legislative Council elections that preference flows are not quite as tight where 
optional preferential voting below the line exists) and this would most likely 
have enabled them to win the last seat. 
 
The controversy over the result in New South Wales stemmed not from 
unusual preference distributions, but because it was argued that some voters 
voted for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), who had drawn Group A (and 
were thus first listed) on the ballot paper, mistakenly thinking they were voting 
Liberal National. The Liberal Democrats, dubbed ‘the party for Liberal voters 
who can’t read’ by Insiders compere Barrie Cassidy, received 9.5% of the 
Senate vote, compared to 3.91% across the country as a whole. There was a 
positive swing of 7.19% in NSW compared to an increase of 2.10% 
nationwide. Antony Green has presented even more convincing evidence that 
there were many intending Liberal-National voters among the LDP vote, with 
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the Liberal-National Senate vote being the lowest since 1934, while the 
Liberal-National House vote was the highest since 1975.38 Further evidence of 
possible voter confusion is provided by the fact that the LDP support among 
postal voters was 11.1% and 13.8% among pre-poll voters. On the Monday 
before Election Day, 2GB radio announcers Alan Jones and Ray Hadley 
began a campaign to inform their listeners of the potential for confusion, and 
Hadley emphasised that the Liberal-National team occupied column Y. In a 
gesture of what he would consider fairness, Hadley also informed his listeners 
that Labor occupied column M.39 The campaign probably had some impact, 
the LDP vote among ordinary voters was only 9%, although absentee voters 
gave the LDP 12.9% of their votes.40 
 
It is difficult to argue, however, that the confusion created by the Liberal 
Democrats and their position cost the Liberal-Nationals a seat. As Malcolm 
Mackerras has pointed out, Liberal-National did win three seats out of six, 
their usual tally in a half-Senate election. Secondly, there is some evidence 
that groups drawing the left hand column on a ballot paper can benefit from a 
donkey vote and this was true even in the days before ticket voting was 
introduced (see the following chapter on minor parties and the performance of 
the Communist Party in the 1950s). And most importantly, the evidence from 
other states is that parties like the Liberal Democrats received a far higher 
preference share from smaller parties than did the Liberal Party – witness 
Victoria, where Liberal-National’s 2.81 quotas did not win it a third seat. Even 
if the entire increase in the Liberal Democrats vote is given to the Liberal- 
National ticket, bringing them to around 41.4% (around 2.9 quotas), there 






38 Green, "Explaining the Results," 406. 
39 Ray Hadley on 2GB, 2 September 2013. Hadley also spearheaded an unsuccessful 
campaign to oust then Treasurer Chris Bowen from his seat of McMahon. 
40 AEC 2013 NSW Senate results see: https://results.aec.gov.au/17496/Website 
/SenateStateFirstPrefsByVoteType-17496-NSW.htm (accessed 27 October 2014). 
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South Australia seems a more likely, though less obvious example of where 
the democratic legitimacy of the result can be questioned. The major 
complicating factor was the incredible level of support gained by Independent 
Senator Nick Xenophon, whose 24.9% vote share broke the record for an 
independent Senate candidate set by Tasmania’s Brian Harradine in 1980. 
Both the Labor (22.7%) and Liberal (27.5%) parties were reduced to less than 
two quotas, but of the three leading groups, only the Liberals won two seats. 
The seat that Labor might have won with its 1.58 quotas was won by the 
Greens with 0.49 quotas, while the seat that Xenophon’s group might have 
won with its 1.74 quotas was won by Family First with 0.26 quotas. 
 
Xenophon’s number two, Stirling Griff, would appear to be the most obvious 
victim of preference ticket manipulation. It would not have been thought likely 
that Family First could catch up to him on the basis of minor party 
preferences. Both Labor and the Greens had placed Family First’s lead 
candidate, Bob Day, higher than Griff on their preference tickets. It is at this 
point that the question ‘did the voters get what they voted for?’ arises. In one 
sense they did, as, in voting for a party ticket, the voter has allowed their 
preferred party to distribute their preferences as the party thought fit. But it is 
argued here that, especially in the case of Labor voters, they achieved the 
election of a man they would, if given the opportunity to choose for 
themselves, probably not have wanted to elect. Day, a former building 
company owner, is a founding member of the HR Nicholls Society, an 
organisation whose guiding objective is the complete deregulation of the 
industrial relations system and, although less explicitly stated, supported the 
emasculation of trade unions.41 This, it is argued, is the exact opposite of what 
a traditional Labor voter would desire. 
 
The idea that Greens voters would prefer Day to Griff is less obvious, but it 
would still seem to be highly unlikely. Day had not been noted for expressing 
 
41 For an explanation of how the HR Nicholls Society gained its name, see Paul Kelly, The 
End of Certainty: The Story of the 1980s (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1992), 260-61. 
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concern for the environment in his pre-Senate days, and his status as a 
climate change sceptic was confirmed in late 2015 during a radio panel 
discussion.42 Furthermore, the fact that the Climate Change Sceptics placed 
Day very high up on their preference ticket suggests they were aware that he 
held a similar view to them on the subject. 
 
Some Labor supporters would no doubt have felt aggrieved that their party 
failed to win a second seat in SA despite winning 1.58 quotas, while the 
Greens won a seat with just 0.49 quotas. These feelings would have been 
strengthened if they had been under the impression that the preferences of 
the Climate Change Sceptics had been decisive. While it is true that the 
latter’s ticket gave preferences to Greens ahead of Labor, this factor was not 
of vital importance as, in the interim, Climate Change Sceptic votes went to 
Bob Day. It was the distribution of Palmer United Party (PUP) preferences that 
gave the Greens’ Sarah Hanson-Young a decisive lead over Labor’s number 
two candidate Don Farrell. Prior to this distribution, Farrell had led Hanson- 
Young on 88,276 votes to 85,365. Hanson-Young received 26,840 of the 
PUP’s 28,187 votes, while Farrell received just 250 votes. 
 
The decision of PUP to preference the Greens ahead of both Labor and 
Xenophon tickets may have been partly based on one piece of common policy 
ground (on asylum seekers) that Clive Palmer shared with Hanson-Young,43 
but it is also possible that the decision was based on tactical considerations 
alone. Whatever the reasons for the decision, it can be claimed with 
confidence that not nearly as many PUP voters would have given their 





42 891 ABC Adelaide. 2 December 2015. Speaking to Matthew Abraham and David Bevan 
between 8.30am and 9am, Day argued that climate change was not caused by human 
behaviour but by the changing behaviour of the sun. 
43 The best account of Palmer’s philosophies is provided by Guy Rundle, "Clivosaurus: the 
Politics of Clive Palmer," Quarterly Essay, no. 56 (2014). Palmer has expressed some 
sympathy for the plight of asylum seekers, while Hanson-Young has been one of their 
staunchest advocates for many years. 
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2016 Senate election suggests that very few PUP voters preferred the Greens 
to a range of other parties. 
 
There is, however, one aspect of the results in which Farrell could claim to be 
hard done by, and at the same time call into question the idea that Stirling 
Griff deserved to win a seat. How many people who voted for Xenophon were 
really voting for Griff as well? On the face of it, quite a number did, as of the 
109,873 surplus votes of Xenophon, 106,935 (97.3%) went to Griff. This is a 
very high number, though not as high as the 99.1% transferring from Labor’s 
Penny Wong to her number two candidate Don Farrell, or the 99.9% 
transferring from Liberal’s Cory Bernardi to his number two candidate Simon 
Birmingham. The point being made here is that like most other voters, most 
people wishing to vote for Xenophon found the task of numbering all 73 
squares below the line too onerous, and therefore opted to vote for Xenophon 
above the line. 
 
Supporters of Griff might well put the argument forward that people voting for 
the number one Liberal and Labor candidates may have been intending to 
vote for Bernardi and Wong and might have been expressing a personal vote 
for Bernardi and Wong without necessarily wanting to vote for Birmingham 
and Farrell. The evidence of the 2016 Senate election, when both a number 
‘1’ vote for group ticket or a vote from 1-6 vote for candidates below the line 
were both valid options, a far larger percentage of major party voters intend 
their votes to be for the ticket than do Xenophon team voters. While 95.3% of 
2016 Liberal votes and 93.1% of Labor votes were ticket votes, only 88.6% of 
Nick Xenophon Team votes were ticket votes. 
 
While Xenophon Team voters showed more independence than major party 
supporters, it pales in comparison with the supporters of Tasmanian 
Independent Brian Harradine over thirty years earlier. In the last two Senate 
election held before the introduction of ticket voting (1980 and 1983), voters 
were required to number all squares below the line if they wanted to cast a 
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valid vote. This task was not as difficult as it might have been in later 
elections, with only 13 candidates to choose from in 1980 and 17 in 1983. 
 
In 1980, only 39.6% of Harradine’s preferences flowed to his number two 
candidate, while the percentages for Liberal and Labor voters following their 
party’s instructions were 94.1% and 96.8% respectively.44 In 1983, 54% of 
Harradine’s voters went to his number two candidate, while the corresponding 
figures for Liberal and Labor were 86.5% and 92.4% respectively. Hughes 
sounded a word of caution in that Tasmania could be quite atypical in the 
level of independence displayed by its voters at Senate elections.45 
 
Because of their long experience with a single transferable vote system in 
their state lower house, it could be argued that Tasmanians have more 
confidence in marking ‘below the line’ ballot papers. The fact that Tasmania 
usually has a lower number of Senate candidates than the mainland states 
probably also played a role in this. There was evidence that some level of 
independence still existed in 2013: 10.3% of Tasmanian electors voted below 
the line in the Senate, compared to only 3.5% across the nation.46 This did 
have some impact on the result: the leakage of votes to the number three 
Labor candidate kept her in the count longer, and enabled the election of 
PUP’s Jacqui Lambie instead of the leading Sex Party candidate. It will later 
be seen that in 2016, the independent spirit of Tasmanian voters rose to even 
higher levels. 
 
What would Xenophon voters had done if the 2016 voting rules had existed in 
2013? If we assume a transfer rate to Griff at the same rate as 2016, this 
would, on the 2013 figures, have left Griff on 7.95%, or 0.56 quotas. This is 
lower than both the second Liberal candidate (0.92 quotas) and Labor’s 
 
44 Hughes, "A Close-Run Thing," 235. 
45 Colin A. Hughes, "An Election About Perceptions," in Australia at the Polls: The National 
Elections of 1983 and 1984, ed. Howard Penniman (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 
316. 
46 See Appendix 1 for details of the above and below the line votes for the 2013 Senate 
election. 
89  
number two (0.59 quotas), but more than the Greens (0.50 quotas). Assuming 
the Greens still finished ahead of Labor on PUP preferences, Griff is 
eliminated before Farrell (he received next to no preferences from other 
groups), and when his preferences were distributed, half of the ticket votes 
went to Labor, the other half to Liberal. This, surely, was enough to keep 
Labor well ahead of the Greens, and Labor would thus have picked up 
Greens preferences when Sarah Hanson-Young was excluded. 
 
On 14 September 2015, Malcolm Turnbull became Prime Minister after 
defeating Tony Abbott in a party room coup. Mackerras claims, without 
providing supporting evidence, that the leadership change was crucial in 
facilitating changes to the Senate voting system.47 Whatever the accuracy of 
the claim, the new Turnbull Government initiated moves to change the system 
in February 2016. The Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Act 2016 was 
passed by both houses on 18 March. Under the new system voters were 
instructed to vote for at least six groups above the line (though one box above 
the line would have been sufficient to cast a valid vote) or to vote for at least 
12 candidates below the line. The new voting system was used for the first 
time at the double dissolution election of 2 July 2016, with very interesting 
results. What can we say about the situation as it has applied thus far? 
 
The 2016 Election: A Batch of Paradoxes 
The Turnbull Government secured re-election at the 2 July election with a 
majority of two seats over all other parties and independents. This was the 
close result that the polls had predicted, although the number of Labor gains 




47 Malcolm Mackerras, "Recent Controversies Regarding the Senate Electoral System," 
Submission 106 to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, 2016, regarding the 
Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Bill 2016, 22, available at 
https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx? id=1efc5d5e-f1ac-4633-be09- 
3b7d79906753&subId=409707 (accessed 7 May 2019). 
48 Labor sources quoted by Chris Uhlmann on ABC TV News and the ABC’s 7.30 by Sabra 
Lane on the three nights before Election Day had predicted the party’s seat gain would be in 
single digits. As it happened, Labor won 69 seats, 14 more than it had won in 2013. 
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contrary to both major party’s expectations. It seems likely that Malcolm 
Turnbull might have hoped that calling a double dissolution would have meant 
that many of the non-Greens crossbench senators would be defeated. Had he 
chosen a normal half-Senate election, all but the independent (but elected as 
DLP member) John Madigan would have been guaranteed to serve another 
three years. 
 
These hopes were dashed when 11 crossbench senators were elected, three 
more than in the old Senate. The decline in the major party vote continued: 
the Liberal-National vote fell 2.5% to 35.2% and was its lowest ever under 
proportional representation. Labor’s vote of 29.8% was only 0.2% higher than 
its 2013 nadir. Yet the seat shares for the major parties only partly reflected 
this. The Liberal-National total of 30 seats was three down on 2013, yet its 
seat share of 39.5% meant it was over-represented by 4.3%. Labor’s seat tally 
of 26 was just one seat more than in 2013, but its seat share of 34.2% saw it 
over-represented by 4.4%, the reverse of the 1990-2013 pattern. 
 
The Greens vote of 8.7% was down 0.5% on 2013, and it lost one seat, but its 
seat share of 11.8% still left it over-represented by 3.1%. Other parties to win 
multiple Senate seats were Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (4.3% of votes and 
four seats, 5.3%), and the Nick Xenophon Team (3.3% of the vote and three 
seats, 3.9 %.) The other seats were won by Liberal Democrats (David 
Leyonhjelm), Family First (Bob Day), Derryn Hinch’s Justice Party and the 
Jacqui Lambie Network, the latter two represented by their respective 
founders. The Palmer United Party’s Dio Wang, the Motoring Enthusiasts’ 
Ricky Muir, Independent (former PUP) Glenn Lazarus and Madigan were all 
defeated. 
 
In an ironic outcome, the Labor Party, which had opposed the voting changes, 
turned out to be the most over-represented party under the new system, while 
the legislation’s co-sponsors, the Liberal-Nationals and the Greens, both lost 
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seats. The Xenophon Team was the only party that had supported the change 
and did better under the new system. 
 
Just after the Electoral Act Amendment Bill had passed the Senate, Labor 
Senate leader Penny Wong predicted that Labor would benefit from the new 
system. Not many other politicians, journalists or commentators appeared to 
grasp this point, and one academic, Nick Economou, predicted that the 
changes would hurt Labor in certain circumstances.49 Yet although not widely 
understood, this thesis argues that Labor was always likely to be a beneficiary 
of the new system, for one major reason. 
 
The key to Labor’s improved chances in the Senate lies in the introduction of 
optional preferential voting. While introducing such a system for the House of 
Representatives might well hurt Labor because it could reduce the flow of 
Greens preferences to Labor in many key seats, Labor got very little benefit 
from Greens preferences, or indeed any other party’s preferences, in the 
Senate. Most of the small parties of the right favoured Liberal-National over 
both Labor and the Greens, so even in cases where such parties preferred 
Labor to the Greens, such preferences rarely went that far. On the other hand, 
small parties of the left have tended to favour the Greens over Labor on their 
preference tickets. 
 
With preferences now likely to leak to Labor at higher rates under the new 
system, as well as the capacity for both above and below the line votes to 
exhaust, Labor does not have the vast majority of preferences ranged against 
it any more, and can now hope to win seats with candidates who have much 
less than a full quota after the exclusion of successful candidates higher up 
the ticket. Thus Labor benefitted from the new system in Queensland (3.43 
quotas and four seats), Western Australia (3.67 quotas and four seats) and 
Tasmania (4.36 quotas and five seats). Only in South Australia (3.61 quotas 
and only three seats) where the existence of the Xenophon Team meant there 
 
49 Economou, "An Instance of Cartel Behaviour". 
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were effectively three major parties, did Labor fail to benefit from the new 
system. 
 
The fact that distances from full quotas and orders of exclusion for 
unsuccessful candidates were not remotely similar in any of the critical states 
makes precise comparisons less reliable. But a comparison of the preference 
shares received by WA Labor’s Senate candidate Louise Pratt at the 2014 re- 
run and the 2016 election clearly illustrate the point. 
 
Table 3.9 Share of Minor and Micro Party Preferences Flowing 

























19,245 990 5.13 5,808 790 13.6 215 3.7 
Shooters 
& Fishers 
32,906 161 0.19 48,069 9,862 20.5 13,521 28.3 
Christians 24,924 216 0.87 37,483 4,510 12.0 14,258 38.0 
Liberal 
D’crats 
46,286 401 0.87 13,895 1,352 11.0 1,191 8.6 
HEMP 97,078 45,234 46.62 36,317 5,104 14.1 5,481 15.1 
Animal 
Justice 
8,467 34 0.41 21,289 2,183 10.3 2,731 12.8 
Family 
First 
9,227 29 0.31 12,864 1,314 10.2 745 5.8 
Source: Australian Electoral Commission: https://results.aec.gov.au/ (accessed 10 October 
2016). 
 
The deviating case of HEMP (simply explained by the fact that a Greens 
candidate remained in the count in 2016 but not in 2014) should not be 
allowed to obscure the general pattern: while Labor was receiving next to no 
preferences from small parties of mostly right of centre persuasion in 2013 (of 
the other groups in the table, only Animal Justice could be considered left of 
centre), it was receiving packages of a few thousand votes from such 
candidates in 2016, as well as 11,289 of the 40,289 votes (28%) flowing from 
the centrist Nick Xenophon Team candidate. 
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These preferences are all very useful when a candidate is somewhere 
between 35,000-40,000 votes short of a quota after the exclusion of their 
successful and unsuccessful team-mates, as Pratt was. The few exhausted 
votes recorded, although small, could have also been of assistance to Pratt 
(although they did not actually matter in 2016) as they left open the possibility 
of her election even if she fell just short of a full quota. Under pre-2016 rules, 
such votes would have stayed in the count and, more likely than not in the 
circumstances of 2013 or 2014, gone to a candidate other than Pratt. 
 
The 2016 law changes similarly assisted both Liberal-National and Greens in 
some cases. The states where Liberal-National won more seats than quotas 
were New South Wales (4.68 quotas and five seats), Victoria (4.34 quotas 
and five seats) and Queensland (4.59 quotas and five seats). The Greens 
won more seats than quotas in all six states, although in the states where it 
won just one seat (New South Wales, 0.96 quotas, Queensland, 0.89 quotas 
and South Australia, 0.77 quotas) their vote was likely to be high enough to 
win a seat under any voting system. In the states where the Greens won two 
seats they were well short of two quotas in all of them, with 1.39 quotas in 
Victoria, 1.37 quotas in Western Australia and 1.45 quotas in Tasmania. 
Whether the Greens would have won a second seat in these states under the 
old rules is difficult to say. The answer is likely to be ‘yes’ for Victoria, where 
the Greens did not compete with a Labor candidate for the last spot on the left 
(leaving the status of Derryn Hinch to one side for a moment), and it is likely 
that the Greens would have received enough from small parties of the left had 
ticket voting arrangements still been in operation. 
 
The two smaller states are more problematic. In Western Australia, the 
Greens’ Siewert would have started well behind Labor’s Pratt, and while the 
Greens might have received enough preferences from small parties of the left 
to push Siewert ahead, there is no guarantee of this. 
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One claim this thesis makes with confidence is that there is no way the left as 
a whole would have won six seats under the old rules. Labor received just 
46.5% of the two-party preferred vote in WA House of Representatives seats, 
which is only just ahead of where a party would need to be to win 6 out of 12 
Senate seats in a double dissolution. Given that some of this Labor vote came 
as a result of preferences from minor parties of the right which, in the context 
of Senate election, would have exchanged preferences among themselves 
before reaching Labor or Greens, and with the old rules ensuring a more 
disciplined flow of preferences than actually happened, it is likely a minor 
party of the right would have won a seat at the expense of either Labor or the 
Greens. 
 
Tasmania provided the most interesting result of the 2016 Senate election. 
Australia’s smallest state provided the closest contest for the final seat, with 
the Greens’ number two candidate Nick McKim edging out One Nation’s 
leading candidate Kate McCulloch by 141 votes to claim the twelfth spot. But 
the count was interesting for reasons other than just this. Given Tasmania’s 
use of Hare-Clark at state level, it could reasonably have been expected 
Tasmanian voters would show a greater level of independence by voting 
below the line at a higher rate than in other states. The fact that Tasmanians 
did vote at a higher rate below the line played a major part in the election of 
Lisa Singh from a low level of the ALP ticket.50 
 
Tasmania: Singh Defeats the Party Machine: Colbeck Not So Lucky 
As has been almost invariably the case in recent elections, parties of the left 
did much better in Tasmania than in any mainland state. At the 2016 election, 
Labor won five of the twelve Senate seats and the Greens two, thus beating 
the next best performance for this combination (six seats in each of Victoria 
 
 
50 See Appendix 2 for details of the above and below the line votes for the 2016 Senate 
election. 
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and Western Australia). The left’s performance looks even better if re-elected 
Independent Jacqui Lambie is included among the senators of the left, as 
Mackerras has considered her.51 The Senate result largely mirrored the 
Tasmanian results in the House of Representatives, with Labor regaining the 
three seats it had lost to the Liberal Party in 2013. 
 
The strong Labor/Greens result in the Senate appears somewhat incongruous 
when the vote tallies for the major parties are examined. Labor received 
33.59% (4.38 quotas), the Liberal Party 32.53% (4.23 quotas), the Greens 
11.16% (1.45 quotas) and Jacqui Lambie Network 8.30% (1.08 quotas). The 
highest polling unsuccessful party, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, polled 
2.57% (0.33 quotas). On the basis of these figures, ten seats were certain 
with Labor or the Greens always likely to win one more seat after the 
distribution of preferences. Given that some other minor parties of the right, 
most notably Family First (0.26 quotas) and Shooters, Fishers and Farmers 
(0.18 quotas) polled a reasonable vote share, it might have been expected 
that a fifth seat would eventually head in this direction. 
 
That this did not happen has two possible causes. A quick analysis of primary 
votes suggests the propensity of voters to support Labor candidate Lisa Singh 
was one factor assisting the left. Although listed at sixth position on the ALP 
ticket, Singh polled a personal vote of 6.12% (0.79 quotas), and, combined 
with the 3.57 quotas given to the party ticket or other Labor candidates, meant 
that Labor was always likely to win five seats. Singh did eventually win a seat, 
while Labor’s fifth placed candidate, John Short, was unsuccessful. Singh’s 
win also ensured an all-female Labor Senate delegation from Tasmania. 
 
The unique feature of Tasmania in comparison with the other states is the 
significant primary vote given to candidates who were not on the top of their 
party’s ticket, and had in fact been placed in positions which would normally 
 
51 Mackerras, "Recent controversies regarding the Senate electoral system". 
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have condemned them to defeat. Like Labor Senator Lisa Singh, Richard 
Colbeck (a sitting Liberal Senator and junior minister) was placed below a 
non-incumbent candidate. 
 
As it happened, ticket votes and distributed surpluses of winning candidates 
had only elected three senators from the two largest parties, as well as 
Lambie and the number one Greens candidate, Peter Whish-Wilson. After the 
distribution of number three Labor candidate Carol Brown’s surplus, Singh 
had 21,653 votes, well ahead of number four candidate Carolyn Bilyk (12,289 
votes) and Short (1,498 votes). 
 
On the Liberal side, Colbeck, who had been demoted to the number five spot 
after a falling out with Senate colleague and Tasmanian Liberal powerbroker 
Eric Abetz, did not do as well. Despite leading the number four Liberal 
candidate David Bushby by 15,380 votes to 15,092 after the distribution of the 
surplus of Liberal number three Jonathon Duniam, Colbeck was not elected. 
 
Singh did better among the voters who voted for lower placed candidates of 
the micro parties than her two Labor colleagues who remained in the count. 
This pattern began to change (as the system’s designers intended) when the 
preferences from the leading candidates of those groups were distributed. 
(The majority of such votes would have been cast mostly by people voting 
above the line, and such votes go automatically to the highest placed 
candidates on other tickets.) Despite this, however, Short remained well 
behind the other two Labor candidates and when he was eliminated, 698 of 
his 1,534 votes went to Singh and 548 went to Bilyk. This left Singh on 22,537 
votes and Bilyk on 13,031 votes. The quota for election was 26,090 votes. 
 
At this stage Colbeck was still 503 votes ahead of Bushby, but at this point the 
preferences from other parties started to heavily favour the latter. By the time 
Colbeck was the lowest polling candidate in the count, he trailed Bushby by 
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6,918 votes to 24,371. At this point Singh led Bilyk by 23,923 votes to 22,006. 
Only 12,460 (73.64%) of Colbeck’s votes went to Bushby. Another 2,171 
votes (12.83%) leaked to Singh but only 592 votes (3.5%) leaked to Bilyk. 
Bushby and Singh were now both over the quota and were thus elected,52 but 
Bushby had a much larger surplus to pass on. 
 
By this stage the only candidates remaining in the count were Bilyk, the 
Greens number two candidate Nick McKim, and One Nation’s Kate 
McCulloch. Any Liberal voter who had followed the party’s how to vote card 
would have given their next preference to Labor and Labor did indeed receive 
the largest share (though well short of a majority) of Bushby’s surplus. 
McCulloch received a larger share of this surplus than did McKim, but it still 
left her 41 votes behind McKim. With only the surplus votes of the now elected 
Bilyk to be distributed, McCulloch was never going to bridge this gap and she 
eventually finished 141 votes behind McKim. 
 
It was an earlier preference distribution that had most impact on the final 
transfer. It illustrates a fault in the new system that had also existed under the 
1949-83 rules, but had not been a factor under the 1984-2013 rules (the 2013 
New South Wales count notwithstanding): the influence of the donkey vote. 
 
The leading Family First candidate, Peter Madden, had 11,074 votes at the 
time of his exclusion, of which 5,221 had been ticket votes. Crucially, Family 
First had drawn column A on the ballot paper, with Labor drawing Column B 
and the Greens Column C. The Tasmanian ballot paper instructed voters to 
number six boxes above the line, although any vote cast above the line for 
just one box would still have been formal. Those who followed instructions 
and voted 1-6 across the left hand side of the ballot paper cast a donkey vote 
 
52 Singh thus became the first candidate since 1955 to be elected from a lower place on a 
party ticket while a higher placed candidate of the same party missed out. The other Senators 
who had performed a similar feat in Tasmanian Senate elections were Reg Wright (Liberal, 
1951), George Cole (Labor, 1949 and 1951), Bill Aylett (Labor, 1951 and 1953) and Robert 
Wardlaw (Liberal, 1955). 
98  
that went, in order: 1 Family First, 2 Labor, 3 Greens, 4 Christian Democratic 
Party, 5 Nick Xenophon Team and 6 Liberal. Evidently a large number of 
Family First voters did so, for when Madden was excluded (just before 
Colbeck’s exclusion), 3,049 votes (27.53%) went to Bilyk, Labor’s highest 
placed candidate remaining in the count. This was a much higher percentage 
than was received by Labor from Family First in any other state. 
 
As well as helping Bilyk in her eventual election, the subsequently larger 
surplus from Bilyk also helped the Greens. Similar assistance was provided to 
both Labor and the Greens by the Liberal Party. Any Liberal voter who 
followed that party’s Senate how to vote card voted 1 Liberal, 2 Christian 
Democrat, 3 Shooters, Fishers & Farmers, 4 Liberal Democrat, 5 Family First 
and 6 Labor. Again quite a large number of voters followed the card, as Labor 
received 42.14% of Bushby’s surplus, compared to 11.81% for the Greens, 
5.207% for One Nation and 26.22% exhausting. While the Liberal Party did 
not directly assist the Greens, the Liberal assistance in building up the Labor 
surplus might have been helpful to the Greens, although it did not matter on 
this occasion. 
 
Conclusion on the 2013 and 2016 Senate Elections 
While the proportionality of the results in some states in 2013 could 
reasonably be questioned (Victoria being the most notable), it was still the 
case that the Coalition secured its normal level of over-representation that 
results from a combination of six-member and two-member contests. Using a 
combination of the 2014 re-run in Western Australia and the original count in 
other states and territories, the Liberal and National Parties received 37% of 
the primary vote and 42.5% of the seats. If the territories are excluded, the 
Liberal-National vote share is 37.2% and its seat share is 41.7%. The 4.5% 
over-representation enjoyed by the conservative coalition in this election is 
therefore not much lower than its 5.9% over-representation in six-member 
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districts since 1990 and so consistent with a long term pattern for Senate 
electoral contests when there is an evenly numbered district magnitude. 
 
The 2016 election was conducted under twelve-member electorates in the 
states. While previous double dissolutions (whether under ten-member or 
twelve-member electorates) suggested that Liberal-National enjoyed a slight 
advantage, but at a lower level than in even-numbered districts of smaller 
magnitudes, the 2016 results suggest very little reduction in Liberal-National 
advantage. Their nationwide vote share was 35.2% and their seat share was 
39.5%. This 4.3% over-representation was only 0.2% less than in 2013. 
Where the 2016 election differed from both the results in previous double 
dissolutions and recent half-Senate elections is the over-representation of the 
Labor Party which, in 2016, stood at 4.4%. The Greens also appear to have 
benefitted from the change to the voting system: a vote of 8.7% yielded them 
11.8% of the seats. 
 
There may well have been something fundamentally unfair about the fact that 
the third Liberal-National candidate in Victoria, Helen Kroger, missed out on a 
Senate seat after her group received 2.81 quotas, while a group receiving just 
0.04 quotas eventually won a seat. Be that as it may, this failure by Kroger 
prevented the Coalition being over-represented by a substantial 7.2%. The 
Coalition could not claim to be hard done by in the other states either: only in 
Tasmania (two seats on the basis of 2.62 quotas) did they win fewer seats 
than quotas. 
 
There may well have been some concern for the future of Australian 
democracy that a party then setting the political agenda was able to persuade 
so many journalists and commentators that it had been hard done by, as the 
Liberal Party was able to do after the 2013 election. As an example, consider 
Antony Green’s comments on the 2013 Senate result, in which he notes that 
‘preferential voting in single-member House electorates may have protected 
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Labor from the consequences of its low vote share in 2013, but no such 
protection was afforded by the Senate’s proportional form of preferential 
voting.’53 In other words, Green saw Labor as deserving its low level of 
Senate representation (31.5% of available seats) as being no better than it 
deserved for its primary vote of around 30%. For the Liberal and National 
Parties, however, he claimed that ‘confusion caused by the record number of 
candidates and parties cost the Coalition one of its existing Senate seats (in 
Victoria) and prevented it from gaining one and possibly two extra seats.’54 
 
As has been demonstrated, there is no basis for claiming that the Coalition 
was deprived of a fourth seat in New South Wales by the confusion arising 
from the Liberal Democrats’ left hand position on the Senate ballot paper. If 
one accepts the more realistic proposition that without the confusion in New 
South Wales (and preference harvesting in other states), the Coalition would 
have won an extra seat each in Victoria and Tasmania, this would mean that 
the Coalition would have won 50% of available seats with a primary vote of 
under 38%. Even if every vote cast throughout the country for the Liberal 
Democrats (3.9% of the nationwide vote) had been a vote intended for 
Liberal-National, this would only bring the Coalition’s nationwide vote to 
41.5%. 
 
Green was not the only commentator who seemed to accept the line that 
many senators were illegitimately elected. On ABC’s Insiders program on 19 
April 2015, journalist Phil Coorey claimed that only two of the eight cross- 
bench senators were elected under their own steam, while the others relied on 
preference deals. In fact, almost the complete reverse is the case: only three 






53 Green, "Explaining the Results," 406. 
54 Ibid. 
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Overall, this thesis takes the view that concerns about the democratic 
legitimacy of the Senate voting system existing before the 2016 election were 
overstated, though it also takes the view that the onerous requirements for 
casting a valid below the line vote exacerbated a situation in which the last 
seat in a Senate contest became a result of decisions made by party 
machines rather than clearly expressed voter choice. In a major sense, the 
new system creates more accountability because any preferences cast by 
voters are now a genuine individual choice rather than a secret preference 
decision of which they may not be aware, but the changes have merely 
reinforced the advantage of the governing party that sponsored it rather than 
giving it an extra advantage. The position of that party’s main rival has also 
been strengthened, something that the government may not have taken into 
account. 
 
In the Australian states and territories that use proportional representation, 
there have been a wide range of district magnitudes used, including three (for 
the NSW Legislative Assembly 1920-25) five, seven, eleven (for South 
Australia’s Legislative Council since 1975), fifteen (NSW Legislative Council 
1978-91) and 21 (for the New South Wales Legislative Council 1995). The 
states and territories also vary in the obligations on voters to number squares 
on their ballot papers, although the importance of the latter factor was 
probably underestimated in the years before the 2013 federal election. 
 
The comparisons of partisan advantage constitute the next chapter. The study 
begins with Western Australia, where it would seem that differing magnitudes 
have the greatest partisan impact. It will be argued that Western Australia 
offers an even more obvious example of how six-member districts provide an 
inbuilt advantage to the Liberal and National Parties. This remains the case in 





District Magnitude and Partisan Advantage in Western 
Australia 
 
In the previous chapter on federal Senate elections it could be seen that an 
increase in district magnitude does not necessarily result in more proportional 
results in Australia. It was also shown that even-numbered districts in general, 
and six-member districts in particular, provided a distinct advantage to the 
Liberal and National Parties and, to some degree, disadvantaged the Labor 
Party (although the latter was not the case in 2016). The following study of 
Western Australian elections is included to reinforce the point about the 1990- 
2013 system, but also to argue that the same principle applies even more 
strongly to Western Australia. It is also argued that the Western Australian 
case demonstrates that the use of five- or seven-member districts, or in the 
WA case a combination of both, does not actually reverse this trend to favour 
the Labor Party at mainstream conservative expense. It merely makes for a 
more even pattern where Labor, if it receives a small voting superiority over 
Liberal-National, can achieve a similar advantage in parliamentary seats. 
 
The above combination appear to give the Labor Party an advantage vis-a-vis 
the Greens, a pattern that is also evident in south-eastern jurisdictions (to be 
analysed in the next chapter). Analysis of the situation prior to the introduction 
of proportional representation in the Legislative Council is included to make 
the point that the introduction of PR enhanced the democratic legitimacy of 
the chamber because, unlike the situation existing prior to 1989, the Liberal 
and National Parties were no longer guaranteed a majority in the chamber 
regardless of the actual vote. However, it will be argued that the move to 
solely six-member districts (engineered, ironically, by a Labor government) 
has restored the old order to some extent. 
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The requirements for casting a valid vote that have applied at WA Legislative 
Council elections since 1989 are essentially the same as those applying at 
Senate elections held between 1984 and 2014. Only in the range of district 
magnitudes does it differ to a major degree. Voters have had two options: to 
vote for a party or group ticket with a single ‘1’ above the line, or to vote for all 
candidates below the line. For the first five elections under PR, two different 
ranges of magnitudes (five and seven) were used. By contrast, the Senate, by 
dint of Section 7 of the Constitution, has always required that each state have 
the same number of members elected. This requirement, incidentally, creates 
another similarity with the WA system. Section 7 creates a malapportionment 
in favour of states with smaller populations; the WA system legislates for 
malapportionment in favour of non-metropolitan areas. 
 
The rural malapportionment is one aspect that makes Western Australia 
distinctive: no other state or territory using PR allows for malapportionment 
beyond 10% of the average enrolment. The other aspect is unique. Unlike the 
Senate, where voter support for the major parties is roughly even across all 
districts (the various states and territories) there is one particular WA region 
(Agricultural) that overwhelmingly supports the conservative side of politics.1 
As the Agricultural Region is one favoured by the malapportionment, this 
factor should favour the conservative parties to some degree. The extent to 
which it is a contributory factor will be investigated in this chapter, and an 
assessment made regarding its overall impact on the representation of the 
various parties as distinct from the impact of district magnitude. It will be 
argued that the move to six-member districts after 2008 has provided a much 
greater partisan advantage in favour of the conservative parties than the rural 
malapportionment did. This remains the case in spite of the 2017 Assembly 
Labor landslide. 
 
1 The ACT has used a mixture of five- and seven-member districts since its adoption of Hare- 
Clark since the 1995 election, while Tasmania has used a mixture of five-, six- and seven- 
member districts since the adoption of Hare-Clark in 1909, although it has always used the 
same magnitude for all seats at any one election. Victoria has used five-member districts in all 
Legislative Council elections since 2006. 
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Before the adoption of proportional representation for the 1989 election, 
Western Australia’s Legislative Council had elected its members in staggered 
terms via a single-member preferential voting method and, prior to the 1965 
election, was subject to a property franchise. Not surprisingly, the 
conservative parties always had firm control of the Legislative Council while 
the property requirement existed, although changing demographics and home 
ownership patterns meant this factor was beginning to weaken by the 1950s 
(as it was with the South Australian Legislative Council). The Labor Party had 
supported the abolition of the property franchise when it was proposed by the 
Brand Government, largely on principle, but also hoping and expecting that 
the change would finally give it a chance of obtaining a majority in that 
chamber. To their dismay, the disadvantage suffered by the Labor Party 
became worse after 1962. The nature and causes of the disadvantage have 
been extensively analysed by Pepperday.2 
 
Others, such as Black,3 noted the Labor disadvantage at this time, but he 
noted that malapportionment was usually (without concrete evidence) given 
the blame, a position disputed by Pepperday who attributes its disadvantages 
to wasted votes in country seats.4 Staggered terms could also have been a 
contributing factor, although the fact that Labor failed to win a majority of 
available Council seats at any election between 1965 and 1983 rules this out 
as the main causal factor. 
 
The 1983 and 1986 Legislative Council elections illustrate Labor’s 
disadvantage under the old system. In 1983 the Labor Party, contesting all but 
one of the 17 seats being elected, achieved a primary vote of 50.63% but was 
able to win just seven seats, or 41.2% of available seats. The Liberal Party 
 
2 Pepperday, "Improving Democracy Through Elite Power Struggle," 1. 
3 David Black, The House on the Hill: A History of the Parliament of Western Australia 1832- 
1990, Western Australian Parliamentary History Project (Perth: Parliament of Western 
Australia, 1991). 
4 Pepperday, "Improving Democracy Through Elite Power Struggle". 
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won nine seats (52.9%) with a primary vote of just 41.57%. The combined 
6.63% vote of the National Country Party and National Party yielded them a 
total of one seat.5 
 
The Labor Party fared a little better in 1986, winning nine of the 17 available 
seats with a primary vote of 44.58%.6 This vote is slightly lower than it might 
have been because Labor made what appears to be a tactical decision not to 
contest the inner-city Metropolitan Province,7 in the (ultimately forlorn) hope 
that the Australian Democrats could win the seat. The Liberal Party, which 
had won nine seats of 17 in 1983 with a primary vote of 41%, got less value 
for votes in 1986, winning six seats of 17 with a primary vote of 41.97%. The 
other two seats were won by the National Party and the Country Party. 
 
After this election, Labor had 16 of the 34 Legislative Council seats, and it was 
able, with the support of National Party Legislative Councillors, to push 
through a raft of electoral reforms affecting both houses. Pepperday analysed 
the process extensively in his Masters thesis in which he claims that most 
Labor MPs were unaware of how the adoption of PR would change the 
composition of the parliament and the polity.8 It will be argued that even in 
2005, after proportional representation had been in use for a few elections, 
the group of Labor MPs then making the decision to further reform the system 
displayed a similar lack of knowledge, or indeed interest, about the impact of 
district magnitude in Legislative Council elections. 
 
Like the federal Labor government in 1983, the WA Labor Party was well 
aware that the package of reforms would assist it in the Legislative Assembly. 
 
 
5 Colin A. Hughes, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1975-1984, vol. 3 
(Sydney: Australian National University Press, 1986). 
6 Colin A. Hughes, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1985-1999, vol. 4 
(Sydney: Federation Press, 2002), 333. 
7 In the corresponding Legislative Assembly electorates, Labor easily retained Perth, won 
Subiaco from the Liberal Party and suffered small swings in the safe Liberal seats of 
Cottesloe, Floreat and Nedlands. 
8 Pepperday, "Improving Democracy Through Elite Power Struggle," 17. 
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The reduction in the level of rural weighting in some northern seats and the 
removal of such weighting for Perth hills seats (one of which tended to swing 
with the electoral tide and three of which were reliably Liberal), were always 
likely to assist Labor. In the end the changes assisted Labor so much that 
they were able to win 31 of the 57 seats (54.4%) in spite of a primary vote of 
42.5% (over 10% down on the 1986 figure) and an estimated two-party 
preferred vote of under 48%. Such an occurrence has not happened since, 
suggesting that the bias in favour of Labor was not systemic. 
 
After changes in 1987, six regions were used for the Legislative Council 
elections. In the metropolitan area, the North Metropolitan Region elected 
seven members, while the East Metropolitan and South Metropolitan Regions 
elected five members each. In the country area, the South West Region 
elected seven members, while the Agricultural Region and the Mining and 
Pastoral Region elected five members each. This still left a significant level of 
weighting in favour of the country area, but it was smaller than it had 
previously been. 
 
The Legislative Council results provided seat tallies that more accurately 


















9 Results of the 1989 Legislative Council election have been obtained from David Black, 
Legislative Council of Western Australia: Membership Register, Electoral Law and Statistics 
1890-1989, Revised ed. (Perth: Parliament of Western Australia, 1991), 372-90. 
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Table 4.1 Vote Shares for the Main Parties: Western Australian 











5 47.3% 36.5% 2.3% 3.6% 5.9% 4.4% 
North 
Metro 
7 39.2% 44.7% 1.3% 3.4% 4.3% 7.1% 
South 
Metro 
5 43.4% 41.8% 2.1% 4.3% 4.9% 3.5% 
Agri- 
cultural 
5 25.6% 41.3% 26.8% 1.7% - 4.6% 
Mining & 
Pastoral 
5 53.7% 33.6% 3.6% 2.7% - 6.4% 
South 
West 
7 37.5% 42% 9.4% 2.2% 3.2% 5.7% 
Overall 34 41.3% 41.1% 5% 3.3% 4% 5.3% 
Source: David Black, Legislative Council of Western Australia: Membership Register, 
Electoral Law and Statistics 1890-1989 (Perth: Western Australian Parliamentary History 
Project, 1991). 
 
Only three parties, Labor, Liberal and National, won seats. The Democrats did 
not make their hoped-for breakthrough. Their vote fell below Greypower (a 
party purporting to represent the interests of older people), and neither party 
was able to win it a seat. The seat shares of the successful parties are shown 
in Table 4.2 (below). 
 
 
Both sponsors of the new system (Labor and National) were over-represented 
overall, by 3% and 3.8% respectively. However, the Liberal Party, which had 
opposed the introduction of PR, were also over-represented by 3%.10 As is 
 
 
10 The Liberal Party, sensibly, did not complain about its reduced level of over-representation 
in the Council, and made only minimal complaints about the less fair lower house result. The 
Liberal leader, Barry MacKinnon, devoted most of his energy to drawing attention to alleged 
corrupt dealings between government ministers and prominent business people, popularly 
known as ‘WA Incorporated’. Mackinnon’s constant calls for a Royal Commission into such 
matters were acceded to in 1991 by then Premier, Carmen Lawrence. By the time the Royal 
Commission findings had been published (in late 1992), Mackinnon had been replaced as 
Liberal Party leader by Richard Court. For an account of WA politics of this period, see Peter 
Kennedy, Tales from Boomtown: Western Australian Premiers from Brand to Barnett (Perth: 
UWA Publishing, 2014), 172-93. 
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usually the case in a single transferable vote system, the burden of under- 
representation was borne by the unsuccessful parties. 
 
Table 4.2 Seat Tallies and Shares for Successful Parties: 

















East Metro 3 2 0 60% 40% - 
North Metro 3 4 0 42.9% 57.9% - 
South Metro 3 2 0 60% 40% - 
Agricultural 1 2 2 20% 40% 40% 
Mining & 
Pastoral 
3 2 0 60% 40% - 
South West 3 3 1 42.9% 42.9% 14.3% 
Overall 16 15 3 47.1% 44.1% 8.8% 
Source: Black, Legislative Council of Western Australia: Membership Register, Electoral Law 
and Statistics 1890-1989. 
 
It is also worth examining the results at macro level to determine whether a 
specific advantage exists with either seven-member or five-member seats, 
and whether there is any truth in the general assumption that larger district 
magnitudes either make results more proportional, as originally suggested by 
Rae,11 or give minor parties a better chance. 
 
The evidence in relation to the latter is unconvincing, since no minor party 
won a seat. In terms of partisan advantage or disadvantage, the Labor Party, 
on the surface at least, appears to be advantaged by five-member regions. In 
three of those regions (Mining and Pastoral, East Metropolitan and South 
Metropolitan), Labor won three of the five seats, while in the Agricultural 
Region it won just one. This represents a total of 10 of the 20 seats (50%) for 





11 Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 115. 
109  
eight in total, while the National Party won two seats, both in the Agricultural 
Region. 
 
The appearance of Labor advantage may be misleading, since the five- 
member districts happen to coincide with Labor’s three strongest regions. It 
will be seen later that this pattern persisted throughout the existence of these 
five-member districts. It seems a good idea to investigate levels of 
representation in individual regions to determine average levels of over- and 
under-representation. 
 
Levels of over-representation and under-representation can be calculated 
from the results cited above. Labor was over-represented by 12.7% in East 
Metropolitan, 6.3% in Mining and Pastoral, and 16.6% in South Metropolitan. 
In Agricultural, on the other hand, Labor was under-represented by 5.6%. The 
average level of Labor over-representation was thus 7.5%. The corresponding 
figures for the Liberal Party were 3.5% over in East Metropolitan, 1.8% under 
in both South Metropolitan and Agricultural and 6.3% over in Mining and 
Pastoral. This adds up to an average over-representation of 1.6%. The Liberal 
Party could never gain more than two seats in any of these regions in later 
elections using five-member districts, though only in one election (2001 in 
both country regions) did they ever drop down to one seat. 
 
The National Party stood in all four regions, but was successful only in 
Agricultural, where it was over-represented by 13.2%. In the other regions its 
vote share equals its under-representation level, giving it an average over- 
representation level of 1.3%. In subsequent elections the National Party did 
not bother contesting South Metropolitan and only rarely stood candidates in 
East Metropolitan and Mining and Pastoral. 
 
It can thus be seen that Labor appears to have gained greatly from five- 
member district magnitudes, although it would seem to be at the expense of 
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the minor parties rather than their conservative rivals. However, it may be the 
case that Labor’s advantage comes from a leader’s bonus in its three strong 
regions rather than from five-member districts per se. The two seven-member 
districts appear to suggest this. 
 
In North Metropolitan, the Liberal Party was over-represented by 12.4%, while 
the Labor Party was over-represented by 3.7%. The National Party was 
under-represented by 1.3%. In the South West region, the Liberal Party was 
over-represented by 0.9%, Labor by 5.4% and National by 4.8%. The average 
over-representation for the Liberal Party is 6.7%, while for the Labor Party it is 
4.6% and for the National Party it is 1.8%. Thus the pattern for this election 
seems to suggest that all of the three largest parties gained some level of 
over-representation, although the Labor Party seemed to perform somewhat 
better in five-member districts and the Liberal Party better in seven-member 
districts. The minor parties would have been disappointed in their failure to 
win any seats at this election. However, the pattern was to improve for minor 
parties in general and the Greens in particular at future elections. 
 
Western Australian Elections 1993-2005 
The next four elections are easier to consider as a group than the 1989 
election. They can be broken down into two pairs, the first two resulting in 
Liberal-National wins under Richard Court, and the second two resulting in 
Labor wins under the leadership of Geoff Gallop. The Liberal and National 
Parties co-operated more closely with each other at this time, so their 
combined vote can be considered together more easily.12 The total number of 









12 Detailed results have been obtained from Western Australian Electoral Commission, 1993 
State General Election Report 6 February 1993 (Perth, 1993). 
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Table 4.3 Seat Tallies for Successful Parties: Western 
Australian Legislative Council Elections, 1993-2005 
 
Year Labor Liberal- 
National 
Green Others 
1993 14 18 1 1 
1996 12 17 3 2 
2001 13 13 5 3 
2005 16 16 2 0 
Source: Western Australian Electoral Commission, 2005 Western Australian State General 
Election; Results and Statistics (Perth, 2006), 172. 
 
The ‘others’ were ex-Liberal turned Independent Reg Davies in 1993, two 
Australian Democrats in 1996 and three One Nation in 2001. If the Democrats 
are regarded as a party of the left and One Nation is regarded as a party of 
the right, it is the case that parties of the left received at least half the seats at 
three of the four elections in this period. In most cases, this represented a 
very good return, as the vote and seat shares for each party show: 
 
Table 4.4 Vote and Seat Shares for Main Parties: Western 



































1993 36.8 41.2 49.6 52.9 5.2 2.9 3.0 0 8.7 2.9 
1996 33.1 35.3 46.5 50 5.6 8.2 6.6 5.9 14.8 5.9 
2001 37.9 38.2 36.4 38.2 8 14.7 3.7 0 17.7 8.8 
2005 43.4 47.1 39.3 47.1 7.5 5.9 0.9 0 9.8 0 
Source: Western Australian Electoral Commission, 2005 Western Australian State General 
Election; Results and Statistics, 172. 
 
If the Democrats’ vote is included in overall left total, parties of the left 
received 45% of the vote in 1993, 45.3% in 1996, 49.6% in2001 and 51.8% 
in 2005.13 It is therefore evident that, especially towards the end of the 
period, parties of the left were getting a distinct advantage from the dual 
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magnitude system. But equally, it is also evident that preference allocations 
have played a role in the improved performance of left of centre parties. The 
most notable of these was One Nation’s decision in 2001 to direct their 
preferences to the Greens ahead of Liberal-National in the country 
regions.14 
 
There was rarely a significant minor party of the right to compete with the 
Liberal and National Parties for the favour of conservative leaning voters. The 
most notable exception was 2001, when One Nation polled 9.9% of the 
Legislative Council vote and won three seats. Adding this vote to the Liberal- 
National total gives the right 46.3% of the vote, an over-representation level of 
less than 1%. Elections either side of this one produced slightly better results. 
There was no notable small party of the right in 1996, while in 2005 the largest 
such parties were Australian Christians 2.28% and Family First (2.01%). If 
these are added to the Liberal-National vote, parties of the right received 
43.6% of the vote and therefore a significant level of over-representation. 
 
Summary of Results for Legislative Council elections 1989-2005 
Among the many varied results for these elections, one particular pattern is 
clear. The Labor Party got very good value for its vote in five-member districts. 
The table below shows the levels of representation in the different magnitude 






13 Western Australian Electoral Commission, 2005 Western Australian State General Election; 
Results and Statistics (Perth, 2006). 
14 As a result of this decision, the Greens were able to win seats in the Agricultural and Mining 
and Pastoral Regions at the Liberal Party’s expense. For details of party ticket preferences, 
Western Australian Electoral Commission, 2001 Western Australian State General Election; 
Results and Statistics (Perth, 2001). The Greens were to benefit to a lesser extent from this 
factor in 2005. See Western Australian Electoral Commission, 2005 Western Australian State 
General Election; Results and Statistics. 
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Table 4.5 Average Labor Over-representation: Western 
Australian Legislative Council Elections, 1989-2005 
 





1989 7.5% 4.6% 5.8% 
1993 3.8% 4.3% 4.4% 
1996 4.1% -0.9% 2.2% 
2001 3.2% 1.9% 0.3% 
2005 8% 2.9% 3.7% 
Overall Average 5.3% 2.6% 3.4% 
Source: Calculated from Western Australian Electoral Commission, 2005 Western Australian 
State General Election; Results and Statistics, 172. 
 
There are two possible reasons why Labor was more over-represented in the 
five-member regions than in the seven-member ones. It could simply be that 
the seven-member regions (North Metropolitan and South West) were Labor’s 
second and third weakest regions throughout the period, or because of the 
nature of the Droop quota. If a party can win 33.3% of the vote in a five- 
member district, it will win 40% of the seats, and if it gets 50%, or just below, it 
will receive 60% of the seats. Only if a party polls less than 30% or in the low 
40% range will a party be under-represented. Labor was always in the former 
situation in Agricultural, but rarely faced the latter situation. 
 
In a seven-member district, on the other hand, the respective quotas are 25% 
for a second seat, 37.5% for three seats and 50% for four seats. Possibly 
because the difference between the quota and the resulting seat percentage 
is smaller (37.5% of the vote wins a party 42.9% of the seats), the resulting 
over-representation level is, on average, not as great. 
 
An examination of Coalition representation levels gives some clues as to 
which factor was more important. 
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Table 4.6 Coalition Over-representation: Western Australian 
Legislative Council Elections, 1989-2005 
 





1989 3% 8.4% 6.8% 
1993 1.3% 4% 3.3% 
1996 1.1% 0.6% 3.5% 
2001 -1.6% 2.9% 1.3% 
2005 9.3% 0.6% 7% 
Overall 2.6% 3.3% 4.4% 
Source: Calculated from Western Australian Electoral Commission, 2005 Western Australian 
State General Election; Results and Statistics, 176-77. 
 
The impression given here is that the Coalition enjoyed a lower level of over- 
representation in five-member regions than in seven-member regions. 
However, this is largely a function of the aberrant result of 2001, caused by 
the unusual distribution of One Nation preferences mentioned earlier. This 
was a rare case of one aspect of the system, namely the onerous 
requirements for casting a formal vote below the line, working to the 
disadvantage of the Liberal and National Parties.15 Indeed, this election 
disguises a trend that was evident from the previous two elections: that the 
Coalition was doing progressively better in five-member regions, and less well 
in seven-member regions. The latter phenomenon was probably caused by a 
weakening of Liberal dominance in the North Metropolitan region. 
 
The other noticeable aspect of the system is that it did not disadvantage the 
Coalition overall, although the level of over-representation came nowhere 
near the gross levels of the old system. This may partly be a function of the 
 
15 As a result of One Nation’s decision to favour the Greens over Liberal-National in country 
regions, Greens candidates were able to unseat sitting Liberal MLCs by margins of 228 votes 
in Agricultural and by 1001 votes in Mining and Pastoral. It is argued that in a voting system 
that allowed voters an easier option for marking their own preferences, enough One Nation 
voters would have voted below the line to enable the Liberal Party to have held their second 
seat in Agricultural, and possibly in Mining and Pastoral too. The distribution of One Nation 
preferences in Legislative Assembly seats contained within the two regions is strongly 
indicative of this likelihood. Liberal-National supporters could thus claim with some 
justification that the aforementioned aspect of the system enabled the transfer of at least one 
seat from right to left. 
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maintenance of malapportionment for country regions, but it follows a pattern 
observable for the Senate and other jurisdictions where Labor Governments 
have adopted a proportional representation system for the upper house. 
 
The calculation of levels of representation for the Greens and Democrats is 
much trickier, because in some cases one or either did not contest all seats, 
and in 1989, Greens candidates ran under different names such as the 
Alternative Coalition. Given this, the total votes for these parties has been 
combined to produce an overall level of representation for what could be 
classed as ‘minor parties of the left.’ 
 
Table 4.7 Representation Levels for Greens/Democrat 
Candidates: Western Australian Legislative Council Elections, 
1989-2005 
 





1989 -5.9% -6.7% -6.2% 
1993 -1.5% -9.4% -4.3% 
1996 0.6% 8.6% 2.4% 
2001 6.3% 2.3% 2.6% 
2005 -7.4% 5.3% -2.5% 
Overall -1.5% 0.02% -1.6% 
Source: Calculated from Western Australian Electoral Commission, 2005 Western Australian 
State General Election; Results and Statistics, 176-77. 
 
The unusual preference allocations of 2001 assisted the Greens in five- 
member districts, so this magnitude probably disadvantaged them even more 
than the averages suggest. Also, a botched Labor how-to-vote card 
submission in 1993 had the effect of reducing the flow of Labor surplus votes 
to the Greens candidate in North Metropolitan Region.16 Had the Greens won 
 
 
16 The failure of the Labor Party to submit a preference ticket complying with the rules meant 
that intending Labor voters were forced to vote for every candidate below the line to cast a 
formal vote. As had happened at federal level between 1949 and 1983, Labor’s vote is likely 
to have been reduced in the North Metropolitan region, thus meaning that fewer Labor 
preferences transferred to the Greens than would otherwise have been the case. 
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one of the seven seats in this region, their seven-member district average 
would have improved at this election from -9.4% to -2.8%, and the overall 
average over-representation in seven-member districts would be 1.3%. 
 
The Greens were also assisted in one case at the 2005 election, but this was 
in a seven-member district. In the South West region, the National Party ticket 
had given the Greens a higher place for the number one Greens candidate 
Paul Llewellyn (number 10) than for the leading Family First candidate 
(number 14).17 Consequently, when the Nationals’ leading candidate was the 
last candidate excluded, his preferences favoured the Greens rather than, as 
would have happened in most circumstances, a fellow party of the right in 
Family First. Llewellyn was thus able to overcome a small deficit at the last 
exclusion to win the last seat comfortably.18 
 
The pattern here suggests that both Labor and Liberal-National were 
somewhat over-represented, and that the Greens’ success or otherwise was 
variable. The Liberal and National Parties were more over-represented than 
Labor was. Such over-representation can have several sources. Part of it lies 
in the nature of the Droop quota itself. A party need receive only 33.3% of the 
vote in a district to win two seats out of five, but such a result yields that party 
40% of the seats. Parties receiving votes in the range of 33-38% tend to be 
over-represented in such circumstances. Similarly, once a party reached 50% 
of the vote in a five-member district it could expect to win three of the five 
seats, or 60%. Provided a party did not reach 60% of the vote, this would 
produce a significant over-representation effect. 
 
Under-representation effects were only likely to happen in circumstances 
where a major party’s vote dropped below 33%. This was the fate of the Labor 
Party in the Agricultural Region, where it comfortably reached the 16.7% 
 
17 Western Australian Electoral Commission, 2005 Western Australian State General Election; 
Results and Statistics, 168. 
18 Ibid., 249. 
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required to win one seat, but never got close to the 33.3% needed for two. On 
only two occasions did the Liberal Party fail to gain at least two quotas in a 
five-member district (East Metropolitan in 2001 and 2005), but it received 
enough preferences from smaller parties to hold two seats. 
 
In the seven-member regions, opportunities for over-representation arise from 
the fact that if a party can get around 50% of the vote, it can go on to win four 
of the seven seats, or 57.1%. This is indeed what happened for the Liberal 
Party in 1993 in North Metropolitan and for the Liberal-National combination in 
South West at the first three PR elections. There were also opportunities for 
lower polling parties to be over-represented in certain circumstances. Labor 
was over-represented by an average of 4.3% during the period, in spite of a 
generally poor vote share. While the Greens were under-represented by 6.4% 
in 1993, largely because the seat they might have won in North Metropolitan 
was won by Independent MLC Reg Davies (in spite of a primary vote of less 
than 6%),19 the situation improved for them 1996 and there was further 
improvement in 2001. 
 
Between the 2005 and 2008 elections, the defection of a Liberal MLC, Alan 
Cadby, to the crossbenches gave Labor an opportunity to implement its much- 
cherished goal of introducing a one vote one value electoral system to the 
Legislative Assembly. However, the Greens’ condition for supporting the 
Legislation in the Council was a move to six-member regions for that 
chamber, while Cadby would not support the removal of malapportionment for 
the Council. The Labor Party would nevertheless have felt confident of 
maintaining its numbers in the Council and increasing its numbers in the 
Legislative Assembly. However, some strange events were to turn WA politics 




19 Davies had been elected as a Liberal MLC for the same region in 1989, and surplus Liberal 
preferences helped him beat Greens candidate Brenda Roy in 1993. His vote dropped to less 
than 4% in 1996 and he was defeated. 
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The 2008 and 2013 Election: System Favours Liberal-National 
In early 2006, Premier Geoff Gallop shocked the state when he announced 
his resignation due to suffering depression. The Labor Party accomplished a 
smooth leadership transition to former television journalist Alan Carpenter, 
who made a good initial impression with the public. In spite of the loss of four 
ministers through minor scandals, Labor maintained a lead in the polls during 
the 2005-08 term.20 This was largely due to the leadership turmoil in the 
Liberal Party, which had four leaders during the period. The third and most 
controversial of these, Troy Buswell,21 resigned as leader two days before the 
Labor government called the election five months before it was due, and was 
replaced by Colin Barnett, who had unsuccessfully led the Liberal Party to the 
2005 election.22 
 
A favourable redistribution had created a number of new, mostly notional 
Labor seats. The analysis of Antony Green suggested that a bigger swing 
than before would be needed to defeat Labor in the lower house, and made 
little difference in the Legislative Council.23 Initial polls suggested a close 






20 For an account of these affairs, see Kennedy, Tales from Boomtown, 248-75. 
21 After a short career including allegations of sexual harassment and (after becoming 
Treasurer) engaging in an affair with newly elected Greens MLA Adele Carle, Buswell was 
forced to resign as treasurer after revelations that when (presumably) drunk, he had crashed 
his government car after leaving a wedding. 
22 Barnett had been set to retire at the election. The short-lived replacement candidate in his 
safe Liberal seat of Cottesloe, Deidre Willmott, was briefly to become his chief of staff after 
the election before taking the position of CEO of the WA chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
a position Barnett had held before his entry to Parliament in 1991. 
23 Antony Green, "2007 Redistribution Western Australia: Analysis of Final Electoral 
Boundaries," Election Papers Series No. 2 (Perth: Western Australian Parliamentary Library, 
2007). Green estimated that in a situation where 2005 support levels were maintained, the 
combined Labor-Greens total in the Council would be 19 seats out of 36, thus maintaining the 
situation whereby parties of the left could pass legislation requiring a simple majority, but 
would lack the constitutional majority required to pass (as the most cogent example) electoral 
boundary legislation. This is because, under the convention applying in that chamber since 
1993, the incumbent government is required to supply a Legislative Council President who, 
unlike their Senate counterpart, has only a casting vote in the event of a tie, but not a 
deliberative vote. 
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The election did not go well for Labor. Results in the Legislative Assembly left 
Labor two seats short of an absolute majority.24 After a week of negotiation, 
the four National MLAs agreed to form a coalition with the Liberal Party, and 
with three Independents supporting the Coalition on supply and confidence, 
Colin Barnett became Premier. 
 
Although Labor lost, it was still over-represented in the Legislative Assembly, 
receiving 35.8% of the vote but winning 47.5% of the seats. But the opposite 
was the case in the Legislative Council, as the Table 4.8 shows. 
 
Table 4.8 Vote and Seat Shares for the Main Parties: Western 
Australian Legislative Council Election, 2008 
 
Party Seats Won Vote Share Seat Share +/- Rep. 
Labor 11 36.1% 30.6% -5.5% 
Liberal 16 39.6% 44.4% +4.8% 
National 5 5.3% 13.9% +8.6% 
Greens 4 11% 11.1% +0.1% 
Others 0 8% 0% -8% 
Source: Calculated from Western Australian Electoral Commission, 2008 Western Australian 
State General Election; Results and Statistics (Perth, 2009), 174. 
 
It can be seen that the Labor Party was significantly under-represented, while 
the major conservative parties in general and the Nationals in particular, were 
grossly over-represented. Others, as usual, bore the brunt of under- 
representation. However, most of this vote was for small right of centre 
parties, and this vote flowed strongly to the Liberals and Nationals via 
preferences. The Greens received roughly the same share of seats as votes. 
 
Why was Labor so disadvantaged? Part of the problem may lie in the 
malapportionment still applying in the Council in favour of rural areas (former 
Labor Legislative Council whip Ed Dermer saw it as the major factor assisting 
 
 
24 Western Australian Electoral Commission, 2008 Western Australian State General Election: 
Results and Statistics (Perth: Western Australian Electoral Commission, 2009), 33. 
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the conservative parties25), but the explanation may lie mostly in the nature of 
the Droop quota. The move to six-member regions meant the quota to elect 
one member in a region was 14.3%, which meant for a party to win three 
seats in a region, it needed 42.9%. The Labor Party could not manage this in 
any region. In the Agricultural region, it could not muster the 28.6% needed to 
win two seats. 
 
Labor’s two strongest regions, East Metropolitan and South Metropolitan, 
provide a stark illustration of the point. Labor achieved 2.88 quotas in East 
Metro and 2.84 quotas in South Metro, ahead of both the Coalition (2.71 
quotas and 2.75 quotas respectively), and the Greens (0.82 quotas and 0.83 
quotas respectively). However, Family First and Christian Democrat 
preferences resulted in the third Liberal comfortably winning, and the resulting 
surplus was mostly made up of a combination of Liberal, Family First and 
Christian Democrat preferences. With Liberal and Family First preferences 
directed to the Greens ahead of Labor, and with other minor candidates 
tending to favour the Greens, the latter won the last seat quite comfortably in 
both regions. 26 
 
One way of testing whether the Liberal-National advantage, and Labor’s 
disadvantage, is caused by malapportionment in favour of the country 
regions, is to measure the average over- or under-representation per region 
type,27 in comparison to the total. If Labor’s overall disadvantage was higher 
than the average per region type, then malapportionment would appear to be 







25 Ed Dermer, Address in Reply Motion, Western Australian Parliamentary Debates 
(Legislative Council), 1 March 2009, 1581. He argues that ‘the malapportionment distorts the 
mirror’. 
26 Western Australian Electoral Commission, 2008 Western Australian State General Election: 
Results and Statistics. 
27 Metropolitan or Country region. 
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Labor won 33.3% of the seats in all regions except Agricultural, where it won 
just 16.7%. Its average under-representation per region type was 4.5%, 
compared to an overall under-representation of 5.6%. This does indeed 
suggest that the malapportionment plays some role, but does not tell the full 
story. After all, the Labor Party had been over-represented at all of the 
previous elections, and by an average of 3.42%. 
 
The Coalition’s over-representation shows a similar pattern: its total over- 
representation was 13.4%, while its average over-representation was 9.7%. 
However, it is the last two figures, and a comparison with the same indices 
over the previous five elections that provide the most telling story. The overall 
level of over-representation is higher than any advantage achieved by the 
conservative parties in the previous five elections (the average total over- 
representation was 4.90%, with a high of 7.75% in 2005). In other words, the 
malapportionment mattered little: it would seem to be the change in the Droop 
quota and, to a lesser extent, the more solid flow from micro parties of the 
right, which produced the hefty Liberal-National advantage. It is also notable 
that the percentage by which overall Liberal-National over-representation 
exceeded average Liberal-National over-representation was 3.22% in 2008, 
compared to an average of 2.06% over the previous five elections. 
 
Remarkably, the margin by which overall disadvantage exceeds average 
under-representation by region type (2.18%) is exactly the same as the 
average difference between the two indices when Labor was over- 
represented at the previous five elections. This perhaps suggests that the 
overall impact of malapportionment was similar, with the change in district 
magnitude producing a change in direction. 
 
The Greens appear to be relatively unaffected by the change, being over- 
represented by 0.03%. However, this compares poorly with the previous four 
elections at which the Greens won seats, when they were over-represented 
by an average of 1.56%. Moreover, the new configuration produced a bad 
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combined result for the parties of the left. The combined Labor-Greens vote of 
47.2% yielded just 41.7% of the seats, an under-representation of 5.5%. 
Again, this compares very poorly with the 1989-2005 period, when parties of 
the left were at least slightly over-represented at each election, even if the 
Democrat vote is included.28 As will be seen, overall Greens disadvantage 
was to re-appear at the 2013 election. 
 
2013: Conservative Advantage Again Evident 
The Barnett Coalition government increased its majority in the Legislative 
Assembly to 17 seats on a two-party preferred vote of 57.3%, an improvement 
of 5.4% on 2008. Both sides of politics acknowledged that the unpopularity of 
Julia Gillard’s federal Labor Government had been a drag on the state Labor 
vote.29 In the Legislative Council, however, Labor suffered no net loss of 
seats, although the Greens’ loss of two seats meant the left lost out overall. 
The overall vote and seat shares for the parties elected were as follows: 
 
Table 4.9 Vote and Seat Shares for the Main Parties: Western 
Australian Election, 2013 
 
Party Seats Won Vote Share Seat Share +/- Rep 
Liberal 17 47.2% 47.2% 0% 
National 5 4.9% 13.9% +9% 
Labor 11 32.5% 30.6% -1.9% 
Greens 2 8.2% 5.6% -2.6% 
Shooters & 
Fishers 
1 1.8% 2.8% _1% 
Others 0 5.4% 0% -5.4% 
Source: Calculated from Western Australian Electoral Commission, Legislative Council 





28 The lowest level of over-representation for the three main parties of the left was 0.07% in 
1993, and the highest was 4.76% in 1996. For a summary of the official results from which the 
author made these calculations, see Western Australian Electoral Commission, 2005 Western 
Australian State General Election; Results and Statistics, 172. 
29 The party spokespeople voicing this opinion were federal deputy Liberal leader Julie Bishop 
and Labor’s then Defence Minister Stephen Smith. Both were guests on ABC TV’s election 
night coverage, 9 March 2013. 
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The impression created by the above figures would suggest that the Greens 
lost one seat to Liberal and one to Shooters and Fishers. In fact, the outcome 
at region level was that the Greens lost their seats to Liberal (North 
Metropolitan) and Labor (East Metropolitan), while the Nationals compensated 
for a loss to Shooters and Fishers in Agricultural with a gain from Labor in 
Mining and Pastoral. 
 
As in 2008, average over or under-representation can be compared with the 
overall measure to test the impact of malapportionment. For Labor, it does not 
appear to have hurt them as it did in 2008: their average under-representation 
was 5.2% compared to the overall 1.9% under-representation. The Greens’ 
average under-representation (3%) was also higher than its overall 
representation, but not by much. The Coalition’s overall over-representation of 
8.61% is higher than its average over-representation by region type (6.29%). 
This is a lower figure than in 2008, but at 2.32% it is still higher than all bar 
one (1996) of the elections held under the five- and seven-member district 
combination. 
 
The 2017 Election: Council System Favours Conservatives Despite 
Labor Landslide 
Labor’s landslide victory in the Legislative Assembly, largely attributable to a 
deterioration in the state’s economic conditions between 2013 and 2017,30 
broke the record for the number of seats gained by a single party at a WA 
election (20 seats) and the seat share for one party or Coalition (69.5%).31 
The result in the Legislative Council was, however, not nearly as good for 
Labor, although both it and the Greens improved considerably on their 2013 





30 A sharp decline in the mining industry had impacted severely upon the state’s revenue 
stream, resulting in increases in state debt and the government losing its AAA credit rating. 
31 The previous highest seat share was 68% (also for Labor) in 1911. See Hughes and 
Graham, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, 1, 572. 
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Table 4.10 Vote and Seat Shares for the Main Parties: Western 
Australian Legislative Council Election, 2017 
 
Party Seats Won Vote Share Seat Share +/- Rep 
Labor 14 40.5% 38.9% -1.6% 
Liberal 9 26.8% 25% -1.8% 
National 4 4.5% 11.1% +6.6% 
Greens 4 8.5% 11.1% +2.6% 




1 2.4% 2.8% +0.4% 
Liberal 
Democrats 
1 1.8% 2.8% +1% 
Others 0 7.3% 0% -7.3% 
Source: WA Electoral Commission: https://www.elections.wa.gov.au/elections/state/ 
sgelection#/sg2017, (accessed 23 January 2018). 
 
Labor received no winners’ bonus; in fact, it was under-represented. The 
Liberal Party was also under-represented, but this was more than 
compensated for by the usual over-representation of the Nationals. The 
Greens were over-represented by a slightly larger margin than Labor was 
under-represented, while the three smaller parties of the right that won seats 
were all slightly over-represented. 
 
Labor’s disadvantage was noted by veteran local Journalist Paul Murray, but 
he argued that the situation now existing was Labor’s own fault for agreeing to 
the continuation of Council malapportionment as the price for establishing one 
vote-one value in the Assembly.32 Murray is correct to say that Labor is partly 
the author of its upper house misfortune, but he overlooks the fact that Labor 
had used every method possible (each of them in vain) to have 





32 West Australian, "Upper House rort robs Labor", 1 April 2017. Murray had been editor of 
the West Australian during the 1990s and early 2000s, and later hosted a mid-morning 
talkback show on radio station 6PR. 
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Moreover, Murray does not appear to be aware that it is the change of district 
magnitude, rather than the level of malapportionment, that has made Labor’s 
task harder. He also does not consider the question of whether the 
maintenance of a pre-2016 Senate style voting system may have cost parties 
of the left a seat or two. Only in two regions (North Metropolitan and South 
Metropolitan) does this seem a realistic possibility, as in three others (Mining 
and Pastoral, East Metropolitan and Agricultural), the combined total of seats 
win by Labor and Greens is higher than their combined total of quotas, while 
in South West, the quota total is only 0.08 quotas higher than the combined 
number of seats. 
 
The South Metropolitan Region looks to be the most likely region to have 
produced a different results under different numbering requirements. Labor 
had received 3.18 quotas, Liberal received 1.76 quotas, the Greens received 
0.62 quotas and One Nation 0.49 quotas. On these figures, it might be 
expected that the number of elected members would be three Labor, two 
Liberal and one Greens, given that Labor preferences were directed to the 
Greens and One Nation preferences were assumed to favour the Liberal Party 
under the much-criticised preference deal between the two (for more on this 
deal, see below). As it happened, it was the next highest polling party, the 
Liberal Democrats, (0.28 quotas) who won the fifth seat after being favoured 
by the preferences of smaller parties (and also One Nation, after micro party 
preferences put the latter behind the Liberal Democrats), and the Liberal Party 
defeated the Greens for the sixth seat after distribution of the Liberal 
Democrat surplus. 
 
Had the new Senate voting system been in place, it is highly likely that the 
Greens would have held their seat. As we saw in the 2016 Senate election, 
many votes from micro parties drifted away to the three largest parties, even 
where the major party and micro party are in ideological opposition. It is 
unlikely that the Liberal Democrats’ Aaron Stonehouse would have overtaken 
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One Nation’s Phillip Scott under these circumstances, and if the likely 
scenario had occurred, it is highly likely that the drift from the micro parties of 
the left to the Greens would have seen sitting MLC Lynn MacLaren re-elected. 
The Liberal Party would also have gained some benefit from the drift of right 
of centre micro party preferences, so Stonehouse would have been be the 
likely loser under a 2016 Senate-style system. 
 
The North Metropolitan Region was far less likely to produce a different result. 
Here Labor received 2.61 quotas, Liberal 2.55 quotas, the Greens 0.70 
quotas and One Nation 0.45 quotas. It is true that the Greens benefitted from 
a much larger flow of micro party preferences than did Labor, thus enabling 
the exclusion of Labor’s number three candidate and the election of former 
East Metropolitan Greens MLC Alison Xamon on her preferences. However, 
this would have been the likely result under any system. It can also be 
claimed with near certainty that the Liberal Party would have won a third seat 
under any system, because of a high likelihood of a reasonably strong flow of 
One Nation preferences to the third Liberal candidate, Tjorn Sibma, especially 
in the presence of a One Nation how to vote card in some Assembly seats 
within the region. 
 
The maintenance of compulsory preferences with ticket voting and its 
potential to assist a Greens candidate over a Labor candidate is illustrated by 
results in two other regions, South West and Mining and Pastoral, where the 
final seat tallies in each region were three for Labor and one each for Liberal, 
National, Greens and One Nation. Labor had received 2.39 quotas in Mining 
and Pastoral and 2.55 quotas in South West, while the corresponding figures 
for the Greens were 0.40 quotas and 0.53 quotas respectively. It is true that 
the number one Greens candidate had more quotas than the number three 
Labor candidate, but it is quite possible that under a 2016 Senate style voting 
system, the Labor candidate would have received enough preferences to 
reverse the direction by the time one of these candidates was due for 
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exclusion. South West provides a starker illustration of the same pattern. The 
third Labor candidate, John Mondy, did lead the Greens’ leading candidate, 
Diane Evers, after the election of Labor’s number two candidate Adele Farina, 
but Evers received substantial help from Animal Justice Party, Daylight Saving 
Party and Fluoride Free WA, thus ensuring she was well ahead of Mondy at 
the point they were the two lowest polling candidates remaining in the count. 
Under the 2016 Senate voting system, it is likely that Labor would have 
received a much higher share of preferences from the three aforementioned 
micro parties, as well as a better share of preferences from micro parties of 
the right, thus making a Mondy win a likelihood.33 
 
In spite of the high level of campaign publicity received by Pauline Hanson’s 
One Nation, and especially its controversial preference deal with the Liberal 
Party,34 the results achieved by the party were unremarkable. Its overall 
Council vote of 8.2% (a better indication of its overall support than its lower 
Assembly vote because not all Assembly seats were contested by the party) 
yielded it 8.3% of the seats, a result that could only be regarded as very fair. 
Despite the apparent assumption among some local commentators that One 
Nation would be assisted by the decision of the Liberals to give it their 
preferences ahead of The Nationals, Labor and the Greens,35 none of the 







33 With official preference distributions as yet unavailable, the calculations and assumptions 
contained in this paper are based the calculations of Antony Green’s Legislative Council 
calculator. See www.abc.net.au/news/elections, and follow the links starting with WA votes 
2017. It may seem strange to imply that Fluoride Free WA is a party of the left, as the desire 
to de-fluoridate the water supply has generally been seen as an extreme right cause, 
although former Labor Premier John Tonkin was the chief critic of fluoridation when it was 
carried out in the late 1960s. However it is regarded as a party of the left for the purposes of 
analysing the South West region, as Fluoride Free WA and the Greens gave each other high 
preference allocations on their respective tickets. 
34 The most notable article written in the aftermath of the election commenting on the impact 
of the deal was by West Australian, "Hanson cops out in poll denial", 14 March 2017. 
35 See, for example, Peter van Onselen, "Disgrace, foolish, stupid," Sunday Times, 19 
February 2017, 41. 
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As it happened, the one case of a region where One Nation was not favoured 
by Liberal preferences cost it a seat. In Agricultural, One Nation had received 
0.82 quotas, and the Liberal Party 1.31 quotas. This would have ensured a 
seat for One Nation had they been the direct beneficiary of Liberal 
preferences. However, the latter party directed preferences to the sitting 
Shooters, Fishers and Farmers MLC Ricky Mazza. The party had initially 
received 0.40 quotas, and with Nationals (2.15 quotas) preferences also 
favouring Mazza, he was already ahead of One Nation candidate Rod 
Caddies at the point at which Labor’s number two candidate, Laurie Graham, 
was elected with the help of Greens and micro party preferences. With the 
Labor surplus strongly favouring Mazza, he comfortably won the sixth seat. A 
2016 Senate voting system would probably have seen Mazza lose because of 
the likely higher preference flow to One Nation. 
 
Liberal preferences were not required for the election of Robin Scott in Mining 
and Pastoral and Colin Tinknell in South West, because micro party 
preferences of the right had elected them before the exclusion of the highest 
placed unsuccessful Liberal candidates in each region. The failure of One 
Nation to win a seat in Agricultural was compensated for by an improbable win 
of a seat in East Metropolitan at the expense of second placed Liberal 
candidate and sitting MLC Alyssa Hayden. Here the Liberal Party had 
received 1.75 quotas and One Nation just 0.56 but, as in the two 
aforementioned country regions, preferences from micro parties of the right 
put One Nation lead candidate Laurie Smith ahead of Hayden at the point that 
all such parties had been eliminated. On the calculation models provided by 
Antony Green, however, Hayden ought to have beaten Smith on the basis of 
surplus preferences from successful Greens candidate Tim Clifford. 
 
The reason for the difference in result, as seen by Green, was the fact that 
groups of preferences from excluded candidates are distributed in individual 
bundles rather than in a bloc as in Senate elections. Although not mentioned 
129  
by Green, such a method is known as the weighted inclusive Gregory 
method.36 Consequently, Clifford received only as many preferences as were 
necessary to elect him. These preferences had been resting with the Fluoride 
Free WA (FFWA) group. Those that were not required were distributed 
between Smith and Hayden. Roughly two-thirds of these went to Smith, 
putting him 347 votes over quota without having to rely on leakage of votes 
from the Greens surplus. 
 
Although immaterial to the final result, the behaviour of Greens voters may 
have been influenced by a system that still allowed preference whisperer 
Glenn Drurey to weave his magic. In East Metropolitan Drurey created a 
situation where Fluoride Free WA’s leading candidate John Watt had a strong 
chance of being elected, something that was noticed by Green as well as the 
local media.37 
 
Regardless of what the other micro parties did in relation to their preferences, 
the preference decision that made a FFWA win a distinct possibility was that 
the Greens had put Watt ahead of Labor’s third placed candidate Matthew 
Swinbourn on their ticket. Many Greens voters, possibly aware of the potential 
for an above the line vote to result in a FFWA win, decided to vote below the 
line: 12.63% of Greens voters took this option, compared to just 4.58% across 
the region as a whole. There was also a higher percentage of below the line 
Greens voters than in any other region: the figures ranged from 12.39% in 
North Metropolitan to 4.06% in South Metropolitan. 
 
Had Labor failed to reach three quotas, there was potential for both Clifford 
and Swinbourn miss out on a seat. In the event, Labor received 3.26 quotas, 




36 For a detailed description of the method, see Miragliotta, Determining the Result, 31. 
37 West Australian, "Potential win for Fluoride Party shows decay in democracy", 17 February 
2017. 
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well ahead of Watt at the time the latter was the lowest polling remaining 
candidate. 
 
It is distinctly possible that these below the line Greens voters might have 
preferenced One Nation ahead of the Liberal Party, thus giving Smith a further 
buffer over Hayden. Anybody casting an above the line vote for the Greens 
was deemed to have preferred Liberal to One Nation. However, the evidence 
from corresponding Assembly results is that where Greens voters had to 
choose their own preference order, the split between the two was relatively 
even. In the four Assembly districts within the East Metropolitan region where 
the Greens candidate was eliminated before the One Nation candidate, One 
Nation received more preferences than Liberal on two of them,38 although in 
every case the combined preference total for the two parties was lower than 
that of the (eventually successful) Labor candidate. It is reasonable to assume 
a similarly even flow among below the line Greens voters. 
 
Conclusion 
With three WA elections now having been held under the six MLCs per region 
configuration (and all producing vastly different results in the three 
corresponding Assembly elections), there is sufficient evidence to suggest 
distinctive patterns in Legislative Council representation. The overall 
assessment of the 2008-2017 period is that while malapportionment may 
have played some role in Coalition over-representation, there are more 
important factors at play, most notably the use of six-member regions and the 
concentration of conservative strength in the Agricultural Region, although this 
had a lesser impact in 2017. There is also no doubt that the use of six- 
member regions has hurt the Labor Party (an average under-representation of 
3% in the three elections covered) and the left in general (the average Greens 
over-representation is so miniscule as to be virtually non-existent). The 
 
 
38 The two Assembly seats in question were Forrestfield and Thornlie, while in Darling Range 
and Midland the Liberal candidate received a higher share. 
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combination of compulsory preferences with ticket voting has provided some 
disadvantage to the left, and a cursory examination of 2017 results shows the 
potential for left gains in the event of the (probably unlikely) replacement of 
the current system with a 2016 Senate style voting system, as the results of 
the 2016 election show is likely to happen in practice. 
 
In some other states and territories, a form of regionalised proportional 
representation has been used, most notably for the Victorian Legislative 
Council (since the 2006 election), the Tasmanian House of Assembly (since 
the 1909 election) and the Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly 
(since the 1995 election). These jurisdictions have used a narrow range of 
district magnitudes ranging from five to seven. Nevertheless, they provide 
enough evidence to assess what, if any, level of partisan advantage exists in 
the jurisdictions, and how much responsibility is borne by the magnitudes 
used as distinct from the political geography of the jurisdictions. Analysis of 









In the last two chapters it could be seen that both district magnitude and ballot 
paper numbering requirements could have a significant impact on which, if 
any, major party bloc was favoured and the success rate of larger and smaller 
minor parties, with distinct patterns evident. This chapter examines three more 
jurisdictions (Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria) with 
varying rules to ascertain if the patterns in them are similar or notably 
different. 
 
These jurisdictions share with the Senate and WA the characteristic that their 
houses that use proportional representation are divided into a series of multi- 
member electorates. Furthermore, with the minor exception of federal double 
dissolutions, they have operated within a narrow range of district magnitudes, 
namely five, six, seven or a combination of two of these magnitudes. They do, 
however, offer voters a much greater level of choice in the method of 
allocating their preferences than in Western Australia and in the Senate under 
the voting rules used from 1984 to 2014. 
 
As well as the fact that Tasmania and the ACT use proportional 
representation for their house of government, they are similar in that neither 
offer voters the option to vote for a party ticket. Voters are instructed to vote 
for individual candidates in order of preference from 1 to the number of 
members to be elected, although the ACT allows for a vote to remain valid if 
the voter has voted for fewer than that number. Victoria, on the other hand, 
has given voters a choice between voting for a party ticket above the line, or 
to vote below the line by numbering candidates from 1 to at least the number 
of candidates to be elected (always five). 
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The impact of district magnitude and its effect on the number of parties 
elected has been partly covered in Chapter 2. This chapter examines in 
greater detail the impact the changes in district magnitude in Tasmania have 
had on the three main parties in that state, and the apparently deviating case 
thrown up by Victoria which, at the 2010 election, produced a result in which 
the Liberal and National Parties enjoyed an advantage in spite of an 
apparently unfavourable district magnitude of five. Of more recent interest, 
however, was the 2014 Victorian election in which, like the 2013 Senate 
election, a large number of small parties won seats in the Legislative Council, 
in spite of the lower district magnitude and the less onerous requirements for 
casting a valid vote below the line. 
 
This chapter will also examine individual contests in the various jurisdictions to 
illustrate occasions where preference distributions were important. It will argue 
a case for the particular partisan patterns mentioned earlier, as well as the 
particular influence of optional preferential voting in assisting, more often than 
not, the Labor Party. 
 
Tasmania 
From the time of its adoption of Hare-Clark in 1909 until the 1956 election, 
Tasmania elected 30 members to the House of Assembly, with five districts 
each electing six members. The potential problem such a system could cause 
is fairly obvious: in a close election, and with two dominant parties, it is highly 
probable that each district will elect three members from each major party, 
and the result would be parliamentary deadlock. The wide-ranging but non- 
comprehensive account by Newman suggests that politicians and 
commentators alike were aware of this potential problem quite early in the 
system’s existence. Yet strangely this situation did not manifest itself until the 




1 Newman, Hare-Clark in Tasmania, 76. 
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during this period in his book Mirror of the Nation’s Mind.2 The figures suggest 
that more often than not, one of the major parties won over 50% of the seats. 
Only in six elections did either party win exactly 50% of the seats, and only in 
the last two of those elections did both major parties win exactly 50% of the 
seats. Wright does not attempt to assess whether one particular party enjoyed 
an overall advantage from the system. This chapter answers this question and 
applies the same technique to later elections and assesses some of the 
possible reasons for the similarities and differences with patterns in other 
jurisdictions. 
 
Between 1909 and 1956, Labor received an average 47.43% share of the 
vote and won 48.63% of the seats, an average over-representation of 1.2%. 
The Nationalist/Liberal Party received an average vote share of 46.75% and 
an average seat share of 48.04%, so its average over-representation was 
1.29%. It can thus be seen that during these years the Liberal Party was still 
favoured, but not by nearly as much as would become the case in later years 
in other parts of Australia. The amorphous category of ‘others’ was under- 
represented by 2.48%, which is quite low compared to more recent elections 
(and reflects the significantly lower ‘other’ vote in early years). 
 
The figures for the period provided by Wright do not suggest any particular 
partisan pattern.3 The Labor Party received a higher proportion of seats than 
its share of the vote would have suggested in 13 of the 17 elections held 
during this period, though in many of them the margin was miniscule. The 
Liberal Party, or the combined Liberal-Country Party at elections where the 
Country Party contested, was over-represented on nine occasions and under- 







2 Wright, Mirror of the Nation's Mind, 100. 
3 Ibid. 
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These figures do not suggest a systemic bias against parties of the left in six- 
member districts. Unlike WA Labor, Tasmanian Labor has never had to battle 
against rural malapportionment. It may be the case that the long existence of 
Hare-Clark system in Tasmania has led to a better Labor performance in rural 
areas, although such a link is hard to prove. Enid Lakeman has suggested a 
possible reason for the latter phenomenon. She argued the absence of a 
country party was because rural voters could vote for farmers within the party 
they naturally prefer .4 
 
One factor assisting the Labor Party in Tasmania was that there were a 
number of elections where it was able to win over 57% or more of the vote in 
some districts,5 thus enabling it to win four seats.6 This phenomenon did not 
occur in Western Australia until the 2017 election,7 although Antony Green’s 
modelling prior to the 2008 election suggested the possibility of a Labor- 
Greens tally of four seats in two regions had the 2005 result been repeated.8 
The Tasmanian Nationalist/Liberal Party, while suffering at those elections at 
which Labor was able to win 4 seats in some districts, were compensated 
overall by the fact that they won three seats out of six at other elections with a 
vote just above 40%. 
 
The problem with six-member districts was made clear by the results of the 
1955 and 1956 elections. In each of these, both major parties won three seats 
in each district, although the Labor Party received slightly more votes each 
time. The deadlock was resolved on each occasion by the party with the lower 
 
 
4 Lakeman, Power to Elect, 80. 
5 The occasions when this happened were 1909 (Darwin), 1925 (Denison), 1937 (Bass, 
Darwin, Denison, Franklin), 1941 (all five electorates) and 1946 (Bass). In 1937 and 1941, 
Labor received over 57% of the overall vote. 
6 Detailed results in individual districts can be found in Colin A. Hughes and B. D. Graham, 
Voting for the South Australian, Western Australian and Tasmanian Lower Houses, 1890- 
1964 (Canberra: Dept. of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian 
National University, 1976). 
7 In the 2017 election, Labor won three seats and the Greens one seat in East Metropolitan. 
See analysis in Chapter 4. 
8 Green, "2007 Redistribution Western Australia: Analysis of Final Electoral Boundaries". 
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vote (the Liberal Party) choosing the speaker, but the Parliamentarians 
decided the situation was unsatisfactory, and legislated to add a seventh 
elected member for each district. This arrangement was to last until 1998. 
 
Seven-member districts 1959-1996 
Between 1959 and 1996 eleven elections were held in Tasmania. There was 
a relatively even spread of success for the two major parties, with Labor 
winning six of these elections and the Liberal Party five, although, as Sharman 
et al have noted, there have been very few changes of party hegemony.9 
In these elections, the Labor Party received an average vote share of 43.98% 
and an average seat share of 45.95%. This gave it an average over- 
representation of 1.97%. The Liberal Party’s vote share over this period was 
44.97% and its average seat share was 47.58%, giving it an average over- 
representation of 2.61%. ‘Others’ were under-represented by an average of 
4.91%, although it should be noted that the average over the last three 
elections was somewhat lower at 3.58%. These were the three elections 
where a group of organised Greens candidates contested. 
 
At one level, these figures fly in the face of the conventional academic wisdom 
that proportionality increases as district magnitude increases, as the over- 
representation of the major parties was slightly higher under the seven- 
member arrangement than it had been under the six-member arrangement. 
The possible reasons for this are complex, but it is argued here that the rise in 
support for candidates other than those for the two major parties can actually 
lead to an increase in the latter’s levels of over-representation. The seven- 
member period happened to coincide with a decrease in support for both 
major parties: the average Labor vote was 1.45% lower during the 1959-1996 
periods than it was during the 1909-1956 period, while the Liberal Party’s vote 




9 Sharman, Smith and Moon, "The Party System and Change of Regime". 
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While it is certain that the Greens took some votes away from Labor, the latter 
did not suffer a loss in seat share beyond what would have been expected. 
Labor was over-represented by an average of 1.49% at the three elections 
between 1989 and 1996, compared to 1.97% overall. The Liberal Party was 
also slightly less over-represented at these three elections: their 1989-1996 
average over-representation was 2.00% compared to 2.61% overall. 
 
During the 1959-1996 period there was little controversy over the fairness or 
otherwise of election results or the electoral system generally. There were 
only four elections that did not result in a clear majority for one of the major 
parties, and there were only two elections (1969 and 1989) at which the party 
receiving the largest vote share did not form government. The second of these 
elections caused consternation in some circles,10 but it did result in as much 
public controversy as the move made after the 1996 election to reduce the 
size of the House of Assembly from 35 seats to 25 seats, via the passing of 
the Parliamentary Reform Act (No. 31 of 1998).11 The controversy came 
because the reform appeared to be motivated, in part at least, by a desire to 
reduce the influence of the Greens,12 whose parliamentary members 
emphatically argued that this was the main motivation of other politicians who 
supported the change. 
 
Five-member electorates 1998-2018 
In 1998 the Liberal Government, by this stage led by Tony Rundle after Ray 
Groom’s resignation, moved to reduce the size of the parliament, ostensibly 
justified as a way to save costs. The legislation passed with Labor support. 
The significance of the move was that with five members to be elected from 
each electorate rather than seven, the quota for election was increased from 
 
 
10 Launceston Examiner proprietor Edmund Rouse spearheaded an unsuccessful attempt to 
bribe newly elected Labor MP and former Examiner, journalist Jim Cox to defect to the Liberal 
Party. Rouse was later to be imprisoned for this offence. 
11 The new Act necessitated amendments to both the Constitution Act 1934 and the Electoral 
Act 1935. 
12 Mackerras certainly thought so. See Malcolm Mackerras, "A more solid reflection of popular 
preferences," The Australian, 14 July 1998, 15. 
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12.5% to 16.7%. The Greens opposed the legislation on the grounds that it 
was designed to make it harder for them to win seats,13 and Malcolm 
Mackerras agreed with their argument.14 
 
The results of the 1998 election showed the Greens had good reason to fear 
the change. The Greens’ vote dropped to 10.2% (in 1996 it had been 11.1%), 
but the slump in seats was more dramatic. Of the four seats the Greens had 
won in 1996, only Peg Putt’s Denison seat was retained.15 The Labor Party 
ended up being grossly over-represented: its 44.8% vote share netted it 
56.5% of the seats, while the Liberal Party was not quite so over-represented, 
with its 38.1% vote share winning it 40% of the seats.16 
 
Part of the reason why levels of over-representation increase as district 
magnitude decreases is the widening gap between the level of vote received 
by (especially) the winning party: under a seven-member system, a vote of 
12.5% nets a party 14.3% of the seats, while in a five-member system a vote 
of 16.7% nets the same party 20% of the seats. The 1998 election, however 
seems to suggest there are more factors in play that help to explain the Labor 
over-representation. The distribution of preferences among parties is 
important, bearing in mind that in Tasmania casting of preferences beyond the 
number of members to be elected is optional, unlike the situation prevailing in 
Senate elections held between 1990 and 2014. 
 
There were no particular electorates where a party polled markedly better 
than it did in the rest of the state, with both Labor and Liberal receiving 




13 Greens MPs expressed such views during the second reading stage of parliamentary 
debates on the said bill, Tasmanian Parliamentary Debates (House of Assembly), 22 July 
1998. 
14 Mackerras, "A more solid reflection of popular preferences". The argument that the main 
motivation was a reduction in the cost of running parliament was not helped by a decision 
made around the same time to grant members of parliament a 40% pay rise. 
15 Tasmanian Electoral Office, Report on Parliamentary Elections 1998 (Hobart, 1999). 
16 Ibid. 
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outright anywhere, while the Greens failed to reach a quota in all five seats. 
There was some difference as to which party had the highest remainder 
(which would have seen that party winning the fifth seat had the system not 
allowed for cross-party preference distribution). The Greens held that 
advantage in Bass and Denison, while Labor held it in Braddon, Franklin and 
Lyons. Only in Bass, where Labor won the final seat, was the initial position 
altered by preferences. 
 
In Bass, the Greens candidate, Kim Booth, was a victim of the relatively even 
distribution of votes among the Labor candidates. There were three Labor 
candidates, Peter Patmore, Jim Cox and Gill James, who each polled a higher 
primary vote than Booth, and the number of votes polled by lower placing 
Labor candidates was higher than that given to other Greens candidates. 
Labor also did better from the preferences from the fourth-placed Tasmania 
First Party than the Greens did. When Booth was eliminated, the vote that 
was passed on to other candidates went strongly to Labor, thus defeating the 
third Liberal candidate in spite of its initial higher remainder.17 
 
The results in the other four seats were more straightforward, but one of them 
warrants a few words of explanation. Why did the Greens hold their seat in 
Denison, in spite of the party holding a smaller quota lead over Labor than it 
did in Bass?18 The answer appears to lie mainly in the number of votes that 
drifted off to other parties via preferences. There were 1,209 votes originally 
cast for Labor candidates that ended up with other parties after the preference 
count. Of these votes, 320 went to the Greens and 107 exhausted. By 
contrast, only 348 Greens votes were so lost: 175 going to Labor and 25 
exhausting.19 It would seem likely that some people chose to cast a vote for 
 
 
17 Liberal had received 2.517 quotas compared to Labor’s 2.467 quotas. The Greens had 
received 0.54 quotas. 
18 In Denison, the Greens had 0.79 quotas and Labor 2.78 quotas. In Bass the Greens had 
0.55 quotas to Labor’s 2.47 quotas. See Tasmanian Electoral Office, Report on Parliamentary 
Elections 1998, 15. 
19 Ibid., 84. 
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Jim Bacon, the popular Labor candidate who would become premier, and 
then chose to support candidates of other parties. 
 
As a consequence, by the time there was just one candidate from each party 
in the field, the Greens’ Peg Putt held a lead of 1,561 votes over Labor’s Andy 
Bennett. The preferences from the surplus votes of three Liberal candidates 
(two elected and one excluded) narrowed this margin by only 141 votes, so 
Putt was elected. 
 
Although the results of this election did defy the prediction of Mackerras that 
‘This plan to scupper the Greens will not work’,20 later elections showed that 
the changes did not turn out to be a permanent barrier to Greens success. 
Nor was Labor to be as grossly over-represented as it was in 1998, although it 
is acknowledged that the five seat configuration worked well for Labor in five 
of the six elections. Only in 2014 was it less over-represented than the Liberal 
Party. 
 











































1998 44.8 56 +11.2 38.1 40 +1.9 10.2 4 -6.2 
2002 51.9 56 +4.1 27.4 28 +0.6 18.1 16 -2.1 
2006 49.5 56 +6.6 31.8 28 -3.8 16.6 16 -0.6 
2010 36.9 40 +3.1 38.9 40 +1.1 21.6 20 -1.6 
2014 27.4 28 +0.6 51.4 60 +8.6 13.5 12 -1.5 
2018 32.6 40 +7.4 50.3 52 +1.7 10.3 8 -2.3 
Avge 40.5 46 +5.1 39.6 41.3 +1.8 15.1 12.7 -2.4 
Sources: Calculated from official results published by Tasmanian Electoral Office Report on 
Parliamentary Elections 1998 (Hobart, 1999); Report on Parliamentary Elections 1999 to 
2002 (Hobart, 2003); Tasmanian Electoral Commission. Report on Parliamentary Elections 
2003 to 2006 (Hobart, 2006); Report on Parliamentary Elections 2007 to 2010 (Hobart, 2010); 
Report on Parliamentary Elections 2011 to 2014 (Hobart, 2014). 
 
 
20 Mackerras, "A more solid reflection of popular preferences". 
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Table 5.1, however shows a consistent, if small, bias against the Greens. On 
average, Labor was significantly more over-represented than the Liberal 
Party, and this was particularly evident in 2018, in spite of the Liberals’ 
election win. The 2014 election had appeared to indicate a pattern of a 
winners’ bonus rather than a systemic bias in favour of Labor. 
 
Elections held between 2002 and 2018 have received little attention in 
psephological literature, probably because of their generally uncontroversial 
nature. However most of these elections produced quirky results in one or 
more divisions, though usually in a way that resulted in a fairer overall result. 
In both 2002 and 2006 it was the Launceston-based division of Bass that 
conformed to the latter pattern, and the south-western division of Franklin that 
provided an exception in 2006 by under-representing the Liberal Party. 
 
Bass is odd one out – on two occasions 
As in 1998, Labor won 14 seats in both 2002 and 2006, but the seat 
configuration was different. Labor won three seats in Denison in both 
elections, but won only two seats in Bass in spite of its vote being over 49% in 
both elections as compared to 41.11% in 1998.21 The Greens were the 
beneficiary in Bass, the Liberal Party the loser in Denison.22 
 
Labor’s 2002 gain in Denison is straightforward: its vote of 50.84% amounted 
to 3.05 quotas.23 Results in Bass, however, look peculiar for both 2002 and 
2006. They illustrate how different Tasmania can be as a result of the optional 




21 Tasmanian Electoral Office, Report on Parliamentary Elections 1999 to 2002 (Hobart, 
2003), 25. 
22 Ibid. The Liberal member to lose his seat in 2002 was then Liberal leader Bob Cheek. 
23 The Greens gained a seat from the Liberal Party in Franklin and Lyons, where its vote had 
risen above a quota and the Liberal vote had dropped well below two quotas. 
24 In Tasmania, voters are required to number their ballot paper from 1 to the number of 
candidates to be elected to cast a formal vote, with further preferences optional. 
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the ballot paper, and a prohibition on handing out how to vote cards on polling 
day. With no ticket voting option available, voters are encouraged to think 
more independently about how they distribute their preferences. It is clear that 
many Bass voters displayed such thinking and exercised their right to a wide 
level of choice for distributing their preferences to the full extent. 
 
The 2002 Labor vote in Bass was 49.14% (2.95 quotas), while the Liberal vote 
was 31.37% (1.88 quotas), and the Greens received 16.55%, or 0.99 quotas. 
The Greens did win a seat with this vote, as would be expected, but the 
winning of a second seat by the Liberal Party appears surprising at first 
glance. Why did this happen? 
 
The answer lies in the higher than average leakage of votes from the Labor 
ticket upon the elimination of candidates. The average leakage level from an 
eliminated major party candidate (either excluded or elected), is around, but 
usually just under, 10%. As the figures below show, the rate was much higher 
for Labor in Bass in 2002 (and 2006). 
 
Table 5.2 Preference Leakage from Elected/Excluded Labor 
Candidates: Bass Election, 2002 
 
Candidate Name Votes 
Transferred 
Votes Leaked % Votes Leaked 
Jim Cox 690 53 7.68% 
Katherine Hay 367 24 6.54% 
Brian Roe 1,550 222 14.32% 
Jenni Jarvis 2,487 259 10.41% 
Geoff Lyons 4,301 746 17.34% 
Total/Average 9,395 1,309 13.93% 







25 Cox was elected immediately on first preferences, while Hay was elected after the 
distribution of Cox’s surplus. The other Labor candidates were excluded. 
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Of the 1,309 votes that leaked away from the unlucky third placed Labor 
candidate Anita Smith, 753 of these found their way to Liberal Party 
candidates. By contrast, when Liberal candidates were eliminated (almost 
always through exclusion), 579 of their 6,915 votes (8.37%) were lost to the 
Liberal Party, with only 270 of them going to Labor candidates.26 
 
Labor’s pre-election pledge to only form government in majority (the same 
promise it had made before, and kept after, the 1996 election) probably cost 
Smith some Greens preferences. When the leading Greens candidate, Ken 
Booth, was declared elected with a surplus of 129, it became evident that 
nearly half of Greens voters had availed themselves of the right to express no 
preference beyond their own party (a practice that Mackerras calls the ‘party 
linear vote’).27 Consequently, only 49 votes of Booth’s surplus transferred to 
Labor, with 18 going to the Liberal Party and the other 62 either exhausting or 
being lost by fraction. The exclusion of unsuccessful Greens candidates had 
seen leakages of 251 votes to Labor candidates and 194 to Liberal 
candidates. 
 
The irony of the Bass result is that the overall state-wide result was fairer than 
if Labor had won the last seat. The same was to occur (for similar reasons) in 
2006, although the Liberal Party received the rough end of the quirks of the 
Hare-Clark system in Franklin. 
 
The 2006 count in Bass 
In spite of another rise in Labor’s primary vote to 49.16% (2.98 quotas), the 
party could win only two seats in Bass, a result which helped make party 
representation in each division identical to 2002. This time it was the Greens’ 
turn to come from further back to win the last seat with a vote of 13.56% (0.81 
quotas), with Booth eventually holding on by 136 votes from Labor’s Steve 
 
26 For details of the distribution of preferences in Bass, see Tasmanian Electoral Commission, 
Report on Parliamentary Elections 2011 to 2014 (Hobart, 2014), 86. 
27 Mackerras, personal conversation with author, 12 October 2012. 
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Reissig.28 The Liberal Party won a comfortable second seat with a vote of 
33.78% (2.03 quotas). 
 
Labor again suffered a significant leakage from its column, though at a higher 
rate from its elected candidates and at a lesser rate from its excluded ones, as 
the table below shows. 
 
Table 5.3 Levels of Leakage from Elected/Excluded Labor 









Michelle O’Byrne 4,029 421 10.45% 
Jim Cox 900 79 8.89% 
Mike Greene 1,258 127 10.10% 
Grant Courtney 2,883 327 11.34% 
Michelle Cripps 4,122 770 18.60% 
Total 13,192 1,725 13.08% 
Source: Tasmanian Electoral Commission: Report on Parliamentary Elections 2003 to 2006, 
81-82.29 
 
Of the 1,725 Labor votes that leaked, 503 went to the Greens. By contrast, 
when Greens candidates were eliminated, only 423 of the 3,851 such votes 
(10.98%) leaked away, of which 175 ended up with Labor. 
 
Labor’s misfortune in Bass was compensated by its good luck in Franklin, 




28 For overall results of this election, see Tasmanian Electoral Commission, Report on 
Parliamentary Elections 2003 to 2006 (Hobart, 2006), 23. The preference distribution for Bass 
can be seen on p. 82 
29 The higher than usual leakage away from first placed candidate O’Byrne may reflect a 
personal/sympathy vote, as she had represented Bass at the federal level between 1998 and 
2004. The loss of Bass, and also Braddon, at the 2004 federal election, was largely 
interpreted as a backlash against Labor’s forestry policy. If this is so, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that some voters voted for O’Byrne out of sympathy without wishing to support the 
rest of the Labor team. 
30 For the full preference distribution in Franklin, see Tasmanian Electoral Commission, 
Report on Parliamentary Elections 2003 to 2006, 88. 
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one seat for its 1.88 quotas. Table 5.4 illustrates one factor hurting the Liberal 
Party which mirrored, to a lesser extent, Labor’s problem in Bass. 
 
Table 5.4 Levels of Leakage from Elected/Excluded Liberal 






Votes Leaked % Votes Leaked 
Will Hodgman 3,395 418 12.31% 
Sue Bastone 1,391 158 11.36% 
Tony Scott 1,688 227 13.44% 
Steve Allie 4,049 449 11.09% 
Total 10,223 1,252 11.90% 
Source: Tasmanian Electoral Commission: Report on Parliamentary Elections 2003 to 2006, 
88.31 
 
Of the 1,252 Liberal votes that leaked, 759 ended up with Labor. By contrast, 
far fewer Labor votes (615 out of 8,668 transferred votes, or 7.1% of the total) 
leaked to other groups,32 and only 176 of these ended up with the Liberal 
Party. The second problem for the Liberal Party in Franklin was that, unlike 
the 2002 Bass situation, there was a substantial package of Greens 
preferences to pass on, and they flowed strongly to Labor. 
 
The Greens had polled well enough to have 1.17 quotas, and therefore had a 
significant surplus to pass on once its leading candidate, Nick McKim, had 
been elected. McKim had needed only one Greens colleague to be excluded 
to bring him up to a quota. Labor did not do significantly better than the Liberal 
Party among those voters who leaked from the Greens ticket: they received 
80 such votes and the Liberal Party 61. But when the second placed Greens 
candidate, Jane MacDonald, was excluded, 941 of her votes went to Labor 





31 Will Hodgman was not Liberal leader at this election. 
32 The leakage level was particularly small from incumbent Premier Paul Lennon: of the 6066 
surplus votes transferred, only 262 (4.32%) drifted away. 
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the Bass results is that the overall state-wide outcome became more 
equitable. 
 
Had Labor won a third seat at either election, the party would have been even 
more over-represented than was actually the case.33 The Franklin result left 
the Liberal Party under-represented, the only occasion over five elections that 
either of the two largest parties suffered this fate. But it would seem hard to 
argue against the overall fairness of a system that delivered such results on 
the basis of voters freely expressing their preferences, or lack of them, among 
candidates of the same or different parties. 
 
2010 No Quirky Results 
The only election of the 1998-2018 period to cause controversy in terms of the 
formation of a Labor-Greens coalition government, was paradoxically the most 
straightforward in seat allocation terms.34 In 2010, each Division returned two 
Labor, two Liberal and one Greens member. The Greens’ under- 
representation was well below average for the period, while Labor and Liberal 
over-representation was also below average.35 On the three occasions where 
parties won seats without full quotas, the party with the highest remainder won 
an extra seat in each case.36 
 
In the only remotely close contest for an individual seat (the fifth In Denison), 
the second placed Liberal, Elise Archer, defeated Independent candidate 
Andrew Wilkie by 815 votes after the distribution of all preferences.37 Wilkie 
 
 
33 The Labor Party won 51.4% of the vote in 2002 and 49.5% in 2006, and won 56% of the 
seats on each occasion. Had Labor won a third seat in Bass, it would have had 60% of the 
seats, pushing its over-representation up to 10.5% in 2006. 
34 The Labor Premier, David Bartlett, had offered his resignation to Tasmania’s Governor 
Richard Butler, but the Governor had refused to accept it, probably doubting the Liberal 
Party’s ability to secure the Greens’ support to form a government. 
35 Results of this election can be found in Tasmanian Electoral Commission, Report on 
Parliamentary Elections 2007 to 2010 (Hobart, 2010). 
36 The three cases were in Braddon (Greens, 0.83 quotas), Denison (Liberal, 1.79 quotas) 
and Franklin (Labor, 1.83 quotas). 
37 For this distribution, see Tasmanian Electoral Commission, Report on Parliamentary 
Elections 2007 to 2010, 83-84. 
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was later to win the co-existent federal seat later that year, and his 
performance is discussed in the analysis of independent candidates in 
Chapter 7. 
 
2014 & 2018: Contrasting Liberal Wins Show System’s Quirks 
Both of these elections saw the Liberal Party win overall majorities under the 
leadership of Will Hodgman. They differ greatly, however, in the 
representation levels of the major parties. In 2014 the Liberal Party achieved a 
record-equalling seat share and was over-represented by 8.8%. In 2018 the 
Liberal Party was over-represented by 1.7%, which was close to the 1998- 
2018 average. By contrast, Labor, which had achieved next to no over- 
representation in 2014, was over-represented by an above-average 7.1% in 
2018. Why the stark contrast? 
 
Braddon stands out as the main cause of the large Liberal over- 
representation, as it is the only division in which it won more seats (four) than 
its quota share (3.53). Without the fourth seat, the Party would have been 
over-represented by 4.8%, close to the average for the highest polling party 
across the period. 
 
In similar circumstances on the mainland, it would generally be expected that 
Labor (0.39 quotas) and the Greens (0.42 quotas) would combine their 
preferences and defeat the fourth placed Liberal. The actual result illustrates 
how the Hare-Clark system, though more democratic in theory because of the 
stronger control that voters have over their preferences and weakening the 
influence of major party machines, will sometimes allow for greater major 
party over-representation.38 
 
One factor assisting the Liberal Party was the distribution of the surplus votes 
of their two highest polling candidates, Alan Brooks and Jeremy Rockliff. 
 
38 For the preference distribution in Braddon, see Tasmanian Electoral Commission, Report 
on Parliamentary Elections 2011 to 2014, 82. 
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These tended to go to other Liberal candidates, but did not go especially 
strongly to any particular one. The eventual consequence was that after the 
exclusion of the fifth-placed Liberal candidate, Kyron Howell,39 the two 
remaining Liberals, Roger Jaensch and Joan Rylah, had 8,477 and 7,758 
votes respectively. These totals amount to 79.1% and 72.4% of the 10,717 
votes required for a quota. In a mainland system with a ticket vote option, it is 
likely that Jaensch would already have been elected, with Rylah struggling on 
a total somewhere around 50% of a quota. 
 
As it was, both were fighting hard with the leading Labor candidate, Bryan 
Green (8,007 votes), and while Green was now elected on the preferences of 
third placed Labor candidate Shane Broad, there were not enough 
preferences from Broad’s surplus, Greens candidate Paul O’Halloran and 
Palmer United’s Kevin Morgan to re-elect Labor’s other MHA Brenton Best. 
Three factors hurt Best: the most notable being that only 83.26% of Broad’s 
3,734 preferences flowed to the remaining two Labor candidates, with 5.03% 
going to Liberal candidates and the rest exhausting or going to the sole 
Greens and Palmer United candidates. 
 
Labor would also have been disappointed to receive just 44.22% of 
O’Halloran’s preferences, with 15.23% going to Liberal candidates and 
40.80% exhausting. The rather weak (70.3%) flow of Bryan Green’s 
preferences was by that stage immaterial to the result (Best could not have 
won even if he had received all of them), and Palmer United Party voters had 
little impact, as 53.33% of the votes held at the point of exclusion by its 
leading candidate Kevin Morgan exhausted. 
 
In 2018 it was Labor that enjoyed the largest (7.4%) over-representation, in 
spite of its overall loss. That the Liberal Party’s over-representation was just 
 
 
39 Of the 2,791 votes Howell held at the point of exclusion, 2,555 (91.5%) of them went to the 
two remaining Liberals. This was a much higher flow than that achieved among the leading 
Labor candidates. 
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1.7% rather than being closer to the winner’s average of 5.7% was largely due 
to an above average leakage of Premier Will Hodgman’s surplus votes away 
from the Liberal column in Franklin, but this worked to the advantage of 
Greens candidate rather than Labor. The latter’s overall advantage was to 
some degree caused by factors that assisted it in Braddon in a manner similar 
to those that helped the Liberals in the same division in 2014, but Labor also 
now seems to be in the happy position of being a semi-Condorcet party in 
Tasmania. 
 
The Condorcet concept refers to a situation where a particular party, although 
not necessarily the most popular, can nearly always win because supporters 
of other parties will choose it in a two-way contest with any other party. 
Labor’s gain of a second seat in Bass looked far from assured with a vote 
amounting to just 1.59 quotas, with the Greens close behind on 0.56 quotas, 
and the Liberal Party (3.53 quotas) also potentially in the running. However, 
provided the second-placed Labor candidate stayed ahead of one of the 
others, they were always likely to win because they would receive the bulk of 
preferences from whoever came third. In Braddon Labor was always likely to 
win a second seat because its 1.64 quota share put it well ahead of the 
Liberal Party (at 3.36 quotas), its nearest rival for the fifth seat. Even if the 
margin had been closer Labor could have been confident because it was the 
second preference party for most Greens and Jacqui Lambie Network voters. 
 
Conclusion from Tasmania 
It is evident from Table 5.1 that the Greens were rarely relatively 
disadvantaged in five-member districts, This outcome, Mackerras had 
argued,40 was what Labor and Liberal politicians had sought when they 
legislated for a 25 member House of Assembly, although their parliamentary 
speeches at the time denied this was their intention.41 In recent elections, the 
level of disadvantage has gradually reduced from the high point of 1998, but a 
 
40 Mackerras, "A more solid reflection of popular preferences". 
41 Tasmanian Parliamentary Debates (House of Assembly), 22 July 1998. 
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level of disadvantage remains. Labor appears to be more advantaged by the 
system than the Liberals. The 2014 election showed that the Liberal Party can 
profit from a winners’ bonus when it is in the ascendancy, but it was far less 
evident in 2018. 
 
Neither the six-member system used from 1909 to 195642 nor the seven- 
member system used between 1959 and 1996 suggest either a particular bias 
towards one major party or the other, or that the Greens were disadvantaged 
in the three elections in which they stood.43 However, it should be noted that, 
had six-member divisions been used during the 1998-2018 period, and people 
had voted the same way (not necessarily a reliable assumption), the Liberal 
Party would have received a higher percentage of representation on four 
occasions, and a lower percentage on only one. The Labor Party would have 
been at a comparative disadvantage more often than not, while the Greens 
would have fared slightly better than was actually the case. 
 
The 2014 result in Braddon showed how a system of optional preferential 
voting can assist a major party by diluting the effect of preference flows from 
minor parties, though the reverse happened in Bass in both 2002 and 2006. 
However, it is hard to argue that the Braddon result is unfair on democratic 
principle. It is likely that some Labor and Greens voters did not wish to give 
preferences to Brenton Best,44 but did not want to give a vote to a Liberal 
either.45 It is not an unreasonable idea for voters without a clear preference for 
Best or Rylah to have the option not to indicate one, thus enabling those 
 
 
42 Between 1909 and 1956 the Labor Party was over-represented by an average of 1.20%, 
while the major conservative party was over-represented by an average of 1.29%. 
43 Between 1959 and 1996 the Labor Party was over-represented by an average of 1.97%, 
while the Liberal Party was over-represented by an average of 2.61%. 
44 These Labor and Greens voters would have been especially pleased to see the end of Best 
after having seen the ABC’s election night coverage on 15 March 2014, in which Best had 
expressed his opposition to the formation of a Labor-Greens coalition in 2010. It also revealed 
that he had failed to attend caucus meetings in 2013, and (according to witnesses) had during 
the campaign referred to Labor Premier Lara Giddings as ‘Lala’. 
45 Evidence of the reluctance of Labor voters to vote for Best was provided by the countback 
that took place after Bryan Green resigned from parliament in 2017. His replacement was 
Broad, not Best. 
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voters who had a definite preference for one or the other to decide the fate of 
the last seat. 
 
The next jurisdiction to be examined is the ACT, which provides more 
evidence that when party machines have less control over the distribution of 
their own preferences, overall outcomes paradoxically become more 
favourable for them. 
 
Australian Capital Territory: More Greens Disadvantage in Five-member 
Divisions? 
The ACT has used some form of local assembly since 1973,46 but the territory 
did not achieve the status of a self-governing jurisdiction until 1989. The first 
two elections for the new Legislative Assembly were conducted under a 
modified d’Hondt system, the major features of which were a threshold of 
approximately 5.56% required to achieve representation and no requirement 
for voters to express preferences beyond their first choice candidate.47 
 
The threshold, no doubt designed to limit the number of small parties elected, 
was only partially successful: as table 2.7 shows, both N(v) and N(s) were 
higher than those accruing from the post-1992 system. The main reason for 
this was the remarkably low vote for the two major parties (a combined vote of 
37.69%) with Labor’s share 22.82% and the Liberal’s an even more paltry 
14.87%. Even so, their seat shares saw them over-represented by 6.32% and 
8.66% respectively. Three other groups (Residents Rally, No Self- 
Government Party and Abolish Self-Government Coalition) won seats, but 
most attention became focussed on the large number of unsuccessful parties 
that stood, with some of the names suggesting they were registered more as 
a joke than a real desire to be elected.48 
 
 
46 For an analysis of the first two elections for the consultative assembly, see Wright, Mirror of 
the Nation's Mind. 
47 An outline of the rules of this system, and the results of this and later elections can be 
found at the Elections ACT website. (www.elections.act.gov.au) 
48 Examples of apparently joke parties were the Sun-Ripened Warm Tomato Party, the 
Surprise Party and the Party! Party! Party. The results of this and later ACT elections can be 
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Public confidence in the system would not have been enhanced by the fact 
that the inaugural parliament saw the formation of two governments, the first a 
Rosemary Follett-led Labor one and the second a Trevor Kaine-led Liberal 
one after the Residents Rally swapped allegiance. This administration lasted 
until the 1992 election, but by then the members had recognised the 
unsatisfactory nature of the system, and a concurrent referendum was held at 
which voters were asked to choose between a Hare-Clark system or a single- 
member preferential voting system for future elections.49 In the end the voters 
opted for Hare-Clark, and the election gave the two major parties a much 
higher vote share.50 
 
As in 1989, results in 1992 showed how unsatisfactory the system was, with 
the major parties again grossly over-represented. The Labor Party received 
39.9% of the vote and 47.06% of the seats, an over-representation of 7.16%. 
The Liberal Party received 39.03% of the vote and 35.29% of the seats, an 
over-representation of 6.26%. The other two groups elected won seats in 
inverse proportions to their vote: the Mike Moore Independent Group won two 
seats (11.76%) with a vote share of 5.6%, while the Abolish Self-Government 
Coalition won one seat (5.85%) with a vote share of 7.1%. It was the parties 
polling just underneath the threshold that had the greatest reason to complain 
about the system. Residents Rally, under whose banner Mike Moore had 
been elected in 1989, received 4.56% of the vote and the Australian 







found at the Elections ACT website: https://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections_and_voting/ 
past_act_legislative_assembly_elections/1989_election, (accessed 3 May 2013). 
49 Some of the arguments for and against the two systems are contained in Newman, Hare- 
Clark in Tasmania, 284-86. 
50 The reasons for this increase are probably many and varied. One possible reason is that 
with several incumbent members now known to the public, the major parties were best placed 
to take advantage of it, but some voters may also have been thinking that their jurisdiction 
would be a laughing stock if the result had been similar to that of 1989. 
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The thin margin between triumph and disaster under the system was 
illustrated by the fact that the Michael Moore Independents’ Group polled only 
just over the 5.56% threshold but ended up being over-represented by 6.16%. 
Had it polled 74 fewer votes it would have won no seats at all. On the other 
side of this divide, Residents Rally would have gained representation with just 
another 1,547 votes. 
 
In accordance with the voters’ wishes as expressed in the referendum result, 
a Hare-Clark system was introduced in preparation for the 1995 election. A 
17-member, three-division system was created, in which the central electorate 
of Molonglo was allocated seven members, while the northern electorate of 
Ginninderra and the southern electorate of Brindabella were allocated five 
members each. This arrangement was used at a total of six elections. 
Analysis now turns to the results of those elections. 
 
Overall Results 1995-2012 
Of the six elections, the Liberal Party formed government after the first two 
with the support of independents Mike Moore (his colleague Helen Szuty 
having lost her seat in 1995), Paul Osborne and (in 1998) Dave Rugendyke. 
Labor formed government after the last four elections with the support of the 
Greens in last two of those, and the combined support of the Greens’ Kerri- 
Lee Tucker and Democrat Ros Dundas in 2001 (the only ACT election where 
the Democrats won a seat). Only in 2004 could Labor form government in its 
own right. The 2012 election was the only one in which the party forming 
government after the election (Labor) polled a lower primary vote than its 
major rival, the difference being a mere 40 votes. The overall vote and seat 
shares for the various parties were as follows: 
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1995 31.6 27.6 41.7 46.8 37.4 38.9 9.1 11.8 +2.8 18.8 11.8 -7.1 
1998 35.3 35.3 47.7 52.9 41.2 47.1 9.1 5.9 -3.2 25.5 17.7 -7.8 
2001 +3.7 +7.7 +5.3 +6.1 +3.8 +8.2 9.1 5.9 -3.2 17.7 5.9 -11.9 
2004 40.5 37.8 31.6 34.8 31.6 38.9 9.3 4.9 -3.4 9.1 0.0 -9.1 
2008 41.2 41.2 41.2 41.2 35.3 47.1 15.6 23.5 +7.9 15.4 0.0 -15.4 
2012 +0.7 +7.3 +9.5 +6.4 +3.7 +8.2 10.7 5.9 -4.8 11.5 0.0 -11.5 
Source: Calculated from results at Elections ACT: https://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections 
_and_voting/past_act_legislative_assembly_elections (accessed 22 May 2013). 
 
Patterns of partisan advantage in the ACT have both similarities and 
differences with those of Tasmania. The most notable difference is that the 
ACT produced a bigger runner-up bonus than it does a winner’s bonus.51 
 
Discounting the 2012 election, where the votes were so close as to be 
regarded as a draw, the Labor Party was over-represented by an average of 
5.09% in the three elections that it won, compared to an over-representation 
of 5.67% in the two elections that it lost. The level of the Liberal Party’s 
representation levels look even stranger: it was over-represented by an 
average of just 2% in the two elections that it won, compared to an average 
over-representation of 6.54% in the four elections it lost.52 The Greens appear 
to be disadvantaged overall by the system, but it is not the case that they 




51 The reasons for this phenomenon are not obvious, but they could include the fact that in the 
ACT the winning party has never reached, and very rarely approached, an overall vote of 
50%, and that the ‘Other’ vote in the ACT is nearly always over 10%, while in Tasmania it has 
always been under that level, save for the early 1980s period when Green Independents 
would have fallen into this category. Both major parties have been able to stay above the 30% 
or below danger zone in the five-member electorates. 
52 If the 2012 result was included, the Liberal Party would have got an even higher runner-up 
bonus than was actually the case, and while Labor’s average winners bonus would now have 
been above that for the two elections in which it was runner-up. Its inclusion would make no 
sense because its win was not based on a primary vote superiority. 
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level was 0.68%, but the difference between their best and worst results 
(12.78%) is much higher than those of the two larger parties. 
 
The most likely reason for such discrepancies would appear to be the differing 
nature of five-member and seven-member districts. As is usual in all STV 
systems, the amorphous category of ‘Others’ was under-represented, by an 
average of 10.46% across the six elections. It is important to note that ‘Others’ 
were still significantly under-represented (average 8.91%) at the three 
elections where at least one ‘other’ was elected.53 
 
It is noticeable that the Greens have achieved consistent success in only one 
electorate: the seven-member district of Molonglo. Since 1995 the Greens 
have always had at least one member elected there, and in 2008 had two 
elected. Its vote and seat shares at each election in Molonglo have been as 
follows: 
 
Table 5.6 Vote and Seat Shares for the Greens: Molonglo 
Election, 1995-2012 
 
Year Vote Share Seat Share +/- Rep Level 
1995 10.12% 14.29% +4.17% 
1998 10.11% 14.29% +4.17% 
2001 12.57% 14.29% +1.72% 
2004 11.50% 14.29% +2.79% 
2008 18.20% 28.57% +10.37% 
2012 13.20% 14.29% +1.09% 
Source: Calculated from results at Elections ACT: https://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections 
_and_voting/past_act_legislative_assembly_elections (accessed 22 May 2013). 
 
At every election the Greens were over-represented in Molonglo. The over- 
representation reached its high point at the Greens’ best election. It may of 
course be that, as will be seen, the Green vote is higher in Molonglo than in 
 
 
53 The only ‘other winner in the six elections was Dave Rugendyke, who in 1998 won a seat 
running under the banner of Osborne Independent Group. Both Osborne and Rugendyke 
were defeated in 2001, when they ran as individual candidates. 
156  
the other two districts. This conforms to a common pattern across Australia, 
whereby the Greens poll higher in inner suburban areas than in outer 
suburban ones. By contrast, the two five-member electorates (Brindabella and 
Ginninderra) showed a consistent pattern of the Greens’ failure. 
 
Table 5.7 Vote and Seat Shares for the Greens: Brindabella 











1995 7.95% 8.71% 8.32% 10% +1.68% 
1998 8.08% 8.69% 8.67% 0% -8.67% 
2001 5.43% 7.94% 6.68% 0% -6.68% 
2004 7.30% 8.20% 7.74% 0% -7.74% 
2008 13.60% 13.90% 13.71% 20% +6.29% 
2012 7.80% 10% 8.97% 0% -8.97% 
Source: Calculated from results at Elections ACT: https://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections 
_and_voting/past_act_legislative_assembly_elections (accessed 22 May 2013). 
 
The average under-representation of seat shares was thus 3.88%. The only 
occasions in which it won seats were in 1995 (Ginninderra) and 2008 (one in 
each). 
 
The Greens were unlucky in that their vote was lower in the electorates where 
it needs to be higher because of the higher quota of 16.67%. Its highest 
support was in Molonglo where it could afford to be a percentage point or two 
lower. As will to be seen, the 2016 change to a 5x5 system has reduced but 
not completely removed this disadvantage. There is one aspect of the 2012 
election in which the Greens were extremely unlucky not to win one more 
seat. The result in Ginninderra illustrates a particular quirk of the Hare-Clark 
system that does not materialise in an STV system with a ticket voting option, 
and perhaps explains why a proliferation of minor parties does not occur in a 
Hare-Clark system. 
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In Ginninderra, Labor received 2.4 quotas, Liberal received 2.0 quotas and 
Greens 0.6 of a quota. The best performing micro party, the Australian 
Motorist Party, received 0.4 quotas. On this basis, it might be expected that 
the Greens would win the fifth seat. However, two factors conspired to hurt the 
Greens’ leading candidate and sitting member, Meredith Hunter, in the 
distribution of preferences. 
 
At the point where Hunter became the only remaining Greens candidate, she 
had 6,457 votes, well short of the quota of 11,013 votes, but a higher tally 
than all but one (Mary Porter) of the Labor candidates still in the count. 
Porter’s eventual election left only a 45 vote surplus to pass on, so it was not 
until the exclusion of the fourth-placed Labor candidate, Glen Macrea, that the 
two remaining Labor candidates overtook Hunter. Of Macrea’s 5,238 votes 
initially distributed, the two Labor candidates, Chris Bourke and Yvette Berry, 
received 2,223 and 2,050 votes respectively. Only 381 votes leaked to 
Hunter, who at this point had 7,662 votes, trailing both Bourke on 8,642 votes 
and Berry on 8,126 votes. 
 
By this time, two Liberals had been elected and the only other candidate still 
in the count was a candidate from the Motorist Party, Chic Henry, with 6,669 
votes. Of the 6,299 votes distributed first, only 614 went to Hunter, with 
Bourke receiving 824 votes and Berry 1,025. Of the 363 that had come to 
Henry from the last elected Liberal, 36 went to Hunter, 45 to Bourke and 34 to 
Berry, with 247 exhausting and one vote lost by fraction. Hunter was thus 
defeated as she had fewer votes than the two remaining Labor candidates. 
 
Hunter’s preferences, though immaterial to the final result, were now 
distributed, of which 5,289 showed a preference for one of the two remaining 
Labor candidates, while 2,933 did not show any preference. By contrast, in 
Brindabella, when the second-placed Labor candidate Mick Gentleman was 
elected, he had a surplus of 1,928 votes, with the only remaining candidates 
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being third placed Liberal candidate Andrew Wall on 8,742 votes and highest 
placed Greens candidate Amanda Bresnan on 6,957 votes. Bresnan would 
have needed well over 90% of Gentleman’s preferences to win, and in the 
end she received just 804 (or just over 41%) of them, with 151 going to Wall 
and 973 exhausting. Wall won the fifth seat by 8,893 votes to Bresnan’s 
7,761. 
 
It is notable that far more Greens voters were willing to give a later preference 
to Labor candidates than Labor voters were willing to give preferences to 
Greens candidates. Such a phenomenon has attracted little attention from 
either politicians or commentators, probably because, until the 2013 Senate 
election, it was almost unheard of for a Labor candidate’s preferences to be 
distributed while a Greens candidate was still in the contest. This situation has 
become more common (even in single-member districts), so it is a fruitful 
source of future investigation for political scientists, especially in jurisdictions 
where the marking of preferences beyond one’s first choice party are optional. 
This is especially so in cases where the order in which Labor or Greens are 
eliminated might make a material difference as to who is elected.54 
 
The other definite pattern from the ACT is that minor and micro parties do not 
do well out of the Hare-Clark system, although they had initial success under 
the d’Hondt system (the possible reasons for this will be explored in the 
conclusion to this chapter). While Independent candidates did have some 
initial success, they have had no success since 1998, in spite of the fact that 






54 A case where such order of exclusion could have made a difference was in the seat of 
Melbourne Ports at the 2016 House of Representatives election. Sitting Labor MP Michael 
Danby defeated Liberal candidate Owen Guest after a heavy flow of Greens preferences to 
Labor. However, Danby had led the Greens candidate by just 800 votes at the latter’s point of 
exclusion. Because Danby had put Liberal ahead of Greens on his how to vote card, it is likely 
that Guest would have won the seat if Danby had finished behind the Greens. 
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was former Liberal Chief Minister Trevor Kaine.55 Possible reasons for the 
failure of Kaine and other Independents will be discussed further in Chapter 7. 
 
2016: Labor Holds Government (and vote) Under New Arrangements 
The election held on 15 October 2016 saw the return of the Labor government 
for its fifth term, this time under the leadership of Andrew Barr.56 The vote and 
seat shares for the major parties were as follows: 
 
Table 5.8 Vote and Seat Shares for the Main Parties: ACT 
Election, 2016 
 
Party Vote Share Seats Seat Share +/- Rep 
Labor 38.4% 12 48% +9.6% 
Liberal 36.7% 11 44% +7.3% 
Greens 10.3% 2 8% -2.3% 
Others 14.7% 0 0% -14.7% 
Source: Elections ACT: https://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections_and_voting/past_act_ 
legislative_assembly_elections/2016-election (accessed 21 February 2017). 
 
A comparison with Table 5.5 shows that while all three large parties lost voter 
support in 2016, Labor lost the least, and enjoyed a gain in seat percentage 
(as did the Greens) while the Liberal Party lost ground. The overall picture 
obscures a distinct regional pattern. Both northern electorates (Ginninderra 
and Yerrabi) each gave Labor three seats and the Liberals two. The two 
central electorates (Kurrajong and Murrumbidgee) each returned two Labor, 
two Liberal and one Greens, while the southern electorate of Brindabella 
returned three Liberal and two Labor. There were also some distinct regional 






55 Kaine won a seat in Brindabella as a Liberal 1995 and 1998, but after resigning from the 
Liberal Party in 1999 he could not hold his seat in 2001 under the banner of Kaine 
Independent Group. Both he and his running mate (and wife) Sandie Brooke polled a much 
lower vote in 2001 (a combined vote of 1.12%) than in 1998 (13.29%). 
56 Labor had won the 2001, 2004 and 2008 elections under the leadership of Jon Stanhope, 
and the 2012 election under Katy Gallagher. 
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by candidate factors57 as the main local issue: the Labor government’s 
proposal to build a tram line from the Canberra CBD to the northern suburb of 
Gungahlin. There are some differences in patterns of partisan advantage 
between the old and new systems, which are discussed in the conclusion 
which follows. 
 
Conclusion from the Australian Capital Territory 
Elections in the Australian Capital Territory provide further evidence to 
suggest that five-member districts produce a systemic bias against the 
Greens in comparison to the situation in seven-member districts, although the 
Greens seem less disadvantaged by the 5x5 arrangements used in 2016.58 
The results also provide justification for the claim of Mackerras that the ACT 
electoral system should be regarded as semi-proportional rather than 
proportional.59 
 
The most striking difference between the ACT and Tasmania is how rarely the 
ACT has produced majority government (just once in six elections under the 
Hare-Clark system) while the six Tasmanian elections across the same period 
have produced majority governments on four occasions. Jim Chalmers had 
noted in an article on the 2001 election that majority governments appeared to 
be elusive, and although he was temporarily proved wrong in 2004, later 
elections have reverted to the hung parliament pattern.60 
 
 
57 The changes in Labor’s vote ranged from +6% in Yerrabi (which includes Gungahlin) to - 
5.6% in Murrumbidgee, where it had no sitting members standing. The change in the Liberal 
vote ranged from +2.5% in Murrumbidgee, the electorate of its leader Jeremy Hansen, to - 
5.9%,in Brindabella where its former ACT leader and now Senator, Zed Seselja, had stood in 
2012. The Greens’ vote rose by 1.5% in Kurrajong, the electorate of its leader Shane 
Rattenberrry, but fell 2% in Yerrabi. 
58 The main reason for this appears to be the creation of Murrumbidgee, which spread some 
strong pockets of Greens support between two electorates. Antony Green’s calculations of 
2012 results adjusted to the new boundaries suggested the Greens were in a favourable 
position to win the two seats they actually won. See ‘2016 ACT Election Preview’ on Antony 
Green’s election blog (www.abc.net.au/news/elections). 
59 Malcolm Mackerras, "A system that works well for us," Canberra Times, 31 October 2012, 
17. 
60 Jim Chalmers, "The Australian Capital Territory Election of 20 October 2001," Australian 
Journal of Political Science 37, no. 1 (2002) 165-68. 
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The reason for the difference is somewhat obvious, although it is perhaps so 
obvious that some politicians and journalists are inclined to overlook it: ACT 
voters have never given a party over 50% of the primary vote (the highest so 
far was Labor’s 46.8% in 2004, when it won a majority). By contrast, 
Tasmanian voters have on two occasions given a party over 50% of their vote 
(Labor in 2002 and Liberal in 2014), and a majority government was formed 
each time. On two other occasions (1998 and 2006), majority Labor 
governments were formed with vote shares of 44.8% and 49.5% respectively. 
The 1998 figure does suggest that Labor’s majority had a manufactured 
quality about it, but the vote is still significantly higher than those polled by the 
highest polling ACT party governing in minority.61 In other words, the disparity 
in the outcome can be explained, to a large degree, by the different 
characteristics of the political demography in Tasmania and in the ACT. 
 
The last state to be examined here in terms of the primary vote, Victoria, 
differs from the other two in that its proportional representation system only 
operates for elections to the upper house, so the issue of government viability 
does not arise. Where Victoria also differs is that while voters have the same 
option of voting for as few or as many candidates beyond the number to be 
elected within the region, they also retain the option of voting for a party or 
group ticket above the line. District magnitude remains significant but, in 2014 
at least, ballot paper numbering options appear to have had a greater impact. 
 
Victoria: Combination System Produces Varying Results 
Like Western Australia, Victoria’s Legislative Council was elected (until 2001) 
via a system of single member provinces combining the voters of multiple 
neighbouring Assembly districts. Levels of rural vote weighting were never as 
 
 
61 The highest vote shares polled by such parties were Labor in 2001 (41.7%), and Liberal in 
1995 (40.5%). In each case the said party formed a coalition government after the election. 
Surely no party receiving such a vote would claim to deserve to govern in majority in a system 
claiming to be proportional! 
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high as in WA, but Victorian Legislative Council elections were similarly 
dominated by the conservative parties for the vast bulk of the twentieth 
century. Even during the 1979-1999 period (1999 marked the first competitive 
Legislative Council election after 27 years of Liberal Party dominance) a 
systemic bias in favour of the Liberal and National Parties was evident. 
 
In spite of the seven Assembly elections during the same period producing an 
even spread of results, the concurrent Legislative Council elections saw Labor 
under-represented by an average of 6.88%, while the Liberal and National 
Parties were over-represented by an average of 13.39% during the same 
period.62 
 
This pattern was to alter dramatically at the 2002 election, where the Bracks 
Labor government was returned in a landslide. Unlike John Cain (Labor 
Premier, 1982-1990), however, Steve Bracks was able to win a comfortable 
Legislative Council majority for his party. A 47.49% vote share for Labor 
yielded 77.27% of the seats, while the Liberal and National Parties’ combined 
vote of 38.88% won just 22.72% of the seats. The Greens vote of 10.87% won 
no seats, but a strong flow of its preferences to Labor enabled the latter to 
gain enough seats to enable the Bracks Government to introduce the 
proportional representation system under which the Greens were to have 
some success. 
 
The new system (used for elections since 2006) allowed for the election of a 
Legislative Council of 40 members, with those members being chosen from 
eight regions of five members each, elected under a single transferable vote 
system. The methods of voting lay somewhere between the Tasmanian and 
Western Australian methods. Voters could choose to number at least five 
 
 
62 For an analysis of possible reasons for such a bias, see Nick Economou and Brian Costar, 
"Electoral Enquiry or Political Debate? Analysis, Commentary and the Controversy of 
Victoria's Legislative Council Electoral Process," in Electoral Research - The Core and the 
Boundaries, ed. Jane Peace (Adelaide: South Australian State Electoral Office, 2000) 1-16. 
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candidates in order of preference below the line (with further preferences 
optional) or to vote for a single party/group above the line. In theory, the 
easier below the line voting option should have seen more voters choosing 
this method than in the Senate. As will be seen, the number of people utilising 
the below the line option has been disappointingly low for any observer who 
hoped for more independent thinking from voters. 
 
The four Legislative Assembly elections held concurrently with the PR 
Legislative Council elections have produced three comfortable Labor wins 
(2006, 2014 and a landslide in 2018) and one very narrow Liberal-National 
win (2010). As the table below shows, Liberal-National have generally held 
their own in terms of winning Council seats, although 2018 was something of 
an exception. 
 
Table 5.9 Vote and Seat Shares for the Main Parties: Victorian 































































2006 41.4 47.5 +6.0 39.0 42.5 +3.5 10.6 7.5 -3.1 9.0 2.5 -6.5 
2010 36.4 40.0 +3.6 43.1 52.5 +9.4 12.0 7.5 -4.5 8.5 0.0 -8.5 
2014 33.5 35.0 +1.5 36.1 40.0 +3.8 10.7 12.5 +1.8 19.7 12.5 -7.2 
2018 39.2 45.0 +5.8 29.4 27.5 -1.9 9.2 2.5 -6.8 22.1 25.0 +2.9 
Ave. 37.6 41.9 +4.3 36.9 40.6 +5.7 10.6 7.5 -3.1 12.7 10.0 +2.7 
Source: Victorian Electoral Commission: https://www.vec.vic.gov.au/Results/results-state.html 
(accessed 17 January 2019) 
 
Labor clearly gained some advantage from the system, with the level tending 
to rise as its vote increases. The same pattern is evident for Liberal-National. 
The Greens, on the other hand, (still) tend to be significantly disadvantaged: 
although 2014 was an obvious exception, the pattern evident in 2010-14 re- 
emerged in 2018, but to a greater extent than before. 
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The amorphous category of ‘Others’, though under-represented overall, went 
from having next to no success in 2006 (one seat) and 2010 to a modicum of 
success (five seats) in 2014, and was actually over-represented in 2018, 
winning ten seats overall. The improved performance of ‘Others’ was assisted 
by the work of preference harvesters. No doubt emboldened by their success 
at federal level in 2013, by 2014 they had a better idea of how to use the 
ticket voting option to control the flow of micro party supporters’ preferences, 
although the less onerous requirements for casting a valid below the line vote 
ought to (and, at least in 2014, did) dilute their influence to some extent. 
 
Antony Green had some idea of the limits of this diluting factor. On ABC TV’s 
2014 election night coverage, when asked by compere Ian Henderson if there 
was any chance of the new Labor government having a Council majority, he 
quickly said ‘no’, gave an estimate of the final numbers and launched an 
attack on the ticket voting aspect of the system. He expressed the hope that 
politicians might eventually have the will to abolish that part of the system.63 
 
The election of five micro party MLCs in 2014 and ten in 2018 (only two of 
whom were sitting members), suggests that Green has legitimate grounds for 
his complaint. None of the successful group tickets could garner even a 
quarter of a quota in 2014, while only four of the 2018 group (three of them 
from Derryn Hinch’s Justice Party) reached this figure.64 
 
The fact that four micro groups elected MLCs despite polling less than one 
tenth of a quota in that region raises major questions about the legitimacy of 
the system: did voters really intend to elect these candidates? The less 
onerous requirements for casting a valid below the line vote ought to have 
made the results more a genuine choice of voters, although one particular 
2018 contest casts doubt on this proposition. 
 
63 Antony Green, ABC Election Night coverage, 29 November 2014. 
64 See Appendices 3 and 4 for a list of the successful micro parties and their quota shares in 
the respective regions. 
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The 2014 results, however, suggest that not only could neither of the three 
largest parties claim to be hard done by, but also that there was at least one 
case of where the less onerous requirements for casting a below the line vote 
might well have stopped micro parties from winning even more seats. 
 
The 2014 Contest in South Eastern Metropolitan 
In the 2014 Legislative Council election for South East Metropolitan, Labor 
won 2.40 quotas and two seats, Liberal 2.11 quotas and two seats, and 
Greens 0.38 quotas and one seat. Even if Labor supporters felt unlucky at 
missing out on the third seat, they would have accepted the legitimacy of the 
result if they accepted the logic of preferential voting. What they and other 
observers who had not studied Antony Green’s calculator might not have 
realised is that preference leakages may have facilitated the Greens’ win and 
deprived micro parties of another potential success. 
 
Green’s calculation suggests that had all votes been cast above the line, the 
Sex Party (which received 0.18 quotas) would have won the last seat at the 
expense of the Greens. Green’s explanation for such a result not actually 
happening was that the Sex Party fell short, “due to the leakage of 
preferences away from the party ticket because of voters making up their own 
mind on preferences by voting below the line.”65 It is worth looking at the 
preference flows in some detail to attempt to determine how much the 
intricacies of the Victorian voting system might have contributed to such a 
result. 
 
Only two micro parties, Voluntary Euthanasia (0.03 quotas) and Animal 
Justice (0.11 quotas), gave the Sex Party their second preference, while the 
Liberal Party (2.11 quotas) preferences went there as well after initially being 
 
 
65 ABC 2014 Victorian Election results: www.abc.net.au/news/vic-election-2014/results/ 
legislative-council (accessed 17 January 2019). 
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directed to Family First. Had these three batches been delivered to the Sex 
Party in full, it would have enabled its leading candidate, Martin Leahy, to 
overtake Labor’s third placed candidate, and the latter’s preferences favoured 
Leahy over the Greens’ leading candidate Nina Springle. 
 
As it happened, only 2,020 (87.3%) of Voluntary Euthanasia’s 2,315 votes 
went to Leahy, while 30 votes leaked to Labor, 42 went to the Greens and 16 
were exhausted, thus ensuring such votes never reached Leahy. Similarly, 
when Animal Justice preferences were distributed, 7,246 (94.43%) of its initial 
votes went to Leahy, but 58 leaked to Labor, 162 to Greens and 94 were 
exhausted. The flow of Liberal preferences to the Sex Party via Family First 
was much higher at 99.20%, suggesting that the handing out of Liberal how to 
vote cards at most polling booths produced a more disciplined preference 
flow. 
 
The consequences of these leakages and exhaustions was that Leahy, 
instead of being 948 votes ahead of Labor’s number three candidate after the 
distribution of the Liberal batch, as Green’s calculator had predicted, was 
actually 334 votes behind. Hence Leahy was now excluded, and with his 
ticket preferences flowing to the Greens, and with the batches from Animal 
Justice and Voluntary Euthanasia also directed that way (the Liberal batch 
having favoured Labor), Springle won comfortably on Labor preferences. Her 
final opponent was Daniel Nalliah of the Rise Up Australia Party, a Christian- 
based xenophobic group that had finished eleventh out of fifteen groups on 
primary vote, but had benefitted from the cascading preferences of other 
micro parties of the right. 
 
The argument here is that without the less onerous requirements for casting a 
valid below the line vote, it is likely there would have been more above the 
line votes, and this may well have enabled the Sex Party to win another seat. 
It is acknowledged, however, that this factor did not stop micro parties winning 
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seats in five other regions, and in each case the successful micro parties 
bridged a bigger gap over a competing major party than the 0.22 quotas that 
the Sex Party failed to bridge in South East Metropolitan. The biggest gap 
bridged was 0.48 in Western Victoria, where Vote 1 Local Jobs overtook the 
Greens, but Liberal-National was the unlucky group on three other occasions. 
 
The 2018 Results 
Even bigger gaps were bridged in 2018, with the highest being 0.73 quotas in 
Southern Metropolitan, one of four occasions the Greens were overtaken by a 
micro party. The three next highest margins overcome all worked to the 
disadvantage of Liberal-National, the smallest of these being 0.63 in Western 
Victoria. 
 
The highest partial quota that failed to win a party/group an extra seat was 
Liberal-National’s 1.87 quotas in Northern Victoria. Liberal-National were also 
hurt in Western Victoria (1.80 quotas) and South Eastern Metropolitan (1.74 
quotas), while the Greens were hurt in Southern Metropolitan (0.81 quotas 
and no seats). 
 
This loss by the Greens appears to have occurred because of a deliberate 
strategy by all small parties to direct preferences to Sustainable Australia, but 
the result in Western Victoria stands out because the Liberal-National’s failure 
to win a second seat was entirely due to the behaviour of small parties of the 
right. Without exception, they preferenced the leading candidate of the centrist 
Derryn Hinch’s Justice Party, Stuart Grimley, ahead of Liberal number two 
candidate Joshua Morris. 
 
The last of these preference distributions enabled Grimley to win despite his 
party receiving just 0.27 quotas. The later success of the left wing Animal 
Justice Party (0.17 quotas) occurred because the preferences from small left- 
wing parties (and Labor) had put its leading candidate, Andy Meddick, ahead 
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of the leading Greens candidate, and Greens’ preferences enabled Meddick 
to defeat Morris by 1,600 votes. 
 
The key to Meddick’s success was not the logically absurd decision of the 
majority of right-wing parties to favour him over Morris, because the number of 
preferences available for transfer after Grimley’s election was too small to 
matter. Instead it was the decision of Labor to prefer Animal Justice over the 
Greens that made the crucial difference. Had the Labor ticket favoured the 
Greens, the latter would have won a seat because the Greens’ 0.45 quotas, 
together with Labor’s 0.29 quota remainder, that of Animal Justice and the 
Victorian Socialists’ 0.16 quotas would take the Greens past a full quota very 
comfortably. A similar want of Labor preferences cost the Greens a seat in 
Southern Metropolitan. 
 
The results in Northern Victoria and South Eastern Metropolitan, although 
painful for National and Liberal voters in the regions concerned, were less 
unreasonable because in each case the extra seat that might have been won 
by Liberal-National went to a fellow party of the right, the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP). In the former region, the Nationals were hurt by small parties of 
the right preferring Derryn Hinch’s Justice Party, while in the latter it was 
Greens preferences that secured the last seat for the LDP, not unreasonably 
since the majority of Greens voters would probably, if left to their own devices, 
have directed their preferences this way. 
 
Conclusion from Victoria 
Even allowing for the absurdity of the Western Victoria result in particular, the 
evidence appears to suggest that the Legislative Council voting system is 
much more systemically weighted against the Greens than against Liberal- 
National. When it is realised that if one of the ‘absurd’ 2018 results had gone 
Liberal-National’s way, they would actually have been over-represented, it is 
clear that Liberal-National have much more scope for seat gains with a slightly 
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improved vote than the Greens do. This tallies with the advantages the 
system provided them in 2010, 2014 and, to a lesser extent, 2006. 
 
The comparison of Victorian Greens results with those in Tasmania and the 
ACT suggests, in addition to the effects of district magnitude of 5 per se, an 
additional systemic bias against the Greens caused at least in part by the 
preference harvesting the Victorian system still allows. As with Tasmania and 
the ACT, Labor can be confident that five-member divisions provide some 
advantages, but also that preferences harvesting has, so far at least, caused 
them little or no pain in Victoria. 
 
It is not surprising that smaller parties have a better record in Victoria than 
either Tasmania or the ACT. What is surprising is that smaller parties have 
also done better in Victoria than in Western Australia, in spite of the more 
onerous requirements for casting a valid below the line vote in the latter 
system, which is somewhat surprising. 
 
It may well be disappointing for those observers wishing to see greater voter 
independence that even with less onerous requirements for casting a below 
the line vote, so few Victorian voters (6.1%) voted below the line in 2014. The 
2018 evidence suggests that more voters are exercising this option, no doubt 













66 ABC Radio election analyst Paul Strangio estimated the below the line percentage to be a 
little over 10% statewide. Micro party and Greens voters appear to have exercised the option 






Proportional Representation and Minor Parties: Some 
Deviating Cases 
 
The analysis in previous chapters established that there were three specific 
features of proportional representation systems in Australia that assist minor 
and micro parties when present, and tend to hurt them when absent. They 
are: (a) higher district magnitudes, (b) ticket voting options and (c) more 
onerous requirements for casting a valid vote below the line. Results from 
Victoria, especially in 2014, tend to suggest that (a) and (b) are more 
important factors than (c), though it should be noted that the best micro party 
result (the 2013 Senate election) occurred under a combination of (b) and (c), 
even when (a) was absent. 
 
It is also clear, however, that any type of proportional or semi-proportional 
system produced a better result for minor parties (both in terms of their 
numbers and their results) than the majoritarian system that preceded it, as 
well as the overall level of proportionality. Therefore Duverger’s proposition 
that proportional systems tend to lead to multi-party polities is not overturned.1 
It is also noted that even the 2013 Senate result, while over-representing 
certain micro parties, did not overturn Rae’s similar proposition that any 
electoral system will produce higher levels of over-representation for larger 
parties than for smaller ones.2 
 
It does not follow, however, that all minor parties have done better under 
proportional systems than under plurality/majoritarian ones. Five Australian 
parties differ from general patterns to some extent. In the case of the 
Communist Party and Katter’s Australian Party, they have achieved success 
 
 
1 Duverger, Political Parties. 
2 Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. 
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only in plurality or majoritarian systems. The Democratic Labour Party and the 
One Nation, while winning some seats under both conditions, would have 
been disappointed with their success rate in proportional systems, while the 
Australian Democrats found that not all houses with proportional 
representation produced positive outcomes, although they did much better 
overall than in single member jurisdictions. 
 
The first party examined in this chapter, the Communist Party, had over 
20,000 members at the peak of its public acceptability in the mid-1940s,3 and 
was considered sufficiently dangerous by Prime Minister Robert Menzies that 
he twice sponsored legislation to have it banned.4 
 
However, the complete failure of the Communist Party at Senate elections 
from 1949 onwards not only reveals that a party considered dangerous by 
conservative politicians of the day posed little or no threat, it also reveals 
much about the limited extent to which minor parties are actually assisted by 
an electoral system that theoretically aids them. 
 
The Communist Party: Much Ado About Nothing 
The Communist Party of Australia was formed in the 1920s shortly after the 
Russian Revolution, and first fielded candidates at a national election at the 
height of the Great Depression in 1931, mostly in urban working class or 
industrial/mining areas. It took a similar approach in later elections for the 
House of Representatives. At the peak of its support in 1943, Communist 
 
3 Stuart Macintyre, The Reds (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1998), 406. 
4 The Communist Party Dissolution Bill 1950 caused particular alarm among some Labor 
politicians, who feared that their party could be declared ‘communist’ because of the presence 
of bank nationalisation and free education policies in its platform, policies also advocated by 
Marx’s The Communist Manifesto. In the circumstances of the time, this could have led to a 
one-party state. For an account of these debates, see Clyde R. Cameron and Daniel Connell, 
The Confessions of Clyde Cameron 1913-1990 (Crows Nest, NSW: ABC Enterprises, 1990). 
Labor’s deputy leader Herbert ‘Doc’ Evatt challenged the validity of the legislation in the High 
Court, on the grounds that it overturned the normal legal protocol of the presumption of 
innocence and was a gross infringement of the right to free speech. All judges except Chief 
Justice Latham found in Evatt’s Favour, ruling that the legislation overstepped the 
government’s powers during peacetime. 
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Party candidates received an average vote of 8.31% in the sixteen seats in 
contested.5 After World War II, the party continued to stand candidates in 
selected House electorates, and also stood candidates in nearly every state in 
Senate elections after the adoption of proportional representation in 1949. The 
party dramatically scaled back its electoral activities for both houses in the late 
1960s, before splitting into Marxist-Leninist and Trotskyite factions in the early 
1980s and disbanding altogether after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 
 
At state level, the party would occasionally contest single-member electorates 
of a similar type to those contested at federal level, but only once stood 
candidates in proportional representation elections held prior to World War II 
in either New South Wales or Tasmania.6 The only instance of a Communist 
candidate being elected to parliament was Fred Paterson in the Queensland 
Legislative Assembly seat of Bowen in both 1944 and 1947. Paterson’s 
double success, as well as his more numerous failures, gives some insight as 
to the unique circumstances under which a Communist could succeed, and 
also gives us an idea as to why the Communist Party failed to prosper when a 
proportional representation system was used in the Senate. 
 
Proportional Representation and the Red ‘Menace’ 
Results at the 1949 election were disappointing for the party, and their vote 
did not improve much at future elections. The national vote shares received by 









5 Communist Party results during the period have been obtained from Hughes and Graham, 
Voting for the Australian House of Representatives, 1901-1964. See Appendix 5. 
6 That was in the 1925 NSW election where they polled less than 1% of the vote in three 
inner-city electorates. See Colin A. Hughes and B. D. Graham, Voting for the New South 
Wales Legislative Assembly 1890-1964 (Canberra: Dept. of Political Science, Research 
School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1975), 199-209. 
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NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS 
1949 2.09% 2.11% 3.05% 3.61% 2.91% 1.62% 0.73% 
1951 1.70% 3.59% 4.48% 6.33% 5.90% 1.05% 0.83% 
1953 3.53% 1.47% 3.48% 1.14% 0.78% 3.35% 0.54% 
1955 1.73% 1.39% 1.12% 4.15% 0.94% 0.71% 0.92% 
1958 0.69% 0.36% 1.18% 1.01% 2.87% 1.06% 0.64% 
1961 1.81% 0.92% 0.92% 2.12% 0.69% 0.93% 0.84% 
1964 0.54% 0.41% 0.26% - - 0.65% 0.54% 
Source: Colin A. Hughes, and B. D. Graham. A Handbook of Australian Government and 
Politics. Vol. 1 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1968). 
 
With seven senators being elected in every state, the quota required was a 
fairly modest 12.5%. It is clear that its highest 1949 vote got it nowhere near 
this figure. The lowest quota for election at any of the above elections was 
9.09% in 1951 but, as the above table shows, the party fell well short of this in 
every state. 
 
The Communist Party did not fail because of lack of publicity, with an 
unsuccessful attempt to ban it via referendum in 1951,7 and with Prime 
Minister Menzies, according to stalwart Labor MP Fred Daly, ‘as usual, 
campaigning on the fear of communism’ at the 1953 election.8 By the time of 
the 1955 election, the debate had moved on from the threat of communism 
and to the unfitness of the Labor Party to govern because of its internal 





7 The referendum was held in September 1951 and was narrowly lost, with 50.56% opposed 
and 49.44% in favour. 
8 Daly, From Curtin to Hawke, 119. 
9 The Labor Party had split over issues relating mostly to communism, resulting in the 
formation of the Democratic Labor Party. The remaining elements of the Labor Party 
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period, as well as its highest vote in any individual Senate contest. Why was 
this so? 
 
The most likely answer also accounts for why the 1949-55 Communist Party 
performance, bad as it looks by any standard, is in fact even poorer than it 
looks at first sight: because nearly every significant increase (or decrease) 
seems to be heavily influenced by the donkey vote. 
 
In NSW the Communist Party vote rose 1.89% in 1951 after drawing Column 
A on the ballot paper, having drawn Column D in 1949. Conversely in Victoria, 
the party drew Column A in 1949 but Column B in 1951, which saw their vote 
drop by 1.91%. It also dropped in the other four states where the party did not 
draw Column A on either occasion. The Communist vote rose in Victoria in 
1953 after it again drew Column A. Only in 1961 did the Victorian Communist 
vote again rise above 2%, where it had again drawn Column A. 
 
The drawing of Column A would also seem to be the main reason for 
significant rises in the Communist vote in 1955 for both Queensland and 
Western Australia, and in 1958 in South Australia, and the corresponding fall 
at the following Senate election.10 The only time the Communist vote rose 
markedly without donkey vote assistance was the 0.82% gain in South 
Australia in 1953. In New South Wales the Communist Party remarkably drew 
column A at all Senate elections between 1951 and 1959, but its vote fell 
markedly when it did not have this advantage in 1961. 
 
Further evidence that much of the Communist vote was the outcome of a 
donkey vote is provided by some of the preference distributions during the 
 
 
remained deeply divided, and Menzies campaigned on the theme (later to be made famous 
by Bob Hawke): ‘If you can’t govern yourselves, you can’t govern the country.’ 
10 Hughes and Graham, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, 1. The fact that 
Communist preferences flowed strongly to the second-placed Liberal-Country tickets in both 
NSW and WA is indicative of a high proportion of donkey votes. 
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period. For example, in NSW in 1951, where Communist and Labor had 
drawn Columns A and B respectively, the leading Communist candidate was 
the last to be excluded from the count and his preferences went 93.5% to 
Labor and only 6.5% to Independent Jack Lang. However in 1955, when the 
Communists had again drawn Column A and Liberal-Country had drawn 
Column B, their third placed candidate received 73.2% of Communist 
preferences and the third Labor candidate only 26.3%.11 
 
A similar pattern was to show up in the 1955 and 1961 Senate contests in 
Victoria. In 1955, when the Communist Party drew Column D, the leading 
Communist candidate, Ralph Gibson, saw 8,973 of his 14,206 votes (63.16%) 
go to Labor (as might reasonably have been expected on ideological grounds) 
and only 2,915 votes (20.5%) going to the Liberal Party and 1,878 votes 
(13.1%) to the top DLP candidate Frank McManus, who was eventually 
elected. However, in 1961, when the Communist Party drew Column A and 
Liberal-Country drew Column B, 34,817 (74.1%) of Communist preferences 
went to the third Liberal candidate, 8,998 (19.2%) to the third Labor candidate 
and 3,163 (6.3%) to Senator McManus. Ironically this had the effect of putting 
the Liberal candidate ahead of the Labor candidate, and with Labor 
preferences going to the Liberal, Senator McManus was defeated. 
 
In the House of Representatives seats contested by the Communist Party, it 
did not do as well as it had before and during World War II, with its average 
vote per electorate contested never rising above 5% and very rarely achieving 
a vote of more than 10% in individual electorates.12 Even the Australian 







11 These preference distributions from Senate contests can be found in Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Handbooks from the 1950s and 1960s. 
12 For a summary of average and highest votes for Communist candidates in the House of 
Representatives at this time, see Appendix 5. 
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introduced by the Holt Government, dubbed the ‘lottery of death’ by its 
critics,13 failed to lift the average Communist vote above 4% in 1966. 
 
Paterson’s Unique Success 
Fred Paterson stood twelve times in Queensland and federal elections 
between 1926 and 1950, ten times as a Communist Party candidate. His 
highest vote was 47.34% in the state seat of Bowen in 1941.14 With the 
exception of one colleague in 1944,15 Paterson’s vote share was over 10% 
higher than that of any other Communist candidates running in the same 
election,16 which suggests he had personal appeal beyond his party label. 
 
The fact that Paterson’s highest vote was a losing one, and that his victories 
were based on somewhat lower shares, reveals a lot about the conditions that 
facilitated his success. In 1941 Paterson lost a two-way contest with a Labor 
candidate. In 1944 and 1947 he faced both Labor Party and Country Party 
(CP) candidates.17 In 1944, his vote share was 44.51%, compared to 39.34% 
for Labor and 16.15% for the CP. In 1947 Paterson’s vote fell to 39.34%, but 
Labor’s vote fell even further to 30.52%, while the CP vote rose to 30.13%.18 
 
Most crucially, the use of a first-past-the-post system in 1944 and 1947 
ensured Paterson’s success. Had a compulsory preferential voting system 
 
 
13 Under the policy, young men who were too young to vote were forced to register for 
possible service in Vietnam under threat of indefinite imprisonment if they did not, and 
birthdates were drawn out of a barrel to determine whether they were or were not conscripted. 
It did not stop Holt winning the 1966 election in a landslide. 
14 See Appendix 6 for a complete list of Paterson’s party labels and vote shares. 
15 V.J. Sullivan received 42.75% of the vote in (state) Herbert in a straight contest with Labor. 
See Colin A. Hughes and B. D. Graham, Voting for the Queensland Legislative Assembly, 
1890-1964 (Canberra: Dept. of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, 
Australian National University, 1974). 
16 A typical example was the 1943 election for the House of Representatives, where Paterson 
received 34.2% and the next highest vote share was 11.35% in Newcastle (NSW). See 
Hughes and Graham, Voting for the Australian House of Representatives, 1901-1964. 
17 Results from Queensland elections from this period can be found in Hughes and Graham, 
Voting for the Queensland Legislative Assembly, 1890-1964. 
18 For detailed analysis, see Ross Fitzgerald and Harold Thornton, Labor in Queensland 
(Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1989), 164. The authors suggest he was the 
victim of more traditional gerrymandering. 
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been in use (as it was, and still is, at federal level), it is almost certain that CP 
preferences would have gone to the Labor candidate at a high enough rate to 
enable the latter to win on each occasion. At the 1943 federal election, where 
Paterson stood in Herbert (which overlapped with the State seat of Bowen), 
over 86% of CP preferences flowed to Labor. A similar flow in Bowen in 1944 
would have seen Labor win with around 53.3% of the two-candidate preferred 
vote, and the figure would have risen to over 58% in 1947.19 
 
What would have happened if the optional preferential voting system actually 
used in Queensland between 1904 and 1941 had been retained for later 
elections is far less certain. It is a reasonable surmise that one of two things 
would have happened. The Country Party had a choice to either abstain from 
the contests (as it had in 1941), making a Labor win likely, or it could put up a 
vigorous campaign, as it clearly did in 1947, with many volunteers handing out 
how to vote cards suggesting voters preference Labor ahead of Paterson. 
Under the second scenario, it is likely, in 1947 at least, that enough CP voters 
follow this advice to enable Labor to win narrowly. 
 
It is highly unlikely that the Queensland Labor Government considered this 
matter when introducing first-past-the-post, and Daly’s comments suggest that 
Communist Party welfare played no part in the considerations of the Chifley 
Government when it introduced proportional representation. It is worth noting, 
however, that there is at least one overseas example where a Communist 
Party was semi-intentionally blocked by an electoral system. This chapter now 
turns to compare the effectiveness of these systems with the Australian one. 
 
The Fate of Communist Parties in Europe After World War II 
Only in two countries in Western Europe, and only for very brief periods, did a 
communist party form part of a governing coalition during the Cold War era. In 
France, the Communist Party formed a coalition with the party led by 
 
 
19 Hughes and Graham, Voting for the Australian House of Representatives, 1901-1964. 
178  
President Charles de Gaulle after the 1947 election. In Finland the Finnish 
People’s Democratic League, as the Communists were known, formed a 
coalition with the Social Democrats and the Agrarian League after the 1946 
election, and was to be part of left-centre coalitions on three later occasions. 
With one exception, this success was based on a vote of over 20%. Clearly a 
party with such a level of public support will have an impact on electoral 
politics under any conditions. The Italian Communist Party also maintained a 
vote of over 20% during this era, but it remained impotent in national 
government formation terms because other parliamentary parties refused to 
deal with it.20 
 
In five Western European countries (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and 
West Germany) communist parties had much lower vote shares, so electoral 
arrangements could be and sometimes were used to emasculate them. West 
Germany, with its use of a Mixed Member Proportional system, is the most 
notable of these. 
 
One of the key features of (now united) Germany’s MMP system is a 5% 
threshold barring a party from list representation unless it has won a minimum 
of 5% of the party list vote or won at least three electorate seats. This clause 
may have been introduced to prevent the re-emergence of the Nazi Party 
(and Hunt saw this as the major motivation behind the clause),21 but it turned 
out to be a very effective way to exclude the Communist Party. Except for the 
1949 election, when it won 5.7% of the vote and 15 of the 402 seats (3.73%), 






20 Even on the occasions when the Communists received a vote of 30% or slightly more, the 
Christian Democrats nearly always had a larger vote and seat share and were able to form 
coalitions with other parties. See Gorvin, Elections Since 1945, 177-84. The Communists 
were not to form part of a governing coalition until, rebadged as the Party of the Democratic 
Left, it became part of the so-called Olive Tree coalition in the 1990s. 
21 Hunt, Why MMP Must Go, 129. 
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The only other European country to use a system with Communist-foiling 
features is Norway, where for most of the 1990s a D’Hondt formula was used 
to allocate parliamentary seats to parties. Gallagher has noted the greater 
reductive effect that D’Hondt has on the success of small parties in 
comparison to the Sainte Laguë method in use in Sweden and Denmark. 
Gorvin’s figures suggest that d’Hondt hurt the Norwegian Communist Party’s 
representation until its disappearance at the 1961 election, although Gorvin 
noted the party was a spent force by this time. 
 
By contrast, the Swedish Communist Party, with similar vote shares to its 
Scandinavian neighbour during the 1950s, usually received commensurate 
seat shares22 The party survived into the 1980s and still survives to this day 
as the Left Party. The Danish Communist Party also survived into the 1980s. 
 
The Australian Comparison 
Even if the limiting of Communist Party influence played no part in the thinking 
of the sponsors of Senate proportional representation, it is fair to say that the 
system did the job very well, even in comparison with the West German 
system, where such thinking played at least an indirect role. 
 
The Australian Senate system did not, and still does not, have any component 
of a formal threshold, but the quota required for winning a seat (16.7% in a 
normal half-Senate election and 9.1% in a double dissolution election) proved 
an even bigger barrier to Communist Party success. The Communist Party 
could theoretically have won seats had it been able to garner preferences 
from other small parties, but it is clear from the results of the period that this 






22 It should be noted that in Denmark, where the Sainte Lague formula was used, the 
Communist Party, while not lasting as long, gained reasonable seat shares in comparison to 
its vote share, especially during the 1945-57 period. See Gorvin, Elections Since 1945, 83. 
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Fred Paterson’s victories and failures suggest that the preferential voting 
system in single-member electorates was also an effective system for keeping 
the Communist Party out of parliament. Paterson was unable to win either a 
federal or state seat where either a compulsory or optional preferential voting 
system was used. As will be seen when One Nation’s results are analysed, 
any party that has acquired pariah status, as the Communist Party had, will be 
severely disadvantaged in a preferential voting system, and will be near fatal if 
preference allocation is compulsory. 
 
Issues relating to communism doubtlessly played a major role in keeping 
Labor out of office for 23 years, and in prompting the emergence of the 
Democratic Labor Party, the next minor party to be discussed here. The 
Communist Party itself, however, was rendered electorally impotent by a 
combination of the voting system and its low level of voter support. These 
factors were evidently overlooked by conservative politicians of the 1950s and 
were still being overlooked by like-minded commentator Gerard Henderson 
forty years later.23 It is argued here that much of the public concern expressed 
about communism was very much a case of ‘much ado about nothing.’ 
 
The Democratic Labor Party: A Mixed Set of Results 
The Democratic Labor Party was formed in 1955 after seven Victorian federal 
Labor MPs who had agitated for the removal of Herbert ‘Doc’ Evatt as Labor 
leader split from the party to form what was originally called the Australian 




23 Gerard Henderson, Menzies' Child: The Liberal Party of Australia, 1944-1994 (Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin, 1994), 108-09. Henderson defended the ferocity of the anti-communist 
campaign (or more specifically the need for a ban on the Communist Party) by arguing that 
while senior Communist spokesmen such as Eric Aarons, although mild-mannered in 
appearance, posed a threat to Australia because they would have attempted to introduce 
Soviet-style communist policies had they managed to achieve power. Whatever the accuracy 
of this claim, the results of the 1949 and 1951 elections should have been evidence enough 
that such an achievement would be impossible. 
24 The most comprehensive examination of the DLP’s ideology and political behaviour is 
provided by John Warhurst. "The Communist 'Bogey': Communism as an Election Issue in 
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from Tasmania. All seven Victorians lost their seats at the 1955 election, with 
Stan Keon in Yarra the only one who came close to survival.25 They were 
never to win a House of Representatives seat, but their preferences flowed 
overwhelmingly against Labor, and were vital in keeping Labor out of office in 
both 1961 and 1969.26 
 
They had more success in the Senate. Frank McManus won a seat in Victoria 
in 1955, and the DLP had at least one sitting senator until the 1974 double 
dissolution election, reaching a high point of five Senators after the 1970 
election. After losing all its seats in 1974, they did not return to the Senate 
until after the 2010 election, when John Madigan won a seat representing 
Victoria. 
 
While the federal results suggest the DLP was much more suited by the 
Senate’s PR system than by the House’s single-member preferential system, 
the state pattern is quite different. The DLP never won a seat in the 
Tasmanian House of Assembly, the only state house using PR during the 
DLPs federal heyday. In more recent state elections using a PR system, the 
DLP’s only successes have been in Victoria: one each at the Legislative 
Council elections of 2006 and 2014. On the other hand, it had some success 
at a series of Queensland Legislative Assembly elections (the first few of 
these under the name of Queensland Labor Party), and had one unique 








Australian Federal Politics 1949-1964", Doctoral Thesis (The Flinders University of South 
Australia, 1977). 
25 Keon lost by 791 votes to Jim Cairns, later to become deputy Prime Minister. See Hughes 
and Graham, Voting for the Australian House of Representatives, 1901-1964, 347. 
26 The most comprehensive analysis of how DLP preferences helped the Liberal-Country 
Coalition retain power is provided by Malcolm Mackerras, "Preferential Voting and the 
'Donkey Vote'," Politics 5, no. 1 (1970), 69-76. 
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Even allowing for the greater preponderance of single-member systems 
during the DLP’s strong period, the number of individual successes under 
those conditions (21) compared with PR-elected victories (11) seems lopsided 
given the federal pattern. The NSW case is easily explained: as Dean 
Jaensch has noted, the Liberal Health Minister, Arnold Jago, forgot to 
nominate in his very safe Liberal seat. He does not mention QLP/DLP 
success in Queensland or ask why the DLP failed to profit from the Hare-Clark 
system in Tasmania. An analysis of QLP/DLP candidates in Queensland gives 
some clues as to why results were better there than in the apparently more 
favourable conditions in Tasmania, and equally (un)favourable conditions in 
Victoria. 
 
The QLP was undoubtedly assisted at the 1957 Queensland election by the 
status of its leader, Vince Gair, as incumbent Premier. Eleven of the 24 QLP 
candidates who had been elected as Labor members in 1956 retained their 
seats. The fact that only four of them were re-elected in 1960 confirms this. A 
comparison of the seats held in 1957, and those where QLP members lost, 
shows a clear demographic pattern. 
 
There were 15 members elected under the ALP banner in 1956 who stood as 
QLP candidates in 1957 in provincial or rural seats. Of these, nine were re- 
elected and six were defeated. By contrast, the nine defectors who stood in 
urban seats had just two successes, one of them by the incumbent Premier.27 
The success of rural QLP candidates may be because the socially 
conservative views of the QLP would have greater appeal for country voters, 
but it might also be the case that country MPs carry more of a personal vote 
with them than city MPs.28 Such a theory is supported by the fact that after 
 
 
27 Hughes and Graham, Voting for the Queensland Legislative Assembly, 1890-1964, 241-58. 
28 The argument that provincial and rural MPs’ work can make a positive difference but that 
similar work by capital city MPs generally will not is made by Rodney Cavalier, "An Insider on 
the Outside: A Considered View on Labor Was Always Going to Lose the 1996 Election," in 
The Politics of Retribution: The 1996 Australian Federal Election, ed. Clive Bean et al. (St 
Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996), 23-33. More recently, analysis on the effects of 
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Gair lost his incumbent premier status, he also lost his seat at the 1960 
election, along with his lone metropolitan colleague. By contrast, four of the 
seven country QLP members held their seats, although two became 
Independents shortly after the election and another was defeated in 1963. 
Only Les Diplock survived for three more elections, the last of these (1969) 
under the DLP banner, before retiring in 1972. 
 
By contrast, only one of the seven Victorian federal DLP members, Ballarat 
MHR Robert Joshua, represented a provincial or rural area,29 and none of the 
Labor MPs elected in the 1952 state election who stood as DLP candidates at 
the 1955 Victorian election had represented a provincial or rural area.30 The 
evidence from these two elections is that, in the metropolitan area, 
commitment to a major political party appears to be more important than local 
member standing. Legislative Council results from this period confirm the 
pattern.31 This is also an important consideration for the next chapter, where 
the success rate of Independent candidates is discussed. 
 
Townsley noted the very poor results achieved by the DLP in Tasmanian state 
elections, and suggested as a reason that the smiling face of the local 
Communist leader, Max Bound, was not the likely source of an anti- 
Communist scare campaign.32 Another possible explanation, and more 
plausible, is that the DLP was always likely to receive more votes at a federal 
rather than a state level, especially when it is realized that the issues the DLP 
placed the major emphasis on (foreign affairs, defence and, to a lesser extent 
 
incumbency has been carried out by Simon Jackman, "Incumbency Advantage" in Mortgage 
Nation: The 2004 Australian Election, ed. Marian Simms and John Warhurst (Perth: API 
Network in association with Curtin University of Technology, 2005), 335-47. 
29 Hughes and Graham, Voting for the Australian House of Representatives, 1901-1964. 
30 Colin A. Hughes and B. D. Graham, Voting for the Victorian Legislative Assembly, 1890- 
1964 (Canberra: Dept. of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian 
National University, 1975), 341-57. E.L. Morrissey had won the urban/rural fringe seat of 
Mernda for Labor in 1952, but lost as a DLP candidate in the entirely urban seat of Reservoir 
in 1955. The only DLP success was in the inner metropolitan seat of Richmond. 
31 Colin A. Hughes and Don Aitkin, Voting for the Australian State Upper Houses 1890-1984 
(Canberra: Australian National University, 1986), 66-68 & 73-76. 
32 Townsley, The Government of Tasmania. 
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industrial relations) were principally federal issues. However, as the table 
below shows, there is a much larger gap in the levels of DLP support in 
Tasmania at state and federal levels than in either Victoria or Queensland, 
and to a lesser degree, New South Wales. 
 
Table 6.2 Average DLP Vote Share at State and Federal Levels 
During Era of National DLP strength, 1955- May 1974 
 
State House of 
Representatives 
Senate State Lower 
House 
Victoria 11.89% 14.46% 13.48% 
Queensland 7.48% 11.74% 9.42% 
Tasmania 5.83% 8.62% 3.24% 
NSW 4.94% 5.34% 2.72% 
Source: Hughes, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, Vols 1 and 2. 
 
These figures suggest that, to some extent, the Victorian state vote was only 
minimally affected by Rae’s distal effect, while the Tasmanian House of 
Assembly vote was hardly moved by the allegedly favourable proximal effect 
of proportional representation. The figures provided by Warhurst suggest a 
possible reason why.33 
 
Tasmania was (and still is) notable for its low percentage of Catholic voters. 
Although McManus strenuously denied that the DLP was a Catholic party, 
Jaensch argues that it was definitely a party of (and for) Catholics.34 It seems 
likely, therefore, that Tasmanian DLP voters were much more likely to vote on 
specific local issues rather than ideology as, especially in Victoria, voting DLP 
was much more a tribal thing.35 
 
 
33 Warhurst, "The Communist 'Bogey", 431. 
34 Dean Jaensch, Power Politics: Australia's Party System, 3rd ed. (St Leonards, NSW: Allen 
& Unwin, 1994). 
35 The main reason why DLP voting in Victoria was so tribal was that Melbourne’s Catholic 
Archbishop Daniel Mannix, and some influential country town parish priests (most notably 
those in Ballarat and Bendigo) publicly condemned the ALP for not being sufficiently anti- 
communist, and urged their followers to vote DLP. Urgings in other states were either far less 
vocal or were delivered by less influential clerics. Catholic Archbishops in both SA and WA 
remained publicly neutral during this period. 
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A quirk in the Hare-Clark system hurt the DLP in 1959, the year of its highest 
vote (5.39%) in a Tasmanian election.36 In its best electorate (Franklin) it 
appeared that, on party votes alone, the DLP could have won a seat, as its 
vote of 7.68% represented 0.62 quotas, compared to Labor’s 3.70 quotas and 
Liberal’s 3.50 quotas.37 Under a ticket voting system of proportional 
representation, it is likely that the fourth-placed Liberal candidate would have 
been excluded before the leading DLP candidate, ensuring that candidate’s 
success on the former’s preferences. But after the election of the two leading 
Liberals, Jackson and Miller, the remaining Liberals had 3,384 and 3,015 
votes respectively, keeping them ahead of leading DLP candidate Virgil 
Morgan on 2,498 votes. The quota was 4,014, so had a ticket voting option 
been in place, it is likely that the third Liberal would already have reached the 
quota, but the fourth Liberal would be behind Morgan. As it happened, 
Morgan’s preferences flowed heavily enough to both Liberals to ensure their 
election over the fourth-placed Labor candidate.38 
 
The DLP enjoyed a brief revival in Victoria’s Legislative Council in 2006, and 
also had single wins in the 2010 Victorian Senate contest and the 2014 
Legislative Council election. As we saw in the previous three chapters, smaller 
parties of the (mostly) right had worked out how to manipulate a ticket-based 
PR system to enable themselves to win seats. The Senate and Tasmanian 
systems in use immediately after World War II provided no such advantage for 
the DLP in spite of its much larger vote share. The DLP also suffered because 
it was regarded with such hostility by Labor that the major party chose to 





36 Hughes and Graham, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, 1, 609. 
37 Hughes and Graham, Voting for the South Australian, Western Australian and Tasmanian 
Lower Houses, 1890-1964, 545. 
38 At the end of the count, the fourth-placed Liberal led the fourth-placed Labor candidate by 
605 votes. Preferences counts have been obtained from the Tasmanian Electoral 
Commission website (www.electoral.tas.gov.au). 
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attitude had mellowed so much that DLP candidates were occasionally 
preferred over the Greens. 
 
The Australian Democrats and PR: A Perfect Match? 
While the Australian Democrats were formed under the leadership of former 
Liberal Minister Don Chipp in 1977, Warhurst sees their inspiration as coming 
from two other sources.39 One was the Australia Party, which had been briefly 
led by Tasmanian Independent Senator Reg Turnbull at the 1969 federal 
election, but otherwise had no electoral success. The other was the Liberal 
Reform Movement, a group of ‘small l’ liberals from within and outside the 
Liberal Party who, under the label of Liberal Movement, had some electoral 
success in South Australia but not elsewhere. 
 
The first person to be elected under the Australian Democrats label was Robin 
Millhouse, who had originally been elected to the South Australian House of 
Assembly in 1965 as a Liberal and Country League, but had resigned from 
that party in 1974 to join the Liberal Movement. He was re-elected as member 
for Mitcham in 1975, but when most members of the Liberal Movement chose 
to re-join the Liberal Party in 1976, Millhouse refused and opted to join the 
Democrats upon their formation. He retained his seat at the 1977 and 1979 
elections before resigning his seat to take a position as a Supreme Court 
judge. 
 
In winning a single-member seat as a Democrat, Millhouse is very much the 
exception to the rule. No other Democrat has ever won a federal, state or 
territory single-member district at a general election. Heather Southcott held 
Millhouse’s seat at a 1981 by-election, but lost it to a Liberal at the 1982 




39 John Warhurst, Keeping the Bastards Honest: The Australian Democrats' First Twenty 
Years (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1997), 23. 
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Don Chipp led the Australian Democrats at the 1977 federal election under 
the catchy slogan of ‘Keep the Bastards Honest’, but the first senator to sit as 
an Australian Democrat was Janine Haines, who had been chosen by the 
South Australian Parliament to fill the casual vacancy left by the decision of 
Liberal Movement leader Steele Hall to rejoin the Liberal Party and contest a 
House of Representatives seat. Haines did not stand in the 1977 general 
election,40 but Chipp was elected as a Senator for Victoria while Colin Mason 
won a Senate seat in New South Wales. The Democrats’ nationwide House of 
Representatives vote of 9.38% did not win them a single seat in that 
chamber,41 while their Senate vote of 11.13% won them two seats.42 With 
5.88% of the Senators elected at this election, the party was still under- 
represented. 
 
The Democrats’ vote declined in 1980, to 6.57% in the House and 9.25% in 
the Senate, but their Senate representation improved as three extra seats 
were won in Victoria, Queensland and also South Australia, where the result 
enabled the return of Haines after a three-year interregnum. This time, the 
Democrats were only slightly under-represented with 8.85% of the elected 
Senators. 
 
The party was to maintain a healthy representation in the Senate for the next 
21 years, with their highest share of the vote being 12.6% in 1990 and a low 
point of 5.3%. Acrimonious disputes over policy and leadership contributed to 




40 By the time of Haines’ accession to the Senate, the Democrats had already preselected 
their Senate candidates. Their number one candidate in SA, Ian Gilfillan, narrowly lost the last 
seat to be decided to the third placed Liberal Baden Teague. 
41 The highest vote achieved by a Democrat candidate was 18.64% in Bonython (SA), closely 
followed by 18.36% in Chipp’s former seat of Hotham (Vic). 
42 Their highest vote in any state in the Senate contest was 16.2% in Victoria, and the lowest 
5.86% in Tasmania. See Malcolm Mackerras, Elections 1980 (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 
1980), 236. 
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slumping to 2.09% in 2004 and 1.29% in 2007. It won no seats at either 
election. 
 
The total failure of the Democrats to win seats in the House of 
Representatives, compared with its reasonable results in the Senate, are 
certainly indicative of the ability of a proportional representation system to 
assist a minor party. Results in single member electoral systems in the states 
indicate the same thing. Yet results obtained in multi-member systems in the 
states and territories do not present a completely rosy picture either. South 
Australia stands out as a beacon of success for the Democrats: they won a 
seat in every Legislative Council election from 1979 to 2002 inclusive (and two 
in 1997) and their vote share never fell below 5% in that time. In the other 
states the party’s results were patchy at best. After the adoption of 
proportional representation for the Legislative Council in Western Australia, 
The Democrats received an average vote of 3.56%, ranging from 6.58% in 
1996 (the only election at which it won seats) to 0.93% in 2005 after the 
federal party implosion. In New South Wales it won Legislative Council seats 
only sporadically after the introduction of proportional representation in 
1978.43 Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory turned out to be barren 
ground for the Democrats in spite of the use of Hare-Clark: only twice (1982 in 
Tasmania, 2001 in the ACT) did the Democrats win a seat at a general 
election. The 1982 victory for Norm Sanders in Tasmania followed his original 
success in a 1980 by-election.44 
 
It is argued here that it was not just proportional representation that helped the 




43 Hughes, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1985-1999, 4, 288-311. The 
Democrats won just one seat in every Legislative Council election covered by this (the 4th) 
edition, but it failed to win a seat at two of the three elections under PR covered by the 3rd 
edition, and won no seats after 1999. 
44 The Court of Disputed Returns ordered this by-election after irregularities in declarations of 
campaign expenditure of several successful candidates were discovered. Casual vacancies in 
the House of Assembly are filled by countback, not a by-election. 
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party tried to create for it, and the role it assumed once elected, were ideally 
suited to the circumstances. In 1977 the Fraser Government held a record 
majority and opinion polls suggested it would be comfortably re-elected, so it 
can be argued that a call to ‘keep the bastards honest had some resonance. 
The same circumstances did not exist in New South Wales in 1978 or at most 
Western Australian elections referred to here. 1996 was in fact the only 
election where the atmosphere of the time was similar to the federal 
atmosphere in 1977. 
 
In later New South Wales elections the Democrats always had to compete 
with Fred Nile’s Call to Australia Party (later the Christian Democrats) for the 
role of the third force. While it is the case that the Democrats and Nile did not 
compete over the same ideological ground (in fact Chipp and Nile had little in 
common), it is argued that the two groups competed for the votes of those 
who wanted to place ‘a pox on the major party houses.’ Because a Labor 
Government was in power more often than not, Nile, with his ultra- 
conservative views, would have appeared a more likely candidate for voters 
who wanted to keep them under control, rather than the more liberal 
Democrats. The issues Nile chose to emphasise (opposition to homosexuality 
and support for censorship) were specifically state issues, while the 
Democrats’ interests ranged more widely across the spheres of government. 
 
The lack of success in Tasmania and the ACT can also be partly explained by 
the presence of a strong rival (the Greens) that, unlike Nile, shared similar 
ideological ground. Yet Tasmania in particular is also relevant as illustrating 
the paradox of proportional representation, especially when used for a lower 
house. The DLP were similarly unsuccessful, which is possibly explained by 
the fact that the Labor governments of the 1950s and 1960s were socially 
conservative and constrained by an upper house dominated by conservative 
Independents. For the Democrats, their principal message was nullified by the 
former factor: the conservative Legislative Councillors would have been seen 
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as the best people to keep the Labor government honest, but also because 
under the Hare-Clark system, large majorities are non-existent. The fear of 
giving a party too big a majority simply does not arise. 
 
Analysis of previous chapters suggests that, as a general rule, differences in 
district magnitudes made little difference to Democrats’ representation, 
although it could be argued that the high district magnitude in New South 
Wales (and therefore the lower quota) was the main reason why the 
Democrats survived in that state. It does appear, however, that only in the 
Senate, and to a lesser extent South Australia, can proportional 
representation and the Democrats be said to have been a perfect match. 
 
One Nation: Not Much Help from PR - Until 2016 
Even more so than the Democrats, One Nation came to be identified with the 
persona of one person. Pauline Hanson, who had originally been endorsed as 
the Liberal candidate in what was thought to be the safe Labor seat of Oxley 
for the 1996 federal election, was disendorsed after making allegedly racist 
remarks to a local newspaper.45 In the absence of an official Liberal 
candidate, she won the seat as an Independent with a swing of nearly 20%. A 
few months after election, she made a controversial maiden speech in which 
she targeted Asian people for particular condemnation. Although many 
condemned the speech, it received lavish praise in other quarters, and the 
support Hanson received from the public and in the media convinced her to 
set up a party structure.46 
 
Unlike the Democrats, One Nation has had two chronologically separated 
periods of electoral success. The party first stood candidates in most seats at 
the 1998 Queensland election, receiving 22.68% of the vote and winning 11 of 
 
45 For an account of how these issues affected the 1996 campaign, see Pamela Williams, The 
Victory: The Inside Story of the Takeover of Australia (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997). 
46 The nature of this party structure was to land Hanson in legal difficulty. She was found 
guilty of electoral fraud and served a short prison sentence, although the conviction was later 
quashed after an appeal 
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the 89 seats.47 It did not fare nearly as well in that year’s federal election, 
winning just one Senate seat (in Queensland) while Hanson lost to the Liberal 
Party in the House of Representatives seat of Blair. 
 
One Nation successes were rare and sporadic for the next 17 years: one seat 
at the 1999 New South Wales Legislative Council election, three seats each at 
the 2001 Western Australian Legislative Council and Queensland Legislative 
Assembly elections, and single successes for Rosa Lee Long in the 
Queensland elections of 2004 and 2006. 
 
One Nation’s pre-2016 performance thus resembled the DLP’s performance 
forty years earlier: more successes in single-member electorates (16) than in 
PR-elected houses (five), but to an even greater extent. Why was this so? A 
look at One Nation’s Senate vote between 1998 and 2004 gives some clues, 
but does not tell the full story. 
 
Table 6.3 One Nation Vote by State / Territory, 1998-2004 
 
Year Aus NSW Vic QLD WA SA TAS ACT NT 
1998 9.0% 9.6% 4.1% 14.8% 10.4% 9.7% 3.8% 4.9% 9.3% 
2001 5.5% 5.6% 2.4% 10.0% 7.0% 4.6% 3.3% 2.3% 4.7% 
2004 1.7% 1.7% 0.7% 3.1% 2.4% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Sources: 1998 and 2001 results: Australian Electoral Commission, Electoral Pocket Book, 
(AEC, Canberra, 2002), 2004 results: Australian Electoral Commission, Electoral Pocket 
Book, (AEC, Canberra, 2005). 
 
One Nation lost much of its 1998 vote in 2001, in spite of choosing two higher 
profile candidates, Hanson herself in Queensland and former Labor MP for 
Kalgoorlie Graeme Campbell in WA. It is possible that John Howard’s strong 
stand against unauthorized boat arrivals had the effect of bringing some One 






47 Hughes, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1985-1999, 4, 329. 
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Frank Hough attributes Liberal gains to ‘the filching of One Nation policies,48 
although the opinion poll evidence is unconvincing in this respect. One 
Nation’s 2004 vote was hurt by Hanson’s decision to stand in competition to 
incumbent Queensland One Nation Senator Len Harris. Neither was 
successful. 
 
One Nation’s 2004 vote was never going to be enough to win a seat 
anywhere in the days before organised preference deals became widespread. 
However, its 2001 vote shares in Queensland and Western Australia and its 
1998 vote in NSW and WA represented reasonable proportions of quotas, 
and therefore theoretically gave their lead candidates a chance. Before 
analysing the reasons why they were not successful, it is worth noting two 
Pauline Hanson efforts in majoritarian contests that give some clues as to why 
One Nation performed much better in the 2016 Senate contests than in earlier 
ones. 
 
In the Queensland and federal elections of 1998, Labor had taken the strong 
stand to advocate that their voters place One Nation candidates last, partly 
out of principle, partly because the party hierarchy recognized the threat One 
Nation posed in certain outer metropolitan and country seats, and partly 
because any decision to favour One Nation candidates in preference 
allocations would alienate their ethnic voter base. Consequently, Hanson was 
unable to hold her chosen House of Representatives seat of Blair, in spite of 
her 35.97%, primary vote being over 4% above the combined Liberal-National 
vote. By the time all candidates except those of One Nation, Liberal and Labor 
had been eliminated, Hanson’s lead over eventual Liberal winner Cameron 
Thompson had increased to 7.19% but a strong 73.76% flow of Labor 




48 Frank Hough, "Pauline Hanson's One Nation," in 2001: the Centenary Election, ed. John 
Warhurst and Marian Simms (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 2002), 151-54. 
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At the 2015 Queensland election, however, Hanson came within 110 votes of 
winning Lockyer from sitting LNP member Ian Rickuss, even though she had 
polled just 26.7%, compared with 33.7% for Rickuss. While Hanson had 
received significant assistance from the Katter’s Australian Party candidate (a 
flow of 60.8% of KAP voters indicating a further preference had narrowed the 
Rickuss lead to 4.01%), it was the changed behaviour of Labor voters that 
rendered Antony Green’s election night prediction of a comfortable Rickuss 
win erroneous.49 
 
After 1998, Labor generally urged its voters to ‘just vote 1’ aware that other 
parties were hurt more by vote exhaustion and that One Nation posed a 
diminishing threat. Consequently Labor felt no need to advocate a vote for 
Rickuss over Hanson. Without such recommendation, 58.5% of Labor voters 
indicating a further preference favoured Hanson, while some other votes 
moved into the exhausted column. Rickuss was thus elected with a two 
candidate preferred vote of 50.22%. 
 
We cannot say with certainty what would have happened had Hanson’s 1998 
tilt been held under optional preferential voting, beyond suggesting the result 
would have been much closer. The results in contiguous state seats of 
Baranbah and Lockyer at the state election earlier that year suggests the 
possibility of two different results.50 
 
It is far easier to predict the result of the 2015 Lockyer contest under 
compulsory preferential voting. Labor would have directed its preferences to 
the LNP (as it did in 2017 after the restoration of compulsory preferences) for 
 
 
49 Antony Green on ABC TV coverage of Queensland election, 31 January 2015. 
50 See Appendix 7 for results in Blair under hypothetical optional preferential voting at the 1998 
federal election and see Appendix 8 for Distribution of Labor preferences in Barambah and 
Lockyer at the 1998 Queensland Election. Thompson wins narrowly on a Lockyer-style 
preference distribution, while Hanson wins narrowly on a Barambah-style flow.. 
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fear of promoting an ethnic voter backlash if it favoured Hanson, and the 
higher flow of preferences to Rickuss would have ensured Hanson came 
nowhere near winning the seat. As it was, her near defeat no doubt boosted 
her morale for the 2016 Senate contest. As will be seen, this election 
illustrates a deviation from the normal pattern in that One Nation, unlike other 
minor parties, was advantaged rather than disadvantaged, by a voting system 
that gave voters more options in the way they distributed their preferences. 
 
Voters were given the opportunity to exhaust their votes that they had never 
had in any previous Senate election. Political parties also had the freedom to 
suggest to voters that they could vote for as many, or as few, additional 
parties as they wished. Under these conditions, this thesis argues it makes 
logical sense that One Nation flourished. The lower quota applying at the 
2016 Senate double dissolution election also helped them. 
 
The 2016 Senate Election: Back Comes One Nation 
Malcolm Turnbull’s decision to call a double dissolution election would no 
doubt have given Hanson hope that she could win a Senate seat in 
Queensland because of the subsequent lower quota (7.69% of the statewide 
vote as compared to 14.29% in a normal half-Senate election) and the 
anecdotal evidence of a mid-campaign marginal seat Newspoll would have 
further encouraged her. Her success at the election was not unexpected. 
What did surprise many observers is that One Nation received a nationwide 
Senate vote of 4.29%, up 3.76% on 2013 figures, and that vote netted the 
party 5.26% of total seats. The other successful Senate candidates were 
Brian Burston (New South Wales), Rod Culleton (Western Australia) and most 
surprisingly of all Malcolm Roberts, Hanson’s number two in Queensland. 
What has changed since 1998, when One Nation’s vote share was somewhat 
higher, but its seat share considerably lower? 
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Clearly the lower quota has helped the party. Hanson herself was over a 
quota, but under normal circumstances (a half Senate election) she would 
have held just 0.64 quotas. This might have been enough for her to win a 
seat, although the evidence from the 1998-2001 election was that it would not 
have been. We can say for certain that Roberts would not have won a seat 
under the higher quota as he would have been eliminated before he had a 
chance to receive surplus votes from Hanson or preferences from other 
parties. The higher quota might also have been fatal for Burston’s and 
Culleton’s chances: their quota tallies become 0.26 and 0.28 respectively, a 
figure that even under 2016 conditions proved not to be enough.51 
 
It is argued here, however, that the changes to Senate preference allocation 
rules that have helped One Nation most of all. Under the 1984-2013 system, 
voters were forced to vote for all candidates, either directly below the line or 
effectively with a number ‘1’ ticket vote above the line and, as mentioned in 
previous chapters, voters had a strong incentive to choose the latter method. 
Consequently, political parties had a much greater level of control over how 
their voters allocated their preferences. The new system diluted the impact of 
One Nation’s pariah status and, as will be seen, enabled Roberts to get 
elected. 
 
Under the new voting system, the approach of all parties with enough people 
and resources to hand out how to vote cards was to suggest to voters that 
they only indicate preferences for as many above-the-line boxes as they saw 
as necessary and desirable. For the Liberal Party, this meant six in all states, 
for Labor, it usually meant just two (themselves and the Greens). The Greens 
suggested six in most states: usually themselves, other smaller parties of the 
left, and then Labor. The small parties of the right generally did not have 
enough volunteers to hand out how to vote cards, but one that did (Family 
 
51 It was not enough in 2016 in either South Australia or Tasmania, where quota shares of 
0.38 and 0.33 respectively failed to win One Nation candidates a seat, although, as seen in 
Chapter 4, the Tasmanian lead candidate came very close to winning. 
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First in South Australia) suggested placing a ‘5’ in the One Nation above the 
line box. 
 
An indication of how well One Nation was placed to win Senate seats in three 
states is provided by the table below. 
 
Table 6.4 Total Quotas Held by Highest Polling Parties / 
Groups where One Nation Won Senate Seats, 2016 
 




NSW 4.67 4.07 0.96 0.53 0.39 (LDP) 
QLD 4.59 3.43 0.90 1.19 0.37 (LDP) 
WA 5.00 3.67 1.37 0.52 0.33 (NAT) 
Source: Australian Electoral Commission: 
https://results.aec.gov.au/20499/Website/SenateStateResultsMenu-20499.htm (accessed 14 
November 2018). 
 
It so happened that the parties with the highest remainders won the last four 
seats. This pattern matches those of the other states and territories where, of 
the eight seats won by groups on the basis of partial quotas, only one (Family 
First in South Australia) came at the expense of a group with a higher 
remainder. 
 
One factor helping One Nation in 2016 that was absent in 1998 was that it 
received generous preference shares from other parties running on 
xenophobic or Islamophobic platforms. The Australian Liberty Alliance (ALA) 
was particularly helpful in this regard: One Nation received 35% of their 
preferences in Queensland and 36% in New South Wales. But it was not just 
preferences from like-minded parties of the right helping them. 
 
In Queensland, Roberts received the highest share of any continuing 
candidate from the centrist Derryn Hinch’s Justice Party candidate and these 
preferences put him ahead of incumbent Senator Glen Lazarus for the first 
time. In New South Wales ALA preferences also helped Burston, and he 
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received a higher share of preferences (9.96%) from the leftist Animal Justice 
Party (AJP) than any other candidate. This apparently low figure can be 
explained by the fact that 51.8% of the AJP vote exhausted, which is 
unsurprising when it is noted that the only remaining candidates were from the 
centrist Nick Xenophon Team (who received the second highest share of 
7.14%) and six other parties to the right of centre. 
 
The way the new system changed the behaviour of larger parties and their 
voters also helped One Nation. In 1998, both major parties placed One Nation 
below the other major party in all states (Liberal-National much more 
reluctantly than Labor) for fear of fuelling an ethnic voter backlash. The only 
place where the Liberal-National’s decision might have made a material 
difference was in New South Wales, where Labor’s number 3 candidate 
Michael Forshaw defeated One Nation’s David Oldfield on a heavy (99.44%) 
flow of preferences from the surplus of from newly elected Democrat Aden 
Ridgeway, heavily augmented by votes delivered via Liberal, National and the 
Greens.52 
 
Had 2016 rules applied then, it is highly likely that Liberal-National would have 
made no recommendation between One Nation and Labor,53 making it 
possible that Oldfield could have withstood the likely strong flow of Democrat 
and Greens preferences to Labor. 
 
The 2001 Queensland Senate contest, while less likely to have produced a 
different result under 2016 rules because Hanson unsuccessfully competed 
 
52 Australian Electoral Commission, "Election 98: National Results," (Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia, 1998), 56. 
53 This was what happened in the 2016 Queensland Senate contest. When the fifth placed, 
and last remaining, LNP candidate Barry O’Sullivan was elected, only Family First (whom the 
LNP how to vote card had suggested placing second), One Nation and Labor candidates 
remained in the count. 44% of LNP preferences followed the card with 14% drifting to One 
Nation, 11% to Labor and the rest exhausting. One Nation now did slightly better from the 
now excluded FFP candidate, but the portion of the Labor portion put its number four 
candidate, Chris Ketter, over the quota while Malcolm Roberts, still short of a quota, won 
election ads the last remaining candidate. 
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for the last available seat with the Democrats’ Andrew Bartlett, would certainly 
have been much closer. All of Labor, Greens and Liberal would have 
recommended a preference for Democrat over One Nation, the first two for 
ideological reasons, and the Liberals because the Democrats had helped to 
pass the Howard Government’s signature Goods and Services Tax legislation 
and also because they did not wish to offend a party with some useful 
preferences to deliver in House of Representatives contests. It is more likely 
than not that the combined remainder 0.46 quotas would have gone to Bartlett 
in sufficient numbers to enable him to bridge the gap on Hanson, whose party 
had an initial primary vote lead of 0.70 quotas to the Democrats’ 0.47 quotas. 
However, the 2016 results in Western Australia (to be analysed below), and 
also in South Australia,54 show that preference flows between larger parties of 
the left are much weaker when voters have to consciously indicate their 
preferences even if recommended to do so by a how to vote card. The very 
least that can be said about the 2001 contest is that Hanson would have had 
a fighting chance of defeating Bartlett if the 2016 rules had been in use then. 
 
Western Australia is probably the state that best illustrates the contrast 
between the 1998-2001 and 2016 circumstances and how the change in the 
behaviour of a large party (Labor) possibly altered the result. In 1998 it was a 
large batch of 54,441 surplus votes (amounting to around 0.35 of a quota) 
from newly elected Democrat Brian Grieg, but heavily augmented by 
preferences delivered from Labor and the Greens, that ensured the victory of 
Liberal number three Sue Knowles over One Nation’s John Fischer. Knowles 
received a massive 98.49% of Grieg’s surplus. 
 
In both 1998 and 2016 a Labor candidate was the third last to be eliminated. 
Under the system prevailing before 2016, a very high (87.62% of preferences) 
went to the only remaining party of the left, the Democrats. The system was 
 
 
54 When the preferences of re-elected Greens’ Senator Sarah Hanson-Young were 
distributed, 
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not decisive in ensuring Greig’s win: it is highly likely that under the 2016 
system enough Labor voters would have given Greig their preferences to win 
comfortably, especially if, as would have been almost certain, they had been 
advised to do so by a how to vote card. Both party and voter behaviour might 
well have been radically different in relation to the Liberal Party. Labor might 
well have given no recommendation of preferences between Liberal and One 
Nation, and even if they had, it is quite likely that many Labor voters would 
have ignored such advice. 
 
Evidence for such a scenario is provided by what happened in 2016. While 
Labor’s how to vote card recommended a second preference for the Greens 
and no other preferences, only 60.62% of Labor voters followed this advice. 
14.27% went to National, 10.39% went to One Nation and the remaining 
14.72% exhausted. One Nation’s share of total Labor preferences was slightly 
lower than in 1998, but it left Culleton only 309 votes short of a quota and well 
ahead of the now eliminated National candidate Ken Muir. Muir’s voters then 
indicated a further preference split roughly evenly between Culleton and 
number two Greens candidate, Senator Rachel Siewert. 
 
Results in the 2018 Queensland election showed how much One Nation was 
hurt by compulsory preferences. The return to the arrangement that last 
applied in a Queensland election in 1989 saw One Nation win just one of the 
93 seats in spite of an overall vote of 13%. Labor returned to its 1998 policy of 
preferencing One Nation below Liberal-National, and most of its supporters 
followed its advice. 
 
Overall assessment of One Nation 
The major instructive point about the success or otherwise of One Nation is to 
illustrate the importance of the preferential component of Australia’s 
proportional representation system. The party’s results run contrary to the 
general pattern for minor and (especially) micro party success: it thrives when 
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voters have more control over how they cast their preferences. Systems of 
compulsory preferences have hurt the party when it suffered from general 
pariah status, but the impact of this is considerably diluted once preference 
allocation is left to the voters. This remains so even allowing for the fact that 
left of centre parties exchange preferences with each other. There will be far 
less discipline when having to choose between a range of right of centre 
parties. 
 
Katter’s Australian Party: Strictly a Single-member District Phenomenon 
Bob Katter’s Australian Party was founded by a man whose family have been 
active in Queensland and federal politics for over sixty years under a range of 
party labels. Robert Carl ‘Bob’ Katter had been a parliamentarian for nearly 
forty years when he formed his party in 2012. His father, Robert Cummin ‘Bob’ 
Katter Senior was a federal Country/National Party MP between 1966 and 
1990, and his son Robbie Katter was one of two MPs to be elected to 
Queensland’s Legislative Assembly in 2012. 
 
Even if the Party thought that two seats (2.25% of total seats) a poor return on 
a statewide vote of 11% in the 2012 Queensland election, they would have 
had high hopes of achieving success at federal level, with Bob Katter running 
in Kennedy stronghold (which he had held for 20 years) and a high-profile 
country singer (James Blundell) as its lead Senate candidate in Queensland.55 
Those hopes did not materialise, as Katter retained Kennedy with a much 
reduced majority and the Senate ticket polled just 3.35%. 
 
In the two most recent Queensland elections, the party has contested only a 
small number of seats it thought it could win, and consequently the party 




55 A poll published in Crikey on 20 February 2013 put KAP support in the Queensland Senate 
contest at 7%, a figure commentator William Bowe felt was lower than the actual support 
level. 
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in 2018. Bob Katter retained Kennedy comfortably in 2016, but his party again 
polled poorly in the Senate. 
 
This is a scaled down version of a regionally concentrated party being able to 
win a disproportionate share of seats in a single-member system. However, 
there is one element of the party’s failure in the 2013 Senate contest that 
related as much to election timing as to the voting system. Had KAP polled as 
well in the Senate contest as it had in the 2012 Queensland election, it is 
highly likely that it would have won the sixth seat. In the end, Katter was 
overwhelmed by the greater publicity generation of Clive Palmer and the high 
profile of the Palmer United Party’s lead candidate, former rugby league great 
Glen Lazarus. 
 
A Short Note on New Zealand Under MMP 
Just as the generally high quotas under Australia’s single transferable vote 
system have restricted the number of parliamentary parties, the requirement 
under New Zealand’s Mixed Member Proportional system that a party either 
win at least one electorate seat or reach a nationwide 5% vote threshold to 
win parliamentary seats has a similar effect. In theory, the latter task would 
appear the easier one, especially as the use of first past the post to decide 
electorate seats ought to disadvantage minor parties because they cannot 
receive preferences from the lower polling major party as happens in 
Australia. Yet as the table below shows, more minor parties owe their 
parliamentary status to electorate level success. 
 
Only one party (Greens) has never had to rely on its ability to win an 
electorate seat, and only one other has had to rely on that method less often 
than its ability to reach the 5% threshold. And it is fair to say that only one of 
the other five (the Maori Party) has succeeded because of its ability to win 
seats in a regionally concentrated area (namely the Maori seats). Is there a 
particular pattern that explains the electorate level success of the other four? 
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Table 6.5 Frequency and Method by which Minor Parties Won 








NZ First 1 4 2 1 
Alliance/Anderton 3 0 2 0 
ACT 5 2 1 0 
United Futures 6 0 1 0 
Greens 0 6 1 0 
MANA 1 0 0 3 
Maori Party 3 0 0 1 
Source: Elections New Zealand: www.electionresults.govt.nz (accessed 14 November 2018) 
 
Only the Maori Party fits the most common pattern for smaller parties that do 
well in single-member system: the ability to win a concentrated level of 
support in a handful of seats. In the Maori Party’s case, these were the seats 
reserved for voters identifying as Maori. They got next to no support in general 
electorates. 
 
Especially in the case of United and the Anderton Coalition, both parties might 
possibly have owed their success to a perception that local voters saw leaders 
Peter Dunne and Jim Anderton as quasi Independents, and the reduced list 
vote for the parties within their electorates suggest this.56 But this cannot be 
said of ACT: while since 2005 they have relied on their ability to win Epsom 
for their parliamentary existence, they have won the seat with three different 








56 A typical example of this was at the 2005 election, where Dunne polled 57.11% of the 
electorate vote in Ohariu, but United Futures received just 5.54% of the Party list vote within 
the electorate. See Appendices 6.6 and 6.7 for full figures. 
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The most likely reason for the much higher electorate vote for the three 
parties is the effect that the 5% threshold had on voter behaviour. Voters who 
wished to vote for either of these three parties at electorate level did so in the 
knowledge that even if their candidate lost, their party list vote (provided it was 
cast for a party that did reach the threshold) would still help elect a list 
candidate. By contrast, a voter for one of these parties could not be so 
confident about their party list vote, for if the party did not reach the threshold, 
there was a real risk both their votes would, to use Mackerras’ phrase, end up 
in the rubbish bin. 
 
Overall Conclusion 
The results obtained by the parties analysed in this chapter that deviate, to 
one degree or another, from the common patterns for minor parties under 
proportional and non-proportional electoral systems in the two antipodean 
nations could be seen as exceptions that demonstrate the accuracy of 
existing conventional wisdom. They also indicate that party systems are 
influenced by factors other than voting rules. Perhaps the most important 
factor, however, is the multi-option nature of the systems used: preferential 
voting, bicameralism or a combination of both in Australia and the two-vote 
aspect of the New Zealand system. 
 
It makes sense that preferential voting, whether used in single-member or 
multi-member systems, will dilute the impact of Rae’s distal effect: voters can 
experiment with a vote for a small party, knowing that if that party fails to win a 
seat, they can cast a second preference for a larger party that has good 
chance of success and thus deprive a more disliked large party of a seat. A 
politically savvy New Zealander can similarly experiment with one of their 






Does Proportional Representation Favour Independents? 
 
 
In the last chapter we saw that while smaller parties had generally done better 
under proportional representation systems than in single-member ones, the 
picture is more mixed than conventional wisdom might suggest. The fate of 
Independent candidates under Australian conditions shows an even more 
mixed picture, and the question of whether proportional representation (more 
specifically, the single transferable vote form of it) favours Independent 
candidates is much more in dispute. 
 
Wilfrid Townsley has made the claim that Independents have succeeded in 
Tasmania under the Hare-Clark system while minor parties had, to that point, 
failed.1 Campbell Sharman has claimed that Independents have the chance to 
be elected to the Senate whereas, in the case of a House of Representatives 
election, their only chance for election is if they had reasonably recent 
membership of a major political party.2 
 
A more recent work by Brian Costar and Jennifer Curtin has made a contrary 
claim, arguing that the Senate voting system has not favoured the election of 
Independents, and that Tasmanian cases offer most of the exceptions to the 
general rule.3 A cross-national analysis made by Dawn Brancati has argued 
that, contrary to the views of many of her American academic colleagues,4 
majority and plurality systems are of more help to Independent candidates 
because they can emphasise the individual over the party.5 However, she 
does make a clear distinction between single transferable vote methods of 
 
1 Townsley, The Government of Tasmania, 157. 
2 Sharman, "The Representation of Small Parties and Independents". 
3 Costar and Curtin, Rebels With a Cause: Independents in Australian Politics, 51. 
4 See, for example, Paul Abramson et al., "Third Party and Independent Candidates in 
American Politics: Wallace, Anderson and Perot," Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 3 
(1995) 349-67. 
5 Brancati, "Winning Alone: The Electoral Fate of Independents Worldwide". 
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proportional representation, which give Independent candidates some 
chance, and list systems, which severely limit the chances of Independent 
candidates. 
 
This chapter will analyse the success rates of Independent candidates in 
Australian jurisdictions, with the main emphasis placed on comparisons 
between houses using proportional representation to elect their members, and 
the corresponding house in the same jurisdiction using a single member 
preferential voting system. It will be seen that Independent candidates have a 
poor record in state houses elected by proportional representation, and this 
thesis will argue that the use of a ticket voting option in most of those houses 
(thus turning the system into one more closely resembling a closed list system 
rather than an STV one) is a major reason for this outcome. It will also be 
argued that the absence of a ticket voting option in the Senate for much of the 
time it used a PR system is one reason why federal parliament presents a 
slightly deviating case. This chapter also acknowledges the other factors at 
work in single-member jurisdictions that make Independent success more 
likely than in PR-elected houses. 
 
One difficulty (acknowledged by Brancati)6 for anyone wishing to undertake a 
cross-national study of any type of voter behaviour under a Single 
Transferable Vote system is the small number of countries that use it. Ireland 
and Malta are the only two countries currently using STV in their lower 
houses, and Estonia also used STV for its first post-independence election in 
1990, before reverting to a list system for subsequent elections. Some 
comparison will later be made of these countries, as well as some 










It will also be argued that Sharman’s suggestion of a link between 
Independent success and previous membership of a political party applies just 
as strongly to those elected under STV systems as single-member ones. 
 
A Problem of Definition 
It is a much more complicated matter than to simply say that an Independent 
is somebody who had the Independent label against his or her name on the 
ballot paper, and represented themselves to the electorate as such. Leaving 
aside for a moment the fact that it was not until the 1970s that party labels 
began to appear on ballot papers (and this factor will later be suggested as 
one that helped Independent candidates in the past), there remains a 
question about whether certain candidates should be regarded as 
Independents even if they claimed to be so either in campaign advertising or 
on the ballot paper. 
 
Terry Newman recognized this problem when he questioned the inclusion of 
Tasmanian Green Independents elected in 1989 on a list of elected 
Independents because they gained party status two years later, and he also 
questioned the inclusion of major party defectors who were re-elected as 
Independents on such a list.7 
 
A more difficult problem arises in two particular circumstances. The first is 
when a person originally elected as an Independent forms a party or group to 
contest future elections, as Brian Harradine did for Senate elections after 
1983, and as Nick Xenophon and Bob Katter did for elections for both houses 
after 2010. The problem becomes more acute if such a candidate wins under 
a party label and is the only person elected, thus becoming a parliamentary 






7 Newman, Hare-Clark in Tasmania, 239. 
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The general approach taken in this thesis is to regard all such members as 
Independents unless they have at some time had multiple members elected. 
Thus Nick Xenophon and his colleagues cease to be Independents after the 
2016 Senate election, while Katter stays as a party member because his son 
Robbie Katter and colleague Shane Knuth sit in the Queensland Legislative 
Assembly. Derryn Hinch is classified as an Independent because his Justice 
Party label was only a flag of convenience for the 2016 federal election. 
 
There are some exceptions to this general rule, such as Senator David 
Leyonhjelm of the Liberal Democrats because, although he is the only 
member of his party in any Australian parliament, he represents a party with 
an identifiable platform that is not based around his personality. 
 
As the Senate is the upper house with the longest continuous use of 
proportional representation, it is the best place to start as a point of 
comparison between PR and non-PR elected chambers in the same 
jurisdiction, and also between the different results obtained by party defectors 
and those who started their parliamentary careers as Independents. 
 
Independents in the Senate 
On the basis of the definition of an Independent as defined above, there have 
been eight such candidates elected to the Senate since the introduction of 
proportional representation in 1949. They are listed, in chronological order, in 
the table 7. 1 (below). 
 
Xenophon had been a member of the Liberal Party in his days as a university 
law student, but this was not widely known at the time his election to South 
Australia’s Legislative Council, and therefore played no part in his original or 
later success. 
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Table 7.1 Senators Elected as Independents, 1949-2016 
 
Name State Years 
Elected 
Former Party 
Reg Turnbull Tasmania 1961-1974 ALP (expelled) 
Michael Townley Tasmania 1970-1987 LIB (resigned) 
Sid Negus WA 1970-1974 None 
Brian Harradine Tasmania 1975-2004 ALP (expelled) 
Jo Vallentine WA 1987-1990 NDP (resigned) 
Nick Xenophon SA 2007-2017 None 
Jacqui Lambie Tasmania 2013-2017 PUP (resigned) 
Derryn Hinch Victoria 2016- None 
Sources: Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia and Australian Electoral 
Commission: https://results.aec.gov.au/ (accessed 21 February 2017). 
 
Both Vallentine and Lambie were sitting senators at the time of their 
resignations, while Turnbull had been a sitting Independent in the Tasmanian 
House of Assembly after previously having served in a Labor government in 
that state. Harradine and Townley, while not incumbents at the time of their 
initial election, had received much favourable publicity just prior to their 
election. Harradine, Australia’s longest-serving Independent Senator, had 
initially received national publicity after being denied membership the ALP 
1968 National Executive.8 Townley was better known as a member of a 
prominent Liberal family than for any controversial action on his part.9 
 
It is fair to say that many more terms have been served by senators that owed 
their election, either wholly or partly, to their prior membership of a political 
party than those who did not. As will be seen below, the pattern is similar for 






8 Federal Labor leader Gough Whitlam had put his leadership on the line over Harradine’s 
status because he wanted Harradine’s vote on the issue of state aid for church schools. He 
was narrowly re-elected. See Daly, From Curtin to Hawke, 181. 
9 Townley was the son of former Tasmanian Liberal leader Neil Townley, and nephew of 
Menzies Government minister Athol Townley. 
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Independents in the House of Representatives 
During the period under discussion (1949-2016) there have been thirteen 
members elected to the House of Representatives as Independents. They are 
listed in chronological order in Table 7.2 (below). At first glance, the total of 
eight elected Independent senators appears to be a better result than the 
thirteen elected representatives, since the Senate has roughly half the size of 
 
Table 7.2: Independent Members Elected to the House of 
Representatives, 1949-2016 
 
Name Seat/State Years as 
IND MP 
Former Party 
Ted Mack North Sydney 
(NSW) 
1990-1996 None 
Phil Cleary Wills (VIC) 1992-1996 None 
Peter Andren Calare (NSW) 1996-2007 None 
Graeme Campbell Kalgoorlie 
(WA) 
1996-1998 ALP (disendorsed) 
Paul Filing Moore (WA) 1996-1998 LIB (disendorsed) 
Pauline Hanson Oxley (QLD) 1996-1998 LIB (disendorsed) 
Alan Rocher Curtin (WA) 1996-1998 LIB (disendorsed) 
Bob Katter Kennedy 
(QLD) 
2001-2013 NAT (resigned) 
Tony Windsor New England 
(NSW) 
2001-2013 NAT (resigned) 
Rob Oakeshott Lyne (NSW) 1998-2013 NAT (resigned) 
Andrew Wilkie Denison 
(TAS) 
2010- GRN (resigned) 
Cathy McGowan10 Indi (VIC) 2013- None 
Sources: Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia and Australian Electoral 
Commission: https://results.aec.gov.au/ (accessed 21 February 2017). 
 
the House. However, any fair comparison must include the number of total 
terms won by Independent members rather than the mere number of 
 
10 For an account of how McGowan defeated controversial Liberal frontbencher Sophie 
Mirabella in 2013, see Jennifer Curtin and Brian J. Costar, "The Contest for Rural 
Representation: The celebrated contest over Indi and the fate of the Independents " in 
Abbott's Gambit: The 2013 Australian Federal Election, ed. Carol Johnson and John Wanna 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2015), 275-92. 
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Independents, since the factors that enable their initial election may not be the 
same factors that make for a substantial parliamentary career as an 
Independent. 
 
While nine member representatives (69.2% of the total) relied on prior party 
membership to a greater or lesser degree, they comprise 18 of 28 terms 
served by Independents, a somewhat lower 64.2%. A similar analysis of 
Senate Independents shows a somewhat different picture: of the 14 terms 
served by Senate Independents, ten of them (71.4%) were assisted by prior 
party membership. 
 
The most striking illustration of the pattern in the House is provided by 
Andren, who after being elected without prior party membership, was able to 
secure three more terms before his death from cancer just before the 2007 
election.11 By contrast, the other four elected as Independents in 1996 were 
defeated at the 1998 election. 
 
The House Independent for whom the importance of prior party membership 
is most doubtful is Wilkie. It is the case that he received some favourable 
publicity for his creditable performance as a Greens candidate in 2004 against 
then Prime Minister John Howard in the NSW seat of Bennelong.12 He also 
ran as the Greens’ number two candidate at the 2007 Tasmanian Senate 
contest. He later resigned from the Greens and ran unsuccessfully in the 2010 
Tasmanian state election as an Independent. However, he did not resign in a 
blaze of publicity or claim that he was hard done by in a preselection contest. 
It is possible that Wilkie owed his initial election as much to the publicity he 
 
 
11 For an account of Andren’s background and the issues at the heart of his initial success in 
1996, see Malcolm Mackerras, "Statistical Analysis of the Results," in The Politics of 
Retribution: The 1996 Australian Federal Election, ed. Clive Bean et al. (Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 1997), 207-27. The Andren-specific analysis appears on 224-25. 
12 Wilkie polled 16.4% of the primary vote in Bennelong, an increase of 12.4% on the Greens 
2001 vote. For an account of Wilkie’s campaign for the seat and his public service activities, 
see Elaine Thompson, "New South Wales," in Mortgage Nation: The 2004 Australian Election, 
ed. Marian Simms and John Warhurst (Perth: API Network, 2005), 177. 
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had received as a defence whistleblower in 2003-4 as he did to prior 
membership of the Greens.13 
 
If Wilkie was excluded then the percentage of Independent terms that 
depended on prior party membership is substantially lowered, as Wilkie has 
now been elected three times. With or without Wilkie, the evidence presented 
so far is that it is, if anything, slightly easier for an Independent to be elected 
to a single-member House without prior party membership than it is to be 
elected to the multi-member Senate in the same circumstances. These results 
suggest it is hard to justify Sharman’s claim that prior party membership is 
specifically important for the success of House of Representatives 
Independents.14 
 
The circumstances of Wilkie’s unsuccessful attempt to win a seat in Denison 
(co-existent with the federal electorate) at the 2010 Tasmanian election,15 and 
a comparison with the circumstances later that year, forms the next part of the 
analysis. The fact that Wilkie succeeded in a single-member contest but failed 
in a multi-member one in exactly the same geographical area, it is argued, 
tells us something about the relative favourability of certain electoral systems 
towards Independent candidates. 
 
Andrew Wilkie and a Tale of Two Elections 
Wilkie’s case is the one that best illustrates why it is so much easier for an 
Independent candidate to win in a single-member district than a multi-member 
one, even if the latter is a candidate-based system such as Hare-Clark. Wilkie 




13 As a research officer in the Defence Signals Directorate, Wilkie had written a report 
suggesting that, contrary to then Prime Minister John Howard’s public statements, it was 
probable not that then Iraq president Saddam Hussain did not possess the weapons of mass 
destruction that were had used to justify Australia’s involvement in the Iraq war. 
14 Sharman, "The Representation of Small Parties and Independents". 
15 Tasmanian Electoral Commission, Report on Parliamentary Elections 2007 to 2010. Wilkie 
polled 8.4% of the vote in this election. 
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well behind Labor’s new candidate, Jonathan Jackson (the sitting Labor 
member, Duncan Kerr, had retired) and just behind the Liberal candidate on 
22.65%. However, a heavy flow of Greens preferences had put him ahead of 
the Liberal Party at the point of final distribution, and Liberal preferences had 
put him ahead of Labor with 51.21% of the two candidates preferred vote.16 
In the contiguous state seat at the election earlier that year, Wilkie had polled 
just 8.44%, compared to Labor’s 36.30%, Liberals’ 29.79% and the Greens’ 
24.89%.17 This suggests that when Wilkie’s vote improved at federal level, he 
took 7.14% from Liberal, 5.91% from Greens, but only 0.51% from Labor. 
 
Compared with the previous federal election, there is evidence of some 
tactical voting in Denison. The Liberal primary vote declined by 7.34% in 
Denison compared with a fall of 4.62% in the state as a whole. The Greens’ 
vote rose 0.40% compared to a rise of 3.32% across the state, while Labor 
lost 12.37% in Denison compared to a rise of 1.17% across the state. Clearly 
Labor suffered a retirement slump here, while it was enjoying a sophomore 
surge (the phenomenon by which newly elected MPs tend to do better than 
the rest of their party at their first election as an incumbent) in two other seats. 
 
There also seems little doubt that many Liberals, and some Greens, made a 
tactical decision to vote for Wilkie in the belief that their own candidate could 
not win. In the state election the situation was different. With the quota 
required for election being 16.7%, supporters of the non-preferred party know 
their party can and will win some seats. Consequently, if all other things are 
equal, their vote rises and the Independent vote correspondingly falls. 
 
Wilkie’s previous membership of the Greens and his anti-war stance no doubt 
helped him win the Greens preferences he needed to win the seat. Like 
 
16 These results have been obtained from the Australian Electoral Commission website: 
https://results.aec.gov.au/15508/Website/HouseDivisionFirstPrefs-15508-194.htm (accessed 
2 April 2016). 
17 These results have been obtained from Tasmanian Electoral Commission, Report on 
Parliamentary Elections 2007 to 2010. 
213  
Benson, he had finished third on primary vote, but preferences from the fourth 
placed candidate had put him ahead of the Liberal Party, and a strong flow of 
those preferences had enabled him to win 
 
Preferences were clearly important for enabling Wilkie’s initial success, as 
they were, at one time or another, for five of the other twelve elected 
Independents.18 Rules relating to preference allocation have also played an 
important role in the success rates of Independent candidates at state and 
territory level in Australia. These jurisdictions form the next part of this 
chapter. 
 
Independents in the States since the Adoption of PR 
Of the five Australian states now using proportional representation to elect 
one of its houses, four of them hold their PR elections on the same day as the 
election for their single-member (lower) house. The one exception to this 
pattern is Tasmania where elections for the single-member Legislative Council 
are always held on a different day from those for the PR-elected House of 
Assembly. The former house provides the starkest illustration of how 
Independents can do better in a non-PR house, although this is probably not 
the most important factor that that has made the Council an Independent 
fiefdom for its entire history.19 
 
Of the states using proportional representation to elect their legislative 
Council, New South Wales and South Australia (eleven PR elections each) 
 
 
18 The other six who had won as Independents in spite of trailing somebody else on primary 
vote were Benson, Mack (1993), Cleary (1993) Rocher and McGowan (2013). The other 
seven elected had led on primary vote in every election at which they were successful. 
19 The holding of Assembly Council elections on different days, together with the fact that less 
than half of the latter chamber’s member are elected at any one time means the major focus 
for voters is on candidate quality rather than the state of the government. Another factor 
(mentioned by Newman) is that a large number of ex-Liberal Party members who have 
successfully stood as Independents. Labor-oriented candidates generally represent 
themselves to the voters as such, so, while Labor generally has more official MLCs than the 
Liberal Party, it tends to stand candidates only in the seats it has a realistic chance of 
winning. See Newman, Representation of the Tasmanian People, 170. 
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provide the most fertile ground for comparison, especially as the numbers of 
successful Independents in each state run into double figures.20 Western 
Australia, with eight PR elections for its Legislative Council, also provides 
reasonable comparative evidence.21 Victoria is the least meaningful, because 
it has only had four PR elections for its Legislative Council, and the combined 
tally of Independents elected in both houses during that time stands at five.22 
 
As the table below shows, Independents have a poor success record in the 
PR-elected upper houses as compared with the respective majoritarian lower 
houses. 
 
Table 7.3 Average Rate of Independent Success in State 
Parliaments Since the Introduction of Proportional 
Representation for that State’s Legislative Council 
 
State Lower House Upper House 
South Australia 4.05% 3.03% 
New South Wales 3.84% 1.49% 
Western Australia 2.19% 0.36% 
Victoria 1.25% 0.63% 
Sources: calculations derived from Colin A. Hughes, A Handbook of Australian Government 
and Politics, Vols 3 and 4 and SA, NSW, WA and Victorian state electoral commission 
websites. 
 
Note that South Australia’s first use of PR for its Legislative Council was 1975, 
while for the respective years in other states were 1978 in New South Wales, 




20 Since the introduction of proportional representation for the NSW Legislative Council, 20 
Independent candidates have been elected to the Legislative Assembly, compared to three in 
the Legislative Council. In South Australia the numbers are twelve and three respectively. 
21 In those eight elections, there have been six candidates that won seats as Independents, 
compared to only one in the Legislative Council. 
22 The four successful Independents in the Legislative Assembly were Craig Ingram 
(Gippsland East 2006), Suzanna Sheed (Shepparton 2014-18), Russell Northe (Morwell 2018 
after winning that seat three times as a Nationals candidate), and Ali Cupper (Mildura 2018). 
The sole successful Legislative Council Independent was James Purcell, who won a seat in 
Western Victoria in 2016 under the banner of Vote 1 Local Jobs. It is argued that this label is 
a flag of convenience, even if it is the name of an officially registered political party. 
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A clue as to the reasons for such a poor record for Independents in PR- 
elected Legislative Councils is provided by the results in three jurisdictions 
that have used a PR system to elect a house of government. Tasmania’s 
House of Assembly has had an average rate of Independent election of 
2.34% since the adoption of Hare-Clark, while New South Wales, during its 
brief period of proportional representation in the 1920s, had an election rate of 
4.07% of total parliamentary membership. The ACT Legislative Assembly in 
its short existence has also had a good success rate for Independents 
(4.14%), although no Independent has been elected since 1998, a pattern in 
line with Tasmanian results. 
 
It can thus be noted that only the South Australian Legislative Council 
produced a higher rate of Independent success than any of the three 
jurisdictions just mentioned. This case (caused largely by the incredible level 
of support garnered by Nick Xenophon) should not be allowed to obscure the 
general pattern, which is that, all other things being equal, ticket voting 
disadvantages independents. 
 
Ticket Voting Harms Independents 
The jurisdictions mentioned in Table 7.3 have one thing in common: since 
they adopted proportional representation for their Legislative Councils, voters 
have had, almost without exception, the option of voting for a party ticket 
rather than having to number individual candidates.23 By comparison, 
Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory, the New South Wales Legislative 
Assembly between 1920 and 1925, and the overseas examples of Ireland, 







23 The exceptions are New South Wales between 1978 and 1984 and South Australia in 
1982. 
216  
The above pattern is consistent with the results of Brancati’s analysis 
suggesting that Independents do better in candidate-centred electoral 
systems than party-centred ones.24 The pattern is even more noticeable when 
it is realised that in New South Wales, during its 1920s PR flirtation, and in 
Tasmania, until the 1941 election, party affiliations of candidates were not 
listed on the ballot paper, and all candidates were listed in alphabetical order 
rather than being grouped with other members of the same party.25 It makes 
logical sense that in a situation where voters might struggle, more of them 
would, either by accident or design, vote for an Independent candidate in 
sufficient numbers to get them elected. 
 
This was indeed the case in Tasmania: in pre-1941 elections, Independent 
members comprised an average of 3.61% of House of Assembly membership, 
compared with 2.57% in the 1941-72 period, where candidates of a particular 
(unnamed) party were grouped together, and 0.95% for post-1974 elections, 
when party labels appeared on the ballot paper.26 
 
It should also be noted that the Independent success rate in the Senate was 
slightly higher in the years before 1984, when candidates were grouped by 
party, but party labels were not listed and ticket voting was not allowed 
(1.39%), than in the 1984-2013 period, when the average rate of Independent 
membership was 1.28%. As will be seen, a comparison with Ireland, where 
party affiliations of candidates are listed, but candidates are ordered 
alphabetically rather than by party group, suggests the absence of grouping 
plays a more important role than the presence or absence of party labels. 







24 Brancati, "Winning Alone: The Electoral Fate of Independents Worldwide". 
25 Hogan et al., The People's Choice, 1. 
26 Newman, Hare-Clark in Tasmania, 101. 
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This chapter now returns to the question of why Independents have failed so 
spectacularly in jurisdictions employing a ticket vote or party box in 
comparison to their lower house counterparts. Table 7.4 (below) lists the more 
notable former party-affiliated members who failed in their attempts to win re- 
election to a PR-elected house. In contrast to this long list of failures, there are 
only two ex-party MLCs who enjoyed success as independents: Jim Cameron 
(NSW LC and also former Liberal MLA), elected as an independent 1984 and 
Reg Davies (WA LC (North Metropolitan Region) originally elected as Liberal 
MLC 1989 and elected as an independent in 1993,. By contrast, quite a few of 
the Independents elected at the corresponding Assembly elections had 
originally been elected, or had unsuccessfully sought endorsement, as party 
representatives. Ten of the 12 South Australian lower house MPs elected as 
Independents owe their original election to prior party membership,27 as did 
five of the six Western Australian Independent MLAs,28 but, curiously, only 
three of the 20 New South Wales MLAs elected since the introduction of 


















27 The exceptions are Geoff Brock (Frome, 2009 by-election, 2010. 2014 and 2018) and Don 
Pegler (Mount Gambier, 2010). Of the other ten, seven would have been assisted by a 
sympathy vote acquired through a lost preselection contest. 
28 Only two of these five (Liz Constable and Larry Graham) became Independents because of 
a lost preselection. 
29 They were the (subsequently) well-known Tony Windsor (MP for Tamworth) and Rob 
Oakeshott (MP for Pt Macquarie) and Bruce Duncan (ex-National, Lismore, 1984). It should 
be noted that Independent success in NSW is not just a modern phenomenon: the last 
occasion that there was not at least one Independent elected to the Legislative Assembly was 
1935. See Hughes and Graham, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, 1: 350- 
60. Later editions of Hughes confirm this. 
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Table 7.4 Sitting Members Who Failed to Win Re-election to 
PR-Elected Houses After Success as Party Candidates or in 
Single-Member Electorates 
 




Norman Foster ALP 
(expelled) 
SA Leg. Co. 1975 1982 
Norm Peterson ALP 
(resigned) 




Franca Arena ALP 
(expelled) 
NSW Leg. Co.  1999 
Mark Nevill ALP 
(resigned) 
WA Mining & 
Pastoral 
1983-96 2001 
Tom Helm ALP 
(resigned) 







SA Leg. Co. 1985-93 2002 
Peter Lewis LIB 
(resigned) 




Terry Cameron ALP 
(resigned) 
SA Leg. Co. 1997 2006 
Max Trenorden NAT 
(disendorsed) 
WA Agricultural 2008 2013 
Sources: South Australian results derived from Dean Jaensch, History of South Australian 
Elections, 1857-2006, 2 vols. (Rose Park, SA: State Electoral Office, 2007). NSW result 
derived from Colin A. Hughes, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, Vol. 4;. 
Western Australian results derived from Western Australian Electoral Commission, 2001 
Western Australian State General Election; Results and Statistics. (Perth, 2001). 
 
This chapter now returns to the examination of a case where a former party- 
elected MLC failed to retain his seat as an Independent. Max Trenorden was 
elected as a National MLC for Agricultural Region in 2008 after having served 
as the MLA for Avon over the previous 22 years, and having led the National 
Party between 2001 and 2005. He was disendorsed by the Nationals for the 
2013 election, and he failed to hold his seat as an Independent. His 2013 fate 
provides a telling illustration of why Independent candidates struggle to win 
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seats in STV systems in general and ticket voting STV jurisdictions in 
particular. 
 
The Reasons for Trenorden’s Failure 
At first glance, Trenorden’s respectable 5.26% vote share appeared to have a 
reasonable chance of winning the sixth and last seat. The quota figures for 
Agricultural were: Liberal 2.37, National 2.27, Labor 1.23, Trenorden 0.37, 
Greens 0.27 and Shooters & Fishers 0.23. The first five seats were 
straightforward, but the sixth seat winner was a surprise with the lowest 
polling of these groups, the Shooters & Fishers, eventually winning. They had 
received preferences from most micro parties, most notably Family First and 
Australian Christians. As a result of the latter two, the leading Shooters & 
Fishers candidate, Rick Mazza, was already ahead of Trenorden and all other 
remaining candidates from the main parties. Mazza’s good fortune continued 
when he received good preference flows from the major parties that crossed 
traditional alliances.30 
 
Two aspects of the system that hurt Trenorden would not have been present 
in either a single-member preferential system like the WA Assembly system, 
or a STV system without tickets such as Tasmania. As Chapter Four of this 
thesis showed, Agricultural always has been Labor’s weakest WA region, and 
its 2013 vote of 17.57% was the lowest on record. Yet Labor supporters within 
the region still had a strong incentive to vote for the party knowing it would 
almost certainly win one seat, and with no reason to prefer Trenorden instead. 
 
Under a similar scenario in a single-member district, Labor supporters might 
have been tempted to vote for Trenorden in the knowledge that their own 
candidate could not win. The same principle is true of some others, most 
notably Terry Cameron because, unlike Trenorden he was unable to cultivate 
 
Labor preferences were directed to Mazza ahead of leading Greens candidate Andrew 
Huntley, while both Liberal and National placed Mazza ahead of the candidates of their 
coalition partner. All three parties (and the Greens) placed Mazza ahead of Trenorden. 
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a sympathy vote as a result of a lost preselection.31 In the only case of an 
elected party MLC in WA winning re-election as an Independent (Reg Davies), 
there is little evidence to suggest he enticed supporters of his former party to 
vote for him. Davies appears to have received his support at Labor’s expense. 
 
None of the above is intended to propose that Trenorden would have won a 
seat under a different system, but simply to say that the WA system of 2013 
gave him the least possible chance. It is also clear that Trenorden was hurt, 
as much as Mazza was helped, by the ticket voting system. To cast a valid 
vote, the only options available to voters were to indicate preferences for all 
candidates below a line or to cast a single vote in a group box above the line. 
Such rules create a strong incentive to choose the latter, and thus ensures a 
disciplined preference flow. 
 
Under a Tasmanian system, voters not only have the chance to exhaust their 
votes if they so desire, but any suggestion to voters as to how they should 
mark their preferences must be done away from the polling booth because of 
a ban on such cards at the booths. This not only ensures a less disciplined 
preference flow; it makes uncertain the idea that preferences flow with any 
strength at all. 
 
The fact that WA Legislative Council elections are held concurrently with 
Assembly elections also hurts Independents in a way not realised by most 
commentators. After 2013 results were announced, but before full preference 
distributions were available, it was evident that Mazza could not have finished 
ahead of Trenorden unless Labor preferences had favoured the former. When 
asked why such a decision had been made, deputy Labor leader Roger Cook 
said that Labor preferences were directed to Mazza in exchange for Shooters 
 
 
31 Cameron resigned from the Labor Party in 1998 to pre-empt his certain expulsion after he 
had crossed the floor to vote for the Olsen Government’s legislation to privatise the Electricity 
Trust, in spite of Olsen’s pre-election denial that he intended to do so. Cameron polled a 
derisory 0.2% of the statewide vote when he ran for re-election in 2006. 
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& Fishers’ preferences being directed to Labor ahead of both Liberal and 
National in the lower house seat of Pilbara.32 
 
Given that preference decisions were made in this region that defied 
traditional party alliances, it seems likely that Shooters & Fishers received 
favourable treatment on other preference tickets because of their ability to 
suggest preferences to voters in lower house seats. Because Trenorden was 
running in one upper house seat only, he had no preferences to offer in other 
places, and was therefore much less likely to receive favourable treatment on 
Agricultural Region preference tickets. 
 
The overall history of Western Australian elections provides no evidence to 
suggest that Independents naturally do worse in upper houses. No 
Independents were elected to either chamber in the eight simultaneous 
Assembly/Council elections held between 1965 and 1986. Between 1914 and 
1962, when Assembly and Council elections were almost always held on 
different days,33 the rate of Independent success was slightly higher for the 
Council (5.51%) than for the Assembly (2.94%). The figures for the early 
period should be regarded with some caution: as Black has acknowledged, 
defining an Independent was difficult in those days. 34 
 
South Australia shows a different pattern, but the evidence from the 1910-73 
period is that a single member system helps Independents more than a block 
vote system does rather than suggesting the importance of chamber type. 
Between 1910 and 1933, when both houses used a block vote, the average 




32 Roger Cook MLA, telephone conversation with author, April 2013. At this stage it was not 
known that Labor preferences had favoured Mazza over the Greens as well, although other 
parties’ preference tickers almost certainly rendered this decision immaterial. 
33 On only one occasion (1956) did Assembly and Council elections fall on the same day. No 
Independents were elected to either house that year. 
34 See estimates of numbers in Black, The House on the Hill, 535-38. Black provides a brief 
rundown on p. 125 for Assembly Independents and p. 134 for those in the Council. 
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Council. Between 1936 and 1973, after the adoption of a single member 
system for the Assembly, the average rate of Independent election was a very 
high 8.80% for the former, while for the Council it was just 1.67%. Over the 
entire period of the use of a block vote method for the Council, the average 
rate of Independent success was 2.73%.35 The poor result for Independents 
under the block vote is consistent with results in the Senate during the use of 
such a method between 1901 and 1946, although to a much greater extent for 
the latter chamber.36 
 
For the record, the Victorian results suggest that Independents have done 
better in the Assembly than in the Council by similar margins for the periods 
both before and after the introduction of proportional representation for the 
latter chamber.37 
 
Having established that clear patterns exist in Australia for Independent 
success or failure, this chapter now turns to overseas examples of the use of 
single transferable vote systems to establish if any similar or deviating 
patterns exist. The number of countries that have used or are using such a 
system is quite small, but it will be argued that those jurisdictions show 






35 South Australian percentages have been calculated from statistics provided by Dean 
Jaensch, South Australia State Electoral Office and History Trust of South Australia, History 
of South Australian Elections, 1857-2006, 2 vols. (Rose Park, SA.: State Electoral Office, 
2007). 
36 The average rate of Independent success in Senate elections held between 1901 and 1946 
was 0.56%. For analysis of results in the Senate under block vote methods, see Wright, 
Mirror of the Nation's Mind. The relevant chapter is ‘No Safety in Numbers.’ The average rate 
of Independent success in House elections over the same period was 2.53%. See Hughes 
and Graham, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, 1, 285-379. 
37 During the 1911-2002 period, Victorian Legislative Councillors were chosen at alternate 
elections in single-member provinces, with each province made up of three or more 
neighbouring Assembly districts. During these years, the average rates of Independent 
success were 2.15% for the Assembly and 0.92% for the Council. 
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Independents in STV Systems Overseas: Canada, Ireland, Malta and 
Estonia 
Of these four, Ireland and Malta have the longest continuous use of an STV 
system, having used such a method since gaining independence from the 
United Kingdom. Estonia used STV for just one election (in 1990) before 
reverting to a list system. While Canada has never used proportional 
representation at the national level, two Canadian provinces (Alberta and 
Manitoba) used a combination of proportional and preferential voting for some 
time in the mid-twentieth century. 
 
The record of Independent candidates in Ireland is starkly different from that in 
Malta. In the five Irish elections covered by Adam Carr’s Election Archive, 
Independents have comprised an average 9.09% of parliamentary 
members.38 It is not completely clear whether they did quite as well in the 
earlier period, although figures provided by Farrell for the 1951-92 period 
suggests that Independents did reasonably well in those elections too.39 By 
contrast, no Independent member has been elected to the Maltese parliament 
since 1950. 
 
In his chapter on Malta, Wolfgang Hirczy claims that ”an independent 
candidacy is a virtual invitation to defeat” but unfortunately does not suggest 
any reasons why this is so, other than a suggestion that Maltese voters prefer 
a two-party system.40 Part of the reason, and also for the different picture in 
Ireland, might rest in the differing ballot paper structure as illustrated by 
Farrell.41 In Ireland, candidates are placed in alphabetical order rather than 
being grouped by party: consequently, it is harder for a voter to vote solely for 
candidates of his/her preferred party, thus making it more likely that voters 
will, either by accident or design, vote for an Independent candidate. In Malta, 
 
38 Adam Carr, "Psephos," http://psephos.adam-carr.net. 
39 Farrell, Electoral Systems, 141. 
40 Hirczy and Lane, "Malta: STV in a Two-Party System," 196-97. 
41 Farrell, Electoral Systems, 128-29. 
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on the other hand, candidates of the same party are grouped together on the 
ballot paper, and they are also identified by colours and symbols.42 This 
difference does not provide the whole answer, since the barren run for 
Independents started before the grouping of candidates by party began in 
1976. 
 
With regard to Estonia, it has not been possible to establish the layout of the 
the ballot paper in either the 1990 STV election or the list systems used in 
future elections, but a trend in Independent success, or lack of it, certainly is 
evident. In 1990, unaffiliated candidates comprised 7.62% of elected 
members.43 In the first list election of 1992, not one Independent member was 
elected.44 This pattern has been repeated in elections covered by Carr.45 
 
Preferential Voting and PR Both Help Independents: The Story of Two 
Canadian Provinces 
Before studying the aforementioned provinces in detail, it is worth noting that 
Independent candidates have a poor record in Canadian House of Commons 
elections as well as in the seven Canadian provinces that have used nothing 
but a first past the post system. Since 1935, the starting point of Frank 
Fiegert’s study,46 Independents comprised an average of 0.83% of Commons 
members, compared to 0.92% of the Australian House of Representatives 
since the adoption of preferential voting for the 1919 election. In the seven 
solely FPP provinces, rates of Independent membership range from 0% in 





42 Ibid., 129. Malta Labour Party candidates are identified by a socialist rose, and Nationalist 
candidates by a Maltese falcon. 
43 Pettai, Elections in Estonia 1990-1992, 27. 
44 Ibid., 28. 
45 Carr, "Psephos". 
46 Frank Fiegert, Canada Votes 1935-1988 (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1989). 
Results of recent national and provincial elections have been obtained from official election 
websites and the author has compiled tables combining earlier and later results. 
47 Ibid., 202-03. At the time of Fiegert’s work, the percentage stood at 1.91%, but poor results 
in recent elections have lowered this figure. 
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however, lower than any recorded for any Australian state or territory lower 
house. 
 
The two provinces to use a combination of preferential voting and proportional 
representation, Alberta and Manitoba, provide clear evidence that 
Independents did better under that system than a first past the post one. The 
overall average rates of Independent success in elections held under the 
hybrid system were 11.91% in Manitoba and 8.73% in Alberta, while the 
respective figures for elections held after 1955, when both provinces reverted 
to a first past the post system, were 0.88% for Manitoba and 0.81% for 
Alberta. 
 
The work of Harry Phillips on these two provinces provides conflicting 
evidence on which aspect of the hybrid system helped Independents the 
most.48 In Manitoba, Independents did better in the single-member 
preferential seats (an average of 12.79% of PV-elected seats between 1936 
and 1953) than in the multi-member seats (an average of 8.62% over the 
same period). In Alberta, the reverse pattern occurred: Independents 
represented an average of 16.18% of PR-elected members between 1935 
and 1955, compared to an average of 6.97% in PV elected seats. 
 
These figures suggest, on balance, that the proportional aspect of these 
systems was more helpful to Independents than the preferential ones. This is 
reinforced by the experience of British Columbia, which used single-member 
preferential voting for two elections in 1951 and 1953. With no proportional 






48 Harry Phillips, "Challenges to the Voting System in Canada 1874-1974," Doctoral Thesis 
(University of Western Ontario, 1976). 
49 In all other British Columbia elections, held under a first past the post system, the average 
rate of Independent membership was 0.70%. See Fiegert, Canada Votes 1935-1988. 
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It should be noted, however, that both Manitoba and Alberta had a feature in 
the proportional aspect of their system that seems to assist Independents: 
candidates were listed on the ballot paper in alphabetical order, with no party 
labels listed. It could, of course, be completely coincidental that Independent 
candidates did well at the time these provinces used preferential voting, but as 
the analysis of this chapter shows, and Brancati’s reasoning also suggests, 
there are logical reasons why such a pattern should exist. In the Canadian 
context the only other factors that loom large as sources of independent 
assistance are the geographical size or remoteness of a particular province or 
territory. This factor also applies in Australia to some extent.50 
 
Conclusion 
The evidence from federal and state elections in Australia suggests the 
existence of a distinct pattern in the types of PR systems where Independent 
candidates have relatively high levels of success. Systems with a ticket voting 
option make it harder for Independents to be elected. Only the South 
Australian Legislative Council (due to Nick Xenophon) provides conflicting 
evidence. 
 
The results in Australia (and also Ireland and Canada) would appear to back 
up Brancati’s theory that Independents do better in the more candidate- 
centred systems, regardless of whether they are single-member preferential 
or multi-member proportional. It is clear, too, that preferential voting, in either 
a single-member or multi-member system, helps Independents. Preferential 
voting in single member electorates can be regarded as a Single Transferable 





50 The Yukon Territory, with no history of proportional representation and a very large land 
area, has an average Independent success rate of 3.57%, the highest in the nation. Only 
Saskatchewan, at a very low 0.37%, runs contrary to the pattern of large area provinces 
producing larger numbers of Independents. The Northern Territory, with a land mass and 
population sparsity similar to the Yukon, has an average Independent success rate of 6.51%, 
the highest rate for any Australian jurisdiction. 
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surprising that, in some ways, it produces similar results to those in multi- 
member STV. 
 
Evidence that single-member preferential voting is a better system for 
Independents than single-member plurality is provided by the poor success 
rate for Independents in lower house elections in both the United Kingdom 
and the USA.51 There are two logical reasons why this is so. The distal 
reason, referred to by Brancati,52 is that under preferential voting voters can 
be assured that a vote for an unsuccessful Independent candidate will not be 
wasted, because they can cast a second preference for their preferred 
party.53 The factor assisting Independents at the proximal level is that 
Independent candidates cannot receive preferences from less popular larger 
parties in a first past the post system, while in a preferential system a high-
polling Independent will almost always receive preference assistance from 
such parties, and this will sometimes enable them to defeat the highest polling 
major party candidate. 
 
The Senate appears to show the only instance of Independents doing better 
in the proportional representation house as compared to the single member 
house of the same jurisdiction. Having said that, it should not be a surprise 
that one deviating case should appear to present a more mixed picture. 
Independent candidates can have support that is geographically concentrated 




51 In British elections held since 1922 (the first general election held after the adoption of 
preferential voting in the Australian House of Representatives), Independents comprised an 
average of just 0.48% of Commons members. For results prior to 1992, see F.W.S. Craig, 
British Electoral Facts 1832-1987 (Dartmouth: Parliamentary Research Service, 1989), 24- 
49. Results of recent elections have been added to the table by the author. In the US House 
of Representatives for elections held since 1932 (the earliest election for which data is 
available) Independents comprised an average of 0.32% of the total membership. See 
Gorvin, Elections Since 1945, 378-86. These results run from 1946 to 1988. Results prior to 
1946 and since 1998 have been added by the author. Figures for earlier elections were 
supplied by Malcolm Mackerras. 
52 Brancati, "Winning Alone: The Electoral Fate of Independents Worldwide". 
53 Ibid. 
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It might be thought the main reason why a PR system, especially one based 
on the Single Transferable Vote method, ought to make it easier for an 
Independent to be elected is the same reason that applies to a minor party: 
that it is much easier to gain a quota in a multi-member seat (most commonly, 
in Australia, 12.5%, 14.3% or 16.7%) in a multi-member electorate than it is to 
gain 50% plus one vote in a single-member electorate. There are cases where 
this is true: it is inconceivable that Negus or Xenophon could have hoped to 
be initially elected in a single-member district (but only after they had 
established their credibility with voters at earlier elections). However, there are 
counterbalancing factors that make the situation harder for Independent 
candidates. 
 
A single-member system is much more likely to generate the conditions under 
which Independents can be elected. Because it is the usual practice for major 
parties to select just one candidate per seat, there is always a chance that 
some other candidate of member of the same party will think they deserve the 
preselection more, and contest the seat as an Independent (often unofficially 
aligned to a major party). This can happen regardless of whether the 
Independent was a sitting MP ousted at preselection (as in the case of Paul 
Filing), or a candidate unsuccessfully seeking preselection for a vacant seat 
(such as Liz Constable or Rory McEwen). The Independent candidate will be 
likely to win if he or she can convince enough voters they were hard done by, 
and will nearly always be assisted by the other major party directing its 
preferences to the Independent or, as happens more often at by-elections, not 
contesting the seat at all, leaving the Independent with a relatively free run.54 
Politically astute supporters of the other major party can assist in this process 






54 Liz Constable was assisted in the 1991 Floreat by-election by the Labor Party not standing 
a candidate. 
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As well as the technical factors mentioned earlier there is another reason why 
Independents emerge far less often in STV systems with ticket voting. To 
have been pre-selected in a winnable position in the first place, they have 
usually been good players of machine politics.55 Consequently they are 
unlikely to fall out with their party machine over policy and even less likely to 
lose a preselection. 
 
In a non-ticket STV jurisdiction like Tasmania, a party will choose more 
candidates than it can hope to elect, and rivals within the same party battle it 
out in the electorate while still remaining within the party, so lost preselections 
hardly ever occur. A member can, of course, resign from their party over a 
major policy issue, with former Labor premier Doug Lowe a high profile 
example,56 but it is a much less common occurrence nowadays. 
 
In summary, the patterns as to which conditions assist or hinder the electoral 
prospects of Independent candidates are clear, if somewhat nuanced. Ticket 
voting systems have been shown to be particularly unhelpful to Independent 
candidates, but systems without a ticket vote option, such as the ACT, provide 
opportunities for independent candidates that are found in candidate-centre 
systems. There is also a pattern that, where voters are not required to mark a 
full list of preferences, Independent candidates flourish, which is perhaps 
surprising in the case of single-member districts. In that respect, it would 





55 Some of them play machine politics so well that they become senior factional powerbrokers 
within their parties. Examples of such politicians are former Labor Senators Graham 
Richardson and Mark Arbib (both NSW), former Liberal Senators Noel Crichton-Browne (WA) 
and Nick Minchin (SA) and current Liberal Senator Eric Abetz (Tas.). 
56 Lowe received 28.5% of the overall vote in Franklin, well over two quotas. However Mary 
Willey, who had resigned from the Labor Party on the same day, polled just 5% in Bass and 
lost her seat. See Colin A. Hughes and Don Aitkin, Voting for the Australian State Lower 
Houses 1975-1984 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1987), 274-79. For 
Lowe’s own account of the events that led to his resignation largely over the dams issue, see 
Doug Lowe, The Price of Power: The Politics Behind the Tasmanian Dams Case (Melbourne: 
Macmillan, 1984). 
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harder for minor and micro parties to win seats actually makes elections 
easier for Independent candidates. 
 
The next chapter uses the same techniques to investigate the relative success 
rates for women in proportional and non-proportional systems in Australia 
over the last seventy years. In the middle to late period of the twentieth 
century, advocates for more women as members of parliament had argued 
that the proportional systems enabled women to be elected in higher numbers 
than the non-proportional systems. It will be argued that once the greater 
propensity for minor party candidates to be elected under PR systems is 





Proportional Representation and Women – How Much Help? 
 
 
The previous chapter investigated questions as to whether proportional 
representation systems per se helped or hindered Independent candidates, 
and to which types of PR systems were the most helpful to such candidates. 
This chapter uses similar techniques to answer similar questions in relation to 
the success or otherwise of female candidates under both proportional and 
non-proportional electoral systems. 
 
Many twentieth century writers, both in Australia and overseas, saw a positive 
correlation between proportional representation and greater female 
representation. Figures provided in late 1977 by Malcolm Mackerras showed 
that more women had been elected to the Senate than the House of 
Representatives, although it should be noted that the main purpose of his 
article was to demonstrate that, contrary to the belief of observers with male 
chauvinist inclinations, women candidates were more likely to gain votes for a 
party rather than lose them votes.1 Anne Summers noted a similar pattern six 
years later.2 In a much more comprehensive study published nine years after 
Summers’ work, former Democrat leader Janine Haines, with more case 
studies at her disposal than Mackerras, argued that a direct link existed 
between proportional representation and greater female representation, and 
 
1 Malcolm Mackerras, "Do Women Candidates Lose Votes?," Australian Quarterly 49, no. 3 
(1977), 6-10. An example of such sexist thinking is provided by Hal Colebatch, "Getting at 
Gough Through Supertonk," in Labor to Power: Australia's 1972 election, ed. Henry Mayer 
(Sydney: Angus & Robertson on behalf of the Australasian Political Studies Association, 
1973). On p. 143 Colebatch refers to Fremantle Liberal candidate Erica Lawton, a young 
primary school teacher, as ‘the weakest Liberal candidate imaginable’. In 1969 the Liberal 
Party stood young lawyer and later to be High Court Chief Justice Robert French as its 
Fremantle candidate. The swing to Liberal in 1972 was nearly 2% above the state average 
and the second highest pro-Liberal swing in both the nation and the state. It is fair to argue 
that Colebatch was quite wrong in his assessment of Lawton, but she was never to be seen 
again as a candidate. 
2 Anne Summers, "Holding the Balance of Power? Women in Australian Electoral Politics," in 
Australia at the Polls: The Australian National Elections of 1980 and 1983, ed. Howard 
Penniman (Sydney: American Enterprise Institute, 1983), 124-39. 
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backed up her argument with supporting statistics.3 Haines did concede, 
however, that the better record for women in PR-elected houses might have 
been due to those houses (most notably the Senate) being regarded as less 
important.4 
 
Among overseas scholars, there is some disagreement as to which systems 
of proportional representation assist women candidates, and by how much. In 
a 1981 paper Frank Castles found, in a cross-national study, that the success 
rate of election for women under Single Transferable Vote systems (using 
Ireland and Malta as the only examples), was not much higher than in single- 
member systems, and that list systems produced a much larger success rate 
than either. 5 Figures provided by Bogdanor tend to support Castles’ latter 
argument,6 although Bogdanor also claims that there is a definite link between 
proportional representation systems per se and higher female representation.7 
Rob Salmond made the latter argument more cautiously, but also suggested 
the women seemed to fare slightly worse in semi-proportional STV systems.8 
 
In 1986, Peter Hain took a contrary view: while acknowledging that available 
statistics backed up the claims that systems were more helpful to women than 
STV systems, he argued that the high rate of women elected in certain 
European (especially Scandinavian) parliaments are due to more important 
social factors rather than the use of list systems.9 In 1994, Zimmerman argued 
that STV systems were especially helpful to female candidates, but shortly 






3 Haines, Suffrage to Sufferance. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Francis G. Castles, "Female Legislative Representation and the Electoral System," Politics 
1, no. 2 (1981) 21-27. 
6 Bogdanor, What is Proportional Representation?. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Salmond, "Proportional Representation and Female Parliamentarians". 
9 Hain, Proportional Misrepresentation, 69-70. 
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Malta from his analysis, and suggested its inclusion would alter the picture 
dramatically.10 
 
The fact that such wide-ranging opinions are held by academic observers 
illustrates the difficulty they had in separating institutional and cultural factors. 
Australia provides an almost unique opportunity to separate the two sets of 
factors in two respects. With five Australian jurisdictions holding PR and non- 
PR elections on the same day (very few overseas countries do this), cultural 
factors can almost be completely controlled for. The second is that one 
Australian state (Tasmania) uses proportional representation for its house of 
government, thus providing a control mechanism on the impact of the 
perceived importance of the house, although the fact that House of Assembly 
elections are held on the different day from those of the Legislative Council 
means that it does not provide a completely satisfactory comparison. The fact 
that three state upper houses moved from a non-proportional system to a 
proportional one also enables us to compare women’s ‘before and after’ 
success rates in comparison to the corresponding lower house. 
 
The third and most important factor that makes Australia unique is that the 
majority of its PR houses use a ticket voting option, thus turning their STV 
systems into de facto closed list systems. The most recent changes to Senate 
voting laws have the potential to alter this, but evidence from the first election 
held under the new system is that only Tasmanian voters display enough 
independence to alter the system’s basic nature. 
 
Enid Lakeman attempted some comparative study of Australian conditions 
with the limited material she had at the time.11 With a wider range of data now 
available, this chapter makes a comparative study of Australian jurisdictions 
and argues that once the ability of a proportional representation to assist 
 
 
10 Hirczy, "STV and the representation of women". 
11 Lakeman, Power to Elect, 135. 
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certain minor parties to win seats is taken into account, there exists little 
difference between the systems as to their ability to assist women candidates. 
 
As an aside, it is worth noting, as Hirczy has done, that Australia’s strong 
feminist movement may have boosted female representation in a way that has 
not happened in Ireland and Malta where the feminist movement was 
arguably less effective.12 It is certain that the use of affirmative action quotas 
in the Labor Party since the 1990s have boosted female representation, and 
that the existence of a fundraising body within the party, known as Emily’s 
List, may have boosted female representation more than an list system of PR 
could ever hope to do.13 
 
A Tale of Two Houses in Five Australian Jurisdictions 
Australia’s federal parliament and four of its mainland states combine a single- 
member lower house with a multi-member upper house elected by 
proportional representation. The table below shows the percentage of women 
elected to each house since the adoption of PR for the upper chamber. 
 
Table 8.1 Percentage of Women Elected to Australian 
Jurisdictions Employing Proportional Representation to Elect 







Federal (1949) 9.35% 19.33% 9.98% 
South Australia (1975) 16.86% 23.48% 6.62% 
New South Wales (1978) 9.12% 26.37% 16.25% 
Western Australia (1989) 21.65% 29.50% 7.85% 
Victoria (2006) 33.52% 37.50% 3.98% 





12 Hirczy, "STV and the representation of women". 
13 The Emily of Emily’s List stands for Early Money is Like Yeast, and the body attempts to 
raise campaign funds for Labor women candidates considered to have good parliamentary 
potential. 
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In three jurisdictions, women’s success rates in the upper house exceeded 
those of the lower house by close to 10%, while two states had a considerably 
lower difference. As Haines had suggested, this might also be due to the 
Senate and Legislative Councils being regarded as the less important 
chamber. How can the potential impacts of the two factors be separated? 
 
One way of doing so is to look at results in Tasmania, the only jurisdiction to 
combine the use of a PR-elected lower house with a single-member upper 
house. Because House of Assembly and Legislative Council elections have 
always been held on different days, and also because Council elections are 
periodic rather than general, comparisons of numbers between the two 
houses cannot be completely satisfactory. The method used in this thesis is to 
compare percentages in the Assembly in general election years with those in 
the Council upon the finalisation of Assembly results 
 
Overall averages suggest that proportionality is of greater assistance to 
women than the level of importance of the chamber. In elections held between 
1948 (the first year a woman was elected to either house) and 2018, women 
made up an average of 1.91% of Assembly members, compared to 11.47% 
for the Council. These averages disguise the fact that in the earlier part of this 
period, women had a better record in the Council. Three women had been 
elected to the Council (two of them still incumbents) by the time the first 
woman was elected to the Assembly in 1955, and this in spite of a 
combination of franchise and property laws that made it very difficult for 
women to be elected to the Council.14 Only after the 1979 Assembly election 





14 Only property owners and war veterans were allowed to stand for election, and women 
could only own property if it had been bequeathed to them by a male relative. The first woman 
elected to the Council, Margaret McIntyre, qualified for election as a result of her service as a 
nurse during World War II. She died later that year. Labor Legislative Councillors Lucy 
Grounds (1951) and Phyllis Benjamin (1952) were joined in the Assembly by Amelia ‘Millie’ 
Best and Mabel Miller (both Liberal) in 1955. 
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were two brief periods (1958-9 and 1962-4) when, due to the filling of casual 
vacancies, Assembly women outnumbered their Council counterparts.15 
 
The more rapidly improving female fortunes in the Assembly after 1982 may 
have something to do with the recent success of Greens candidates in that 
chamber, a question that will be investigated later in conjunction with analysis 
of Greens/Democrat success in other PR-elected jurisdictions. In the 
meantime it is worth investigating whether the greater level of success for 
women in mainland upper houses is simply a recent phenomenon or one that 
was evident in the days of upper houses being elected by non-proportional 
methods. 
 
The federal sphere is not useful in this regard, as there was only one woman 
elected to each chamber prior to the introduction of PR in 1949. New South 
Wales has also been omitted from the table below because of the indirect 
method used for the Legislative Council prior to 1978. 
 
Table 8.2 Percentage of Women Elected to State Houses in 
Years Before Proportional Representation for the Legislative 
Council 
 
Jurisdiction Assembly Council Difference 
Victoria 9.55% 11.89% 2.34% 
South Australia 3.60% 6% 2.4% 
Western Australia 3.04% 8.59% 5.55% 
Source: Calculations made by author based on official electoral commission returns. 
 
While women did less well in the Council than in the Assembly in all three 





15 The women so elected were Best who replaced her deceased husband in late 1958 but 
was defeated in 1959, and Lynda Heaven (Labor) who replaced a resigning male colleague in 
1962 but was defeated in 1964. In each case the said member combined with Miller to 
outnumber Benjamin,Grounds having been defeated in early 1958. See Newman, 
Representation of the Tasmanian People, 174-75. 
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The extent to which women’s improved record in PR-elected houses is 
influenced by those houses’ ability to facilitate the election of Democrat and 
Greens members can be measured by omitting those members from the 
overall tally and comparing the remaining numbers of women elected in the 
two types of house. The table below shows two distinctly different patterns. 
 
Table 8.3 Women as a Percentage of Non-Democrat/Greens 





PR House Difference 
Federal (1977) 15.52% 25.12% +9.62% 
New South Wales (1978) 8.83% 23.78% +14.95% 
South Australia (1979) 19.38% 22.50% +3.12% 
Tasmania (1982) 19.01% 21.36% +2.35% 
Western Australia (1989) 21.65% 27.06% +5.41% 
Victoria (2006) 33.43% 34.45% +1.02% 
Source: Calculations based on official electoral commission returns. 
 
In both Victoria and Western Australia the difference is actually smaller for the 
PR period than for the non-PR period once the success of Democrat/Greens 
candidates under the former are factored out. In South Australia the difference 
is slightly larger for the PR-period, possibly due to the fact that more of 
(especially) the Democrats’ leading figures were men. On the other hand 
women have continued to do better in the Senate and New South Wales 
upper house even after Democrat/Greens exclusion. And the difference grew 
bigger in Tasmania in favour of the PR-elected House of Assembly. 
 
From this it might be surmised that PR-elected houses give women a slightly 
better chance than do single-member houses. However, as results from the 
first proportional representation election in Western Australia show, such 




The Impact of the Move to Proportional Representation in Western 
Australia 
As explained in Chapter Four, Western Australia’s Legislative Council was 
elected via a single-member system until the 1989 election, with simultaneous 
half-Council/Assembly elections applying from 1965. As Table 8.2 showed, 
women had a better record in the Council at that time, but the pre-1983 
figures showed an even starker pattern. Only one woman (Liberal June Craig, 
1974-83) sat in the Assembly, while five sat in the Council during this 
period.16 It was the 1983 election (when the ALP’s Brian Burke was elected 
premier) that resulted in the first influx of multiple women into the Assembly. 
However it was not until after the 1986 election (at which future Labor premier 
Carmen Lawrence was elected) that a higher percentage of women sat in the 
Assembly (10.52%) than in the Council (8.82%).17 
 
The adoption of proportional representation for the Council at this election 
coincided with major boundary changes to for Assembly seats. These 
changes, along with the retirement of Burke and Deputy Premier Mal Bryce 
during the 1986-89 period, ensured that, especially on the Labor side, there 
was a larger than normal shuffling of sitting members between houses and 
regions. The overall impact of these moves and the election itself was that 
women comprised 15.79% of Assembly members after the election, compared 
to 14.71% of Council members. 
 
On the surface, these percentages point against the idea that proportional 




16 Three of these (Ruby Hutchison, Lyla Elliott and Margaret McAleer) served in the Council 
for over ten years. For their career records, see David Black, Legislative Council of Western 
Australia: Membership Register, Electoral Law and Statistics 1890-1989 (Perth: Western 
Australian Parliamentary History Project, 1989). 
17 The last time this had occurred was the period between 1936 (when Florence Cardell- 
Oliver was first elected to the Assembly) and 1954 (when Ruby Hutchison was first elected to 
the Council). 
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very much the exception to the rule for Australia at the time.18 The enormity of 
the changes made do, however, beg the obvious, if hypothetical, question: 
How different would the result have been if the old Council voting system 
been maintained, and only minor tinkering been made to Assembly 
boundaries? 
 
We can say for certain that two of the five women elected in 1989 (Beryl 
Jones and Margaret McAleer) would still have had their seats because they 
had been elected in 1986 and would not have faced the voters under the old 
system. Kay Hallahan (Labor), the other female incumbent, would almost 
certainly have stood for, and retained, the South-East Metropolitan seat she 
had won in 1983.19 
 
Of the two new Council members, it is likely that Muriel Patterson (Liberal, 
South West Region) would have won a seat under the old system replacing 
retiring Liberal MLC Colin Bell in South West Province, but it is almost certain 
that Cheryl Davenport (Labor, South Metropolitan Region) would not have 
inherited the safe South Metropolitan Province seat left vacant by the 
retirement of Burke Government Minister Des Dans. 
 
It is arguable that the seat might have been given to Labor rising star Carmen 
Lawrence, although it could also possibly have gone to a Labor MLA residing 
closer to the area in Bill Thomas or Norm Marlborough. Whatever might have 
happened in Labor’s internal workings, It is fair to say that the move to 
proportional representation might, at best, have enabled the election of one 
more woman to the Legislative Council, but, as analysis of the particular case 





18 Haines, Suffrage to Sufferance, 143-45. 
19 The overall swing against Labor was, on best estimates, a smidgin over 6%, and only one 
of the seats contained in the old province recorded a swing remotely close to the 9.5% margin 
Hallahan had enjoyed in 1983. 
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Cheryl Davenport’s Unlikely Success 
Davenport’s selection at number three on Labor’s South Metropolitan ticket 
hardly looked like a guarantee of success, and the final primary vote figures 
(in the era before Antony Green had invented a preference calculator) would 
have given her little confidence. Labor secured 43.42% (2.61 quotas), Liberal 
41.84% (2.51 quotas), Grey Power 4.94% (0.30 quotas) and the Democrats 
4.29% (0.26 quotas). The only other parties to stand were the Green-tinged 
Alternative Coalition (0.21 quotas) and National (0.13 quotas).20 
 
The exclusion of the National’s lead candidate gave Liberal number three 
candidate Diane Airey a small lead over Davenport, and the subsequent 
exclusion of the leading Alternative Coalition candidate gave the Democrats’ 
leading candidate, Peter Nettleton, a comfortable lead over Grey Power 
candidate, Neville Crilly. At this point, pre-election preference negotiations 
became crucial. 
 
The Democrats knew that because of their historical weakness in Western 
Australia, they would require preference assistance from other minor parties. 
They proposed a direct preference swap with (and to), Grey Power, a newly 
arrived party claiming to represent older voters. When that party declined the 
offer and directed its preferences to the Liberal Party instead, the Democrats 
retaliated by placing Labor ahead of Grey Power in all its preference tickets. 
 
Had Grey Power directed its preferences to the Democrats, their 7,061 ticket 
votes would have gone to Nettleton, putting him ahead of both Airey and 
Davenport (he had trailed the latter by just 5,192 votes at the previous count), 
leaving Davenport as the lowest polling candidate and ensuring a win to 





20 Information relating to vote shares and preference distributions have been obtained from 
Black, Legislative Council of Western Australia, 387-88. 
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What actually happened, though, was that while Crilly’s preferences gave 
Airey a large temporary lead over Davenport, the equally strong flow of 
Democrat preferences to Labor gave Davenport a win over Airey by 2,716 
votes. Hence Davenport’s success was eventually determined by the decision 
of a new minor party (Grey Power) as to which of two other parties it 
preferred, and not because of gender factors. 
 
Davenport’s gender was, however, immensely helpful to her in 1993, as the 
Labor Party had adopted an affirmative action quota (initially a requirement 
that women be preselected for 35% of winnable seats).21 She was therefore 
able to secure the second spot on the Labor ticket for the 1993 election, while 
Garry Kelly was placed in the difficult third spot, a position from which he was 
unable to hold his seat. No other male sitting member was relegated to an 
unwinnable seat, so it is a fair guess to say that Kelly would not have been so 
relegated if Davenport had not won a seat in 1989. 
 
In spite of this clearly random event (Grey Power’s preference decision) 
boosting the overall level of female representation in the Council, it was not 
until after the 2001 election that a larger percentage of women sat in that 
chamber than in the Assembly and the pattern persisted until the 2017 
election. 
 
Even allowing for the unusual nature of Davenport’s win and its aftermath, 
Labor’s adoption of affirmative action ought, in theory, to have reduced the 
difference in female representation in PR-elected and non-PR houses. Does 





21 For an explanation of how the affirmative action process works, see Margaret Reynolds, 
The Last Bastion: Labor Women Working Towards Equality in the Parliaments of Australia 
(Sydney: Business & Professional Publishing, 1995), 159. See also Louise Chappell, 
Gendering Government: Feminist Engagement with the State in Australia and Canada 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002), 51-83. This chapter compares, among other things, the rate 
of women’s election in Australia with that of Canada and the USA. 
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The Impact of Affirmative Action in South-eastern Mainland States 
Labor adopted an affirmative action policy four elections before Victoria 
adopted proportional representation for its Legislative Council, and it is 
interesting that for those four elections, the difference in female representation 
between the houses was even larger than it was in the four elections held 
since PR’s adoption. The average rate of female representation between 
1992 and 2006 in the Council was 26.14%, compared to 20.45% for the 
Assembly over the same period. This gap of 5.69% is significantly larger than 
3.98% difference since PR adoption. 
 
Both New South Wales and South Australia held many Legislative Council PR 
elections before Labor adopted an affirmative action policy, so overall 
percentages in those states are influenced by cultural factors still evident in 
the 1970s and 1980s that often frustrated women’s parliamentary ambitions. 
Even for the post 1992 period, however, women have had an easier time 
winning seats in the Legislative Council (an average of 29.87% of elected 
members) than in the House of Assembly (26.75%). The differences in New 
South Wales are even larger: an average of 27.21% for the Council but only 
15.85% for the Assembly. The difference is small in South Australia when 
Democrat and Greens MLCs are excluded, but in New South Wales the 
difference remains just above 10%. 
 
The imbalance in favour of the Council in South Australia has reappeared in 
recent elections. Labor’s landslide defeat in 1993 was, paradoxically, very 
helpful to their female candidates because there were far more vacant 
winnable seats at the 1997 election than usual. Consequently there was a 
higher percentage of women in the Assembly for the following three terms 
reaching a high of 8.90% in 2006. The slow decline in Labor support over the 
next three elections caused this pattern to reverse, notwithstanding the fact 
that only one woman was elected to the Council in 2014. 
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New South Wales stands out as the clear case of women doing far better in 
the Council, but even here there are clear signs of improvement. In 2011 the 
ALP suffered a defeat every bit as bad as that suffered in 1993 by Labor in 
South Australian, and there were similarly a larger than usual number of 
vacant winnable seats available at the next election. As a result, after the 
2015 election, women won more seats in the Assembly (29.03%) than in the 
Council (23.81%) where in previous elections women’s Assembly 
representation had always been at least 10% lower than that enjoyed by 
women in the Council. 
 
Two more questions arise in relation to matters investigated in this chapter. 
One is whether there is any evidence to suggest that women do better (or 
worse) in jurisdictions where parties can rank order their candidates (such as 
South Australia), and those where candidates of the same party compete in 
the electorate (such as Tasmania.) Results obtained suggest a mixed pattern. 
 
A comparison of results in jurisdictions over similar time frames suggests that 
women fared less well in Tasmania than each mainland upper house using a 
quasi list system of proportional representation.22 The difference between the 
Senate and Tasmania is even larger: women comprised an average 19.33% 
of elected senators since 1949, compared to 11.91% for Tasmania over the 
same period. 
 
When Australian Capital Territory results since 1995 (the first election where 
Hare-Clark was used) are compared with the three mainland states then using 
PR, women fared better in the ACT. The difference ranged from 2.94% to 
8.83%. The rate of female success in Victoria in the four elections since the 





22 In each case the comparison with Tasmania begins at the election at which the particular 
state first used PR, and differences range from 2.39% to 5.06%. 
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ACT across its last four elections. The ACT average of 34.31% was, however, 
slightly lower than the 34.76% rate in the Senate over the same period. 
 
These mixed results are not altogether surprising. It might be the case that 
STV systems without ticket voting, in making it slightly harder for Democrat 
and Greens candidates to win, have had a mildly reductive effect on female 
representation in some places, though not in the ACT: the average rate of 
female success under Hare-Clark is higher than for its first two elections under 
a (modified) d’Hondt) system (29.41%). 
 
The notion that women do better in systems where they do not have to lobby 
directly for voters not only sounds insulting: it would only make logical sense if 
there was evidence that, all other things being equal, women generally did 
less well than male candidates in such circumstances. Mackerras found little 
evidence to support that idea forty years ago, and in an era where female 
members are far more common, there is little evidence for it now. 
 
The second (as yet) unanswered question is the extent to which women’s 
chances of election in New Zealand have been improved by that country’s 
move to a Mixed Member Proportional system for the 1996 election. It would 
be an over-simplification to say that because the percentage of women in 
parliament rose from 21.2% at the last plurality election in 1993 to 26.7% in 
1996, the move to MMP assisted women. It would also be misleading to 
reflect on the even lower average across the history of plurality elections, 
since clearly the social factors that discouraged women’s parliamentary 







23 The first election of a woman to New Zealand’s parliament was in 1933, ten years before 
Australia replicated. See Haines, Suffrage to Sufferance, 73. 
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It is reasonable to compare New Zealand women’s success rate with that of 
women in the Australian parliament. The influence of cultural factors is broadly 
similar and there are parallels in that certain minor parties are more likely to 
choose female candidates (in New Zealand’s case the Alliance and the 
Greens).24 
 
In the eight elections held under MMP, women have on average have been 
elected to 33.23% of seats. This compares favourably with the Australian 
House of Representatives (23.81%), though slightly less favourably with the 
Senate (34.76%). When the success of parties less inclined to pre-select 
women is examined, the average becomes 31.34%, thus concurring, if at a 
somewhat weaker level, with trends in Australian jurisdictions. 
 
Conclusion 
It would seem evident from the above that the move to proportional 
representation gave an additional boost to women hoping to enter parliament 
a somewhat higher level of success than their traditional levels in upper 
houses, possibly due to the perceived lesser importance of those houses. The 
obvious ability of PR systems to assist minor parties more likely to select 
women for winnable seats (such as the Democrats and the Greens) appears 
to be the key reason, since in two jurisdictions (Western Australia and 
Victoria) that advantage reduces to pre-PR levels when such parties’ MPs are 
factored out of the equation. 
 
There is also evidence to suggest that the imbalance between PR and non- 
PR houses has narrowed since the Labor Party’s adoption of affirmative 
action quotas, although not by enough to alter the overall picture. It remains to 





24 All results from New Zealand elections after and including 1996 can be found at 
www.electionresults.govt.nz. 
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such an imbalance disappears altogether, beyond perhaps the likely higher 







This thesis has examined the outcomes obtained in the seven jurisdictions 
currently using proportional representation to elect one of their houses, 
comparing results in terms of the proportionality and numbers of effective 
parties with each other, as well as with results obtained with the single- 
member jurisdiction within the same parliament and with the few available 
examples of other countries that elect (or at one stage did elect) their national 
or provincial parliaments via a single transferable vote method. Such 
parliaments have employed a wide range of district magnitudes and rules 
relating to ballot paper numbering to elect their proportional house, meaning 
that none of the seven jurisdictions elected via this method are completely 
alike, although all of them share at least one common feature with some other 
jurisdiction. 
 
Within this wide range of conditions, and despite occasional exceptions, a 
number of conclusions can nevertheless be made about general patterns. 
They are: 
 
1. District magnitude remains the decisive factor in determining overall 
proportionality, with conventional wisdom that the higher the 
magnitude, the more proportional the system, remaining generally 
valid, notwithstanding some deviations around the DM5-7 and 10-12 
clusters. However, ballot paper numbering requirements are a more 
important factor in determining the number of effective parties that 
emerge, especially at the parliamentary level. In general the more 
control voters have over the distribution of their second and later 
preferences, the smaller the number of effective parties. 
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2. Five-member districts disadvantage the Greens in comparison to their 
results in six- or seven-member districts. Both Labor and Liberal tend to 
be over-represented under such conditions, although neither secures a 
significant advantage over the other. 
 
3. Even-numbered district magnitudes in general, and six-member 
divisions in particular, provide an inbuilt advantage to the Liberal and 
National Parties, an advantage only slightly diminished by the 
preference harvesting behaviour of the minor and micro parties. While 
Labor was often disadvantaged in such circumstances in the past, the 
changes made to Senate voting rules appear to have removed this 
disadvantage, although we will need to see the results of the 2019 half- 
Senate election to be sure. 
 
4. DM 7 is the point at which the Greens achieve relative parity with both 
the major parties in vote and seat share comparisons. 
 
5. While proportional systems facilitate the existence of minor parties, 
certain circumstances (largely the existence of a ticket voting option) 
enable some of them to be over-represented. 
 
6. Some significant deviating cases exist in Australia in relation to both 
patterns referred to above. 
 
7. By contrast with minor parties, Independents generally do worse under 
proportional systems than under single-preferential ones, and they 
perform especially badly in STV systems employing a ticket vote. Nick 
Xenophon is the only significant exception to the rule. 
 
8. There is a general pattern for women to be more successful in houses 
elected by proportional representation than the corresponding single 
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member house, although this pattern has diminished over time, at least 
in part due to the Labor Party’s affirmative action policy. A key 
structural reason for the pattern is that proportional representation 
enhances the election prospects of minor parties (most notably the 
Greens and, in the past, the Democrats) that are more inclined to 
endorse women in winnable seats. When members of these parties 
are factored out, the imbalance is diminished further or disappears 
altogether. 
 
A key question remains to be answered in relation to conclusion one. Two 
jurisdictions (the Senate and South Australia) have moved to give voters an 
easier option to choose their own preferences, and according to the argument, 
made it harder for smaller parties to be elected. Has this weakened the 
democratic legitimacy of the system because the power of the big party cartel 
has increased, as Economou has argued,25 or increased its legitimacy by 
enabling voters to give only the preferences they wish and are aware they are 
giving, as Antony Green no doubt believes?26 
 
This thesis leans towards the latter view. If it were simply a case of the larger 
parties gaining more seats as a result of greater financial resources not 
possessed by smaller parties, there might be something unfair and 
undemocratic about a system that allows smaller party preferences to exhaust 
or drift back to a larger party. But more to the point, what the pre-2016 Senate 
and Western Australian systems and, to a lesser extent, the current Victorian 
system, allow is for minor and micro parties to achieve a highly disciplined 
preference flow without the need to supply election day labour to achieve 
such a result via the handing out of how to vote cards. It is evident from 
preference distributions in single member district elections held on the same 
day that even the larger parties, who usually staff polling booths with 
 
 
25 Nick Economou, "An Instance of Cartel Behaviour". 
26 Green, Is it Time for a Fundamental Review of the Senate’s Electoral System? 
250  
volunteers handing out how to vote cards, do not achieve such a disciplined 
preference flow in practice. It seems unfair and undemocratic if a much 
smaller party unable to marshal this level of staffing can achieve this as a 
result of the quirks of the electoral system. 
 
Results from the 2018 Victorian Legislative Council election show that 
preference whisperers can still make their presence felt in spite of less 
onerous requirements for casting a below the line vote. It appears likely that 
ten candidates outside the Labor, Liberal, National and Greens parties will be 
elected compared with five in 2014, and this in spite of what appears to be a 
higher percentage of voters casting a below the line vote. 
 
On a positive note, the fact that such a phenomenon is happening suggests 
that more people are thinking and voting independently rather than just 
following the suggestions of their preferred political party. If this trend 
continues, then some good has emerged from the ‘outrageous’ 2013 Senate 
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State/Territory Above the line Below the line 
New South Wales 97.9 2.1 
Victoria 97.3 2.7 
Queensland 97.0 3.0 
Western Australia 96.2 3.8 
South Australia 93.5 5.4 




Northern Territory 91.9 8.1 
Australia 96.5 3.5 
Source: Mackerras, Malcolm; Submission by Malcolm Mackerras to the Joint Standing 








State/Territory Above the line Below the line Change in BTL 
Vote 2013-2016 
New South Wales 94.6 5.4 +3.1 
Victoria 94.7 5.3 +2.6 
Queensland 93.9 6.1 +3.1 
Western Australia 94.5 5.5 +1.7 
South Australia 91.5 8.5 +3.1 
Tasmania 71.9 28.1 +17.8 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
84.8 15.2 -4.7 
Northern Territory 91.4 8.6 +0.5 
Australia 93.5 6.5 +3.0 
Source: Mackerras, Malcolm; Submission by Malcolm Mackerras to the Joint Standing 




Quota shares of successful micro party candidates, 2014 
Victorian Legislative Council Election 
 
 
Region Party/Group Quotas Primary 
Vote Rank 
Eastern Victoria Shooters & Fishers 0.15 6th 
Northern Metro Sex Party 0.17 5th 
Northern Victoria Shooters & Fishers 0.21 5th 
Western Metro Democratic Labor 0.15 6th 
Western Victoria Vote 1 Local Jobs 0.08 11th 





Quota shares for successful micro party candidates, 2018 
Victorian Legislative Council Election 
 
 
Region Party/Group Quotas Party Vote 
Rank 
Eastern Metro Transport Matters 0.04 12th 
Eastern Victoria SFF 0.30 4th 
Northern Metro Reason 0.20 6th 
Northern Victoria Liberal Democrat 0.23 6th 
Northern Victoria DHJP 0.29 5th 
South East Metro Liberal Democrat 0.04 10th 
Southern Metro Sustainable Aus. 0.08 9th 
Western Metro DHJP 0.41 4th 
Western Victoria DHJP 0.27 4th 
Western Victoria Animal Justice 0.17 6th 





Average vote and highest vote share for Communist Party 
candidates, House of Representatives elections 1949-66 
 
Election Year Average Vote per 
seat 
Highest Vote Share 
1949 3.17% 9.58% (Hunter) 
1951 4.39% 10.45% (West Sydney) 
1954 3.35% 7.66% (Cook) 
1955 4.70% 15.28% (Port Adelaide) 
1958 3.26% 7.63% (East Sydney) 
1961 2.91% 6.99% (Grayndler) 
1963 3.11% 7.23% (Bonython) 
1966 3.33% 8.33% (Melbourne Ports) 
Source: Hughes, Colin A., and B. D. Graham. Voting for the Australian House of 





Party affiliation and vote share for Fred Paterson, Queensland 
Legislative Assembly and House of Representatives elections 1926-50 
 
 








1926 Qld LA Port Curtis Ind Labor 10.73% NA Lost 
1929 Qld LA Paddington Communist 28.36% NA Lost 
1932 Qld LA Toowoomba Communist 4.22% NA Lost 
1935 Qld LA Bowen Communist 15.63% NA Lost 
1937 Fed H of R Herbert Communist 21.17% NA Lost 
1938 Qld LA Bowen Communist 29.33% NA Lost 
1940 Fed H of R Herbert Independent 18.29% NA Lost 
1941 Qld LA Bowen Communist 47.34% 47.34% Lost 
1943 Fed H of R Herbert Communist 34.2% 38.3% Lost 
1944 Qld LA Bowen Communist 44.51% NA Won 
1947 Qld LA Bowen Communist 39.34% NA Won 
1950 Qld LA Whitsunday Communist 12.7% NA Lost 
Source: Hughes, Colin A., and B. D. Graham. Voting for the Queensland Legislative 
Assembly, 1890-1964. Canberra: Dept. of Political Science, Research School of Social 





Distribution of Labor preferences in Barambah and Lockyer, 










Barambah 1,599 39.98 864 21.55 1,546 38.56 
Lockyer 2 678 45.39 976 16.54 2,247 38.02 
Source: Electoral Commission Queensland: Queensland Election 1998 (publication details 





Hypothetical results in Blair under optional preferential 
voting, 1998 federal election 
 
 






Clarke (ALP) Exhausted 
Actual at 
2nd last 
26,525 21,665 19974 0 
Clarke 
Excluded 
+4,304 +7,986 Excluded +7,684 






Hypothetical Result 2: Lockyer distribution 
 







26,525 21,665 19,974 0 
Clarke 
Excluded 
+3303 +9066 Excluded +7,605 





Source: Australian Electoral Commission: Election 98, Divisional Results Queensland, p. 10. 
